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NATO cohesion over cyber necessary to confront Russia-China threat

Odgaard 4/25 (Liselotte Odgaard, Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and a non-resident Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on Chinese foreign, security and defence policy, Indo-Pacific security, and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Aarhus University in Denmark. “NATO’s China Role: Defending Cyber and Outer Space,” The Washington Quarterly, 4/25/2022, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2059145) -LH

Rather than highlighting the need for a division of labor within NATO, the 2022 invasion has highlighted that Russia’s appetite for threatening Europe with military action is closely entwined with its long-standing strategic cooperation with China. Intelligence reports that China told Russia in February 2022 not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing testify to the closely orchestrated Chinese-Russian approach to the West.18 Moscow and Beijing are both strategic opponents of the US, a shared status that has spurred them to coordinate their separate geostrategic priorities in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, forging unison pushback against what they consider Western encroachments on their spheres of interest.19 The poorer than expected performance of the Russian armed forces in its 2022 war with Ukraine has pushed China to try to appear neutral. Nevertheless, China has joined Russia in opposing further enlargement of NATO, and in the Indo-Pacific, Russia has joined China in opposing Taiwanese independence.20 It would be wise for Europe and the US to plan for Sino-Russian geostrategic coordination to continue unless more clear evidence that China will abandon Russia is presented. One thing is certain: China will work with the partners that help it advance a Sinocentric international order based on authoritarian regimes. And to counter this development, Europe and the United States need to devise effective mechanisms for joint responses to Beijing as well as to Moscow.

A US-European division of labor is not likely to help NATO develop tools to defend itself against threats from China and Russia. The lack of electronic warfare in Russia’s war with Ukraine has revealed gaps between its concept of operations and the tactics of the Ukrainian military. As demonstrated in prior operations in Syria and the Donbas, Russia will adapt and learn in the short and long term. For example, Russia can be expected to improve its electromagnetic spectrum management in order to enhance its planning and management of forces on the battlefield. Meanwhile, China is watching the performance of the parties involved in the war with a view to update its cyber and space capabilities as well as strategic concepts. As a consequence, both Russian and Chinese threats will continue to increasingly emerge in the cyber and space domains. This calls for global and functional defenses rather than an exclusive geographical focus. It is more important than ever to design NATO for a future where threats toward transatlantic security are global and requires a unified response.

Even if the balance of forces between the United States and Europe is asymmetrical, the response to Chinese and Russian threats should be joint. In a perfect world, NATO would respond as it did in 1966 when France filed for divorce: redefine the purpose of the alliance by expanding it. In 1967, the Harmel report added to the original purpose of defending member states with the management of European security writ large.21 Ideally, in 2022 a similar exercise would globalize NATO’s purpose to encompass defending the transatlantic member states against threats from China in all domains and across geographic regions.22 However, since 1967, US security interests have moved away from Europe and the post-Soviet sphere and put China and the Indo-Pacific region at the top of the US list of priorities. Washington is not likely to volunteer to spend time and resources renegotiating the fundamental political and military transatlantic relationship. If NATO took on a similar effort, it is likely to produce institutional disintegration and paralysis.23 Instead, NATO must put existing resources and mechanisms to good use to demonstrate its relevance for addressing the China threat in all domains and in the Indo-Pacific. The strategic question for NATO should not be whether, but how?

NATO cannot continue to stand by idly while its member states are redirecting their foreign and defense policies to take into account Chinese encroachments on European security without losing credibility as an adequate guarantor of transatlantic security. It is not only the US that has turned its attention toward the Indo-Pacific; NATO member states such as the UK and France, as well as the EU, are recognized as significant contributors to Indo-Pacific security efforts in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. The US encourages NATO to continue to focus on committing more attention to the Indo-Pacific, an indication that so far the alliance has been largely absent from security initiatives in the region.24 NATO invariably goes unmentioned when deterrence of China is on the security agenda of major powers. Engaging NATO in US and European naval diplomacy would allow NATO visibility on China issues, but it would also meet with insurmountable resistance from significant US partners in the Indo-Pacific, such as France and Germany. If European or US vessels and aircraft were to fly the NATO flag when participating in freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to counter China’s claims to historic waters and demands for prior notification of military vessels, Beijing is likely to respond in line with its current position of issuing warnings and pursuing such military vessels.25 The fact that relaxed prospective responses from Beijing seem highly plausible diagnoses the problem: NATO is no longer a cause for concern for China, who does not believe the alliance can agree on a collective transatlantic response to Beijing’s security challenges.

