Cyber deterrence failure guarantees rapid nuclear escalation
Cimbala 22 (Stephen J. Cimbala, Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, “Nuclear-Crisis Management and Cyber War—A Dangerous Crossroads,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8246&context=nwc-review)- LH
Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a nonnuclear, or even a postnuclear, military-technical arc of development. War in the digital domain offers, at least in theory, a possible means of crippling or disabling enemy assets without the need for kinetic attack, or at least while minimizing physical destruction.4 Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are the very epitome of “mass” destruction, such that their use for deterrence—the avoidance of war by the manipulation of risk—is preferred to the actual firing of same. Unfortunately, neither nuclear deterrence nor cyber war will be able to live in a distinct policy universe for the near or distant future.
Nuclear weapons, whether held back for deterrence or fired in anger, are incorporated into systems for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The weapons and their C4ISR systems must be protected from attacks both kinetic and digital in nature. In addition, the decision makers who must manage nuclear forces during a crisis ideally should have the best possible information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber forces and command systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk acceptance of possible opponents. In short, the task of managing a nuclear crisis demands good information and clear thinking. But the employment of cyber weapons in the early stages of a crisis could impede clear assessments by creating confusion in networks and the action channels that depend on those networks.5 The temptation to take preemptive cyber action—for example, intrusive cyber reconnaissance of commandand-control (C2) systems—might “succeed” to the point at which nuclear-crisis management becomes weaker instead of stronger. Related to this, one challenge of the second nuclear age is that conventional war is more likely to take place within a nuclear context. Paul Bracken has noted the following:
Cyber’s effect on conventional operations has barely been considered in the current nuclear debate. Cyber could cripple U.S. command and control. Space war is also overlooked. Disruptions, from cyber, ASAT [antisatellite], and hacks to our reconnaissance system[,] make good sense from the enemy point of view, to blind our reconnaissance targeting. This would turn our precision strike force into blunt carpet bombing, and likely [result in] a vast increase in collateral damage. Obviously this has political implications. It could lead to a U.S. reluctance to act. This may well be the real intent of such a move on the part of the enemy, to create a kind of nuclear digital brinkmanship that forces the United States to back off in a crisis.6
IT systems provide invaluable intelligence during a crisis, using databases, big data, visualization, geographic-information-systems mapping, artificial intelligence (AI), image recognition, and other means. If the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of these systems is doubtful, leaders will feel that they have lost control and are left groping for options.
Ironically, the downsizing of U.S. and post-Soviet Russian strategic nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, while a positive development from the perspectives of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, makes the confluence of cyber- and nuclear-attack capabilities more alarming. The overkill deployments of missiles and bombers and expansive numbers of weapons that the Cold War Americans and Soviets deployed had at least one virtue; those arsenals provided so much redundancy against first-strike vulnerability that relatively linear systems for nuclear-attack warning, C2, and responsive launch, under or after attack, sufficed. At the same time, Cold War tools for military cyber action were primitive compared with those available now. In addition, countries and their armed forces were less dependent on the fidelity of their information systems for national security. Thus, the reduction of U.S., Russian, and possibly other forces to the size of “minimum deterrents” might compromise nuclear flexibility and resilience in the face of kinetic attacks preceded or accompanied by cyber war.7 In addition, although the mathematics of minimum deterrence would shrink the size of attackers’ as well as defenders’ arsenals, defenders with smaller-size forces might have greater fears of absolute, compared with relative, losses, and therefore might be more prone to preemption-dependent strategies than defenders with larger forces would be. One of the reasons for Cold War force redundancy was that superpowers lacked confidence in the reliability or availability of some of their nuclear systems.
Offensive and defensive information warfare (infowar), as well as other cyberrelated activities, is obviously very much on the minds of U.S. military leaders and others in the American and allied national-security establishments.8 Russia also has been explicit about its cyber-related concerns. In early July 2013, President Vladimir V. Putin urged the Russian Security Council to improve state security against cyber attacks.9 Russian security expert Vladimir I. Batyuk, commenting favorably on a June 2013 U.S.-Russian agreement for the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials (a successor to the then recently expired NunnLugar agreement on nuclear risk reduction), warned that pledges by Presidents Putin and Barack H. Obama of cooperation on cybersecurity were even more important: “Nuclear weapons are a legacy of the 20th century. The challenge of the 21st century is cybersecurity.”10 On the other hand, arms control for cyber is apt to run into daunting security and technical issues, even assuming a successful navigation of political trust for matters as sensitive as these. Of special significance is whether cyber armscontrol negotiators can certify that hackers operating within their own states are sufficiently under control for cyber verification and transparency. There is extensive evidence that Russia, China, and other states use civilian hackers to support national goals. For example, some sources attributed Russia’s hacking into the e-mail account of the Democratic National Committee in 2016 to “Guccifer 2.0”—an homage to the original Romanian hacker using that name. Some forensic evidence supports the hypothesis that Guccifer 2.0 was run by the Russian FSB (the country’s principal security agency), with some involvement by Russian military intelligence.11 Another uncertainty is the potential role of hacktivists who routinely join in conflicts even without state sanction. If a country is in a state-versus-state crisis, then finds itself on the receiving end of an effective, widespread cyber attack that affects “the man on the street,” pressure on the government for a kinetic (i.e., military) response may become overwhelming. Technically minded, determined individuals or small groups of hacktivists now have the potential to shake the world through cyber warfare.