Although NATO visibility may be desirable, it may also not be the best place to start working on increasing the alliance’s role in getting into the game of deterrence of China. French and German resistance toward allowing NATO to play a role in the Indo-Pacific far from the European continent stems from entrapment concerns. Such resistance to the alliance’s involvement indicates that NATO has to prove capable of combining US and European views on how to deal with China threats without increasing the entrapment potential in the eyes of key European allies.

Cyber and space is a promising arena for NATO to address China challenges by building member state resilience. Like the air and sea domains, as areas that belong to no one state and which provide access to much of the globe, they form part of the global commons. Command of the commons has been the key enabler of the US global position of power for many decades.26 However, China wields a sufficient range of sea, air, cyber, and space capabilities such that the global commons is now a contested zone. In contrast to the sea and air domains, cyber and space are sparsely regulated. This lack of international norms enhances the risk of conflict based on misperception, making NATO cooperation pertinent. Adversarial activities toward the US and Europe in the cyber and space domain threaten transatlantic security. These come not just from China, but also from other adversaries such as Russia and Iran. Mechanisms for addressing these challenges in the military sector are essentially generic and not, at least in their basic design, established with a particular country in mind. Thus, cyber and space provide an avenue for NATO to contribute significantly to deterrence of China without having to combat major internal resistance. NATO would also benefit from long-standing US-EU cooperation on cyber and space issues.27 Chinese-Western hybrid war is accelerated by cyber warfare – extinction

Fleming et al. 18 – (T. Casey Fleming, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of BLACKOPS Partners Corporation, Eric L. Qualkenbush, Board of Directors of BLACKOPS Partners Corporation, and Anthony M. Chapa, Board of Directors of BLACKOPS Partners Corporation; "The New Global Competitive Model Based on Cyber and Asymmetrical Hybrid Warfare"; Army Cyber Institute / Cyber Defense Review; https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/new-global-competitive-model-based-cyber-and-asymmetrical-hybrid-warfare; 2-5-2018, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-AZ

Imagine if Pearl Harbor had been attacked and there had been no response from Washington.

This is the actual case today due to a highly sophisticated, mature, and stealth strategy perpetrated against the United States (US) by advanced nation-state military methods leveled at every sector and organization in our society. This includes private sector businesses, all government agencies, the military, and academia - every US organization operating with innovation, intellectual property, or sensitive data. The world is in significant conflict requiring the private sector, US government, and military to deliberately confront this national crisis or become permanently irrelevant. It is no longer “business as usual.”

Over the past three decades, as the US military trained in conventional, nuclear, and counterinsurgency warfare, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged and perfected over forty methods of warfare intended to permanently destabilize and weaken the US both economically and militarily. At the same time, China rapidly grew its economy and military without the required time or investment in innovation. The result is that the US is hemorrhaging its economic strength and relevance at the rate of $5 trillion in lost total value each year, or one-third of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

General (Ret.) Keith Alexander, former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and Commander of US Cyber Command, referred to China’s theft of American innovation and intellectual property as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”

Over time, a weakened US economy directly reduces the strength and effectiveness of the US military. Further, when a country is manipulated by an adversary to lose one-third of the value of its economy each year, it is at war. What does this mean for US citizens? A cumulative and shocking permanent reduction in quality of life to those organizations that "don't know what they don't know."

Asymmetrical Hybrid Warfare

Clear and Present Existential Threat

Over the past thirty years, the US government and private sector have advanced their policy of full-cooperation, including substantial financial and technological investment in China, under the belief that they were moving towards a more democratic, free-market society while China played intentional misdirection and deception. In 1986, month number three, the Communist Party of China (CCP) officially declared Asymmetrical Hybrid Warfare (AHW) against the US and its western allies in its nation-state Program 863. This strategy commits all of China with its strict Communist military rule to engage in any and all methods to become on par with, surpass, and dominate the West at any and all cost. China’s ultimate objective is to harvest and perpetuate the Chinese Dream through the extraction and extinguishing of the American Dream, the American way of life and ending Western dominance. The Chinese strategy is that a er 200 years of Western global dominance, it is their destiny to reverse roles with the US and to relegate it to a forced supplier with a much lower quality of life. To underscore this strategy, China refers to the last century as “the century of great humiliation.” It must also be emphasized that AHW strategy is rooted in Unrestricted Warfare or “war without rules.”

Death by a Thousand Cuts

The Modern Battlefield is Everywhere

AHW has been established as the future of modern warfare and business strategy across the globe. It is ultimate warfare that has many forms: economic warfare, transaction warfare, industrial warfare, drug warfare, and propaganda warfare, to name only a few. Each method is characterized by the non-utilization of military or conventional warfare that is typical of aircraft, ships, troops, and weapons. While China continues to aggressively develop and expand its military, it does so with the belief that if it must resort to the use of conventional or nuclear warfare, it has ultimately failed at achieving the enemy’s capitulation through the combined methods of AHW. In the business sector, AHW has become the “New Global Competitive Model” where the “winner takes all.” Soon, China will dictate transactions and pricing based on its market dominance. As businesses rush to move to “digital transformation” and “Big Data,” each must perform a 180° cybersecurity transformation based on sensitive data protection and adversarial motives as a means to survive. Currently, AHW is the primary focus of our adversaries: China is, by far, the most successful at methodically executing all AHW methods, while Russia, North Korea, Iran, and India engage in relatively few methods at present. The strategy is to continuously inflict damage or cuts to every facet of American society just below the pain threshold where we choose not to act. We believe that China has achieved an estimated 750 cuts towards “death by a thousand cuts.” (Sun Tzu)

Definition

AHW is characterized as unconventional, non-military, multi-method strategic warfare based on deception and void of any rules between countries where economic and military power, strategy and tactics differ significantly. The attacking country exploits inherent weaknesses through numerous uneven and seemingly unrelated AHW methods that are designed to destabilize the unwitting target country for ultimate and complete economic and military submission. Extensive use of misinformation and plausible deniability are used to deceive and deflect suspicion of the strategy or its methodical advancement. Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, offset warfare, non-linear warfare, and cyber warfare. AHW is rooted in unrestricted warfare (war without rules where “everything is fair play”) which is also described as “anything warfare.” Source: BLACKOPS Partners Corporation

Culture Disparity as a Strategic Weapon

It is important to note the striking contrast between the two cultures of the US and Communist China. It is this great divide that has contributed to China’s manipulation and acceleration of AHW against the US. The CCP believes its “legalism” philosophy of supreme law and people are superior to America’s constitutional democracy underpinned by justice, religion, a Creator, and “all men are created equal.” Since 1949, the CCP have controlled all aspects of China’s commerce, military, and daily life where intellectual property is state-owned, all data is controlled, and it is the national duty of all citizens to support the regime, including all aspects of espionage. The Communist culture is further defined not by “winning vs. losing”; rather, “living vs. dying.” It is this extreme belief that underscores China’s support for AHW in its conflict with the US. Another distinction is that the CCP controls every business transaction with US companies. In many cases, the CCP resembles a powerful organized crime faction, through its shell business partnerships and facades. There is no distinction between China’s organized crime, military, or government. This places every US business partnership or transaction with China at extreme risk.

Critical Role of Intelligence

China’s uncompromising commitment to AHW demonstrates a national objective to destroy the US and its Western allies. The critical nucleus that drives the AHW strategy is the complete dependence on stolen innovation, intellectual property (IP), sensitive data, and military secrets - namely intelligence. For over thirty years, China has orchestrated the most impressive and sophisticated strategy with an intricate global network of espionage and industrial the to fuel AHW. In recent years, an emboldened China has demanded the complete surrender of all intellectual property during the process of contracting current international business transactions. Conversely, intelligence plays a critical role for the US to gauge the executional success of AHW, changes in strategy, and individual and cumulative damages.

Cyber Warfare as the Key Accelerator

China has successfully intertwined Cyber warfare as the key AHW accelerator due to its relatively minimal investment and the difficulty of attributing actions to a specific actor. At the same time, cybersecurity remains fundamentally broken in the US and the West due to failed cyber strategies, lack of awareness of AHW, lack of accountability, overconfidence, and over-dependence on inherently fallible cybersecurity products. This is made clear by the “new normal” of the increased trend in number, frequency, and resulting total damages from cyberattacks.

Current estimates place global cyber losses at $6 trillion by 2021, with expectations that this will increase further in the future, according to Cybersecurity Ventures. Cyber warfare and cybersecurity have become a “whole of society” challenge that requires a unified, elevated strategy and 180° approach to combat the morphing threat. As we examine today’s cybersecurity environment, we are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. It is only in the context of AHW that we can begin to fully understand cybersecurity’s critical role for successful defense, protection, and resolution. We have learned to treat cybersecurity first and foremost as a human problem and a senior leadership challenge, not solely an IT issue.

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