The cyber domain cuts across the other geostrategic domains for warfare as well: land, sea, air, and space. On the other hand, the cyber domain, compared with the others, suffers from a lack of historical perspective; it “has been created in a short time and has not had the same level of scrutiny as other battle domains,” as one author has argued.12 What this might mean for the cyber-nuclear intersection is far from obvious.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT Definitions and Parameters Crisis management, including nuclear-crisis management, is both a competitive and a cooperative endeavor between military adversaries. A crisis is, by definition, a time of great tension and uncertainty.13 Threats are in the air, and time pressure on policy makers seems intense. Each side has objectives that it wants to attain and values that it deems important to protect. During a crisis, state behaviors are especially interactive and interdependent with those of another state. It would not be too farfetched to refer to this interdependent stream of interstate crisis behaviors as a system, provided the term system is not understood as referring to something completely separate from the state or individual behaviors that make it up. The system aspect implies reciprocal causation of the crisis behaviors of A by B and vice versa.
One aspect of crisis management is this deceptively simple question: What defines a crisis as such? When does the latent capacity of the international order for violence or hostile threat assessment cross over into the terrain of actual crisis behavior? A breakdown of general deterrence in the system raises threat perceptions among various actors, but it does not guarantee that any particular relationship will deteriorate into specific deterrent or compellent threats. In defining the onset of a crisis, Patrick M. Morgan offers the useful concept of immediate deterrence failure: specific sources of hostile intent have been identified by one state with reference to another, threats have been exchanged, and responses now must be decided on.14 The passage into a crisis is equivalent to the shift from a Hobbesian world of omnipresent potential violence to the actual movement of troops and exchanges of diplomatic démarches.
All crises are characterized to some extent by a high degree of threat; a short time for decision; and a “fog of crisis”—reminiscent of Clausewitz’s “fog of war”—that confuses crisis participants about what is happening. Before modern scholars ever invented the discipline of crisis management, historians had captured the rush-to-judgment character of much crisis decision-making among great powers.15 The influence of nuclear weapons on crisis decision-making is not easy to measure or document, because the avoidance of war can be ascribed to many causes. The presence of nuclear forces obviously influences the degree of destruction that can be inflicted should crisis management fail. Short of that catastrophe, the greater interest of scholars is in how the presence of nuclear weapons might affect the decision-making process itself in a crisis. The problem is conceptually elusive; there are so many potentially important causal factors relevant to a decision on war versus peace. History is full of dependent variables in search of competing explanations.
Crisis Management: The Requirements The first requirement of successful crisis management is communications transparency. Transparency includes clear signaling and undistorted communications. Signaling refers to the requirement that each side must send its estimate of the situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to have identical or even initially complementary interests, but a sufficient number of correctly sent and received signals is a prerequisite for the effective communication of goals and objectives from one side to the other. If signals are sent poorly or misunderstood, steps taken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, including miscalculated escalation.
Communications transparency also includes high-fidelity communication between adversaries and within the respective decision-making structures of each side. High-fidelity communication in a crisis can be distorted by everything that might interfere physically, mechanically, or behaviorally with accurate transmission. Electromagnetic pulses that disrupt communication circuitry and physical destruction of communication networks are obvious examples of impediments to high-fidelity communication. Cultural differences that prevent accurate understanding of shared meanings between states can confound deterrence as practiced according to one side’s theory. As Keith B. Payne notes with regard to the potential for deterrence failure in the post–Cold War period, “Unfortunately, our expectations of opponents’ behavior frequently are unmet, not because our opponents necessarily are irrational but because we do not understand them—their individual values, goals, determination, and commitments—in the context of the engagement, and therefore we are surprised when their ‘unreasonable’ behavior differs from our expectations.”16