Cyberwar uniquely likely to escalate—credible deterrence is a must-have
Cimbala 22 (Stephen J. Cimbala, Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, an American Studies faculty member, “Nuclear-Crisis Management and Cyber War—A Dangerous Crossroads,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2022, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8246&context=nwc-review)- LH
POTENTIAL DISRUPTERS Information or cyber warfare has the potential to attack or to disrupt successful crisis management with regard to each of the preceding attributes.24 First, infowar can muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications networks.25 The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack; however, destroyed or altered information also may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been interpreted correctly when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal “resolve” instead of “yield” to its opponent on a particular issue; side B, misperceiving what it has received as a “yield” message, may decide to continue its aggression, but then meets unexpected resistance, causing a much more dangerous situation to develop. There is also the possibility of cyber-enabled preemption to disable enemy nuclear missiles before they reach the launchpad or during the launch itself. Apparently, the United States has used such “left-of-launch” techniques against North Korea.26 During a nuclear crisis, would such a move be accepted by the attacked party as one of intimidation and deterrence or, to the contrary, would offensive cyber war against missile launches prompt a nuclear first use or first strike by the defender for fear of losing its retaliatory capability?
Infowar also can destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for successful crisis management. One way it can do this is by disrupting communication links between policy makers and military commanders during a period of high threat and severe time pressure. Unanticipated problems, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, may arise under these conditions. For example, political leaders may have predelegated limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restrictive conditions; only when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of predelegation, would military commanders be authorized to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their commands.27 Clogged, destroyed, or disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military commanders perceive a situation to be far more desperate, and thus permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really is. For example, during the Cold War, disrupted communications between the U.S. national command authority and ballistic-missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a joint decision by submarine officers and crew, in the absence of contrary instructions, to launch.
Second, infowar during a crisis almost certainly will increase the time pressure under which political leaders operate. It may do this literally, or it may affect the perceived timelines within which the policy-making process yields its decisions. Once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications (C3) system being subverted by phony information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the possible loss of military options will be enormous. In the case of American Cold War nuclear war plans, for example, disruption of even portions of the strategic C3 system could have prevented competent execution of parts of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation’s strategic nuclear war plan. The Cold War SIOP depended on finely orchestrated time-on-target estimates and precise damage expectancies against various classes of targets.28 Partly misinformed or disinformed networks and communications centers would have led to redundant attacks against the same target sets and, quite possibly, unplanned attacks on friendly military or civilian installations. Even in the post–Cold War world of flexible nuclear-response plans, the potential slide toward preemption, on the basis of mistaken or exaggerated fears of C2 vulnerability, casts a shadow over deterrence stability. As Blair has warned, “There are no widely accepted methods for calculating command and control performance under wartime conditions, and empirical validation of such an assessment cannot be done. Compared with the tight and tidy standard calculations of force vulnerability, any objective assessment of command and control systems would raise more questions than it answered.”29
A third potentially disruptive effect of infowar on nuclear-crisis management is that it may reduce the search for available alternatives to the few and desperate. Policy makers seeking escapes from crisis denouements need flexible options and creative problem-solving. Victims of infowar may have a diminished ability to solve problems routinely, let alone creatively, once information networks are filled with flotsam and jetsam. Questions to operators will be posed poorly, and responses (if available at all) will be driven toward the least common denominator of previously programmed SOPs. Retaliatory systems that depend on launchon-warning dynamics instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially vulnerable to reduced time cycles and restricted alternatives. “A well-designed warning system cannot save commanders from misjudging the situation under the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of launch on warning. Such a posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates to converge on reality. Rapid reaction is inherently unstable because it cuts short the learning time needed to match perception with reality.”3
The propensity to search for the first available alternative that meets minimum satisfactory conditions of goal attainment is strong enough under normal conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations.31 In civil-military C2 systems under the stress of nuclear-crisis decision-making, the first available alternative quite literally may be the last—or so policy makers and their military advisers may persuade themselves. Accordingly, the bias toward prompt and adequate solutions is strong. During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, a number of members of the presidential advisory group continued to propound an air strike and invasion of Cuba during the entire thirteen days of crisis deliberation. Had less time been available for debate and had President Kennedy not deliberately structured the discussion in a way that forced alternatives to the surface, the air strike and invasion might well have been the chosen course of action.32 Paul K. Davis and coauthors have noted the following:
Usual discussions of crisis stability assume that leaders are in control of their nuclear capabilities. Again, history is sobering. President Kennedy became worried in 1961 about possible unilateral actions by military leaders to prepare a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union. He instigated efforts to tighten the President’s personal control. Soviet leadership worried about survivability of its forces and developed capability for launch on warning and automatic response. Such systems could be the source of accidental war.33
Fourth and finally on the issue of crisis management, infowar can cause flawed images of each side’s intentions and capabilities to be conveyed to the other, with potentially disastrous results. Another example from the Cuban missile crisis demonstrates the possible side effects on U.S. crisis management of simple misunderstanding and noncommunication. At the most tense period of the crisis, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course and strayed into Soviet airspace. U.S. and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a possible Arctic confrontation of air forces loomed. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that Soviet air defenses might have interpreted the U-2 flight as a prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling for a compensatory response by Moscow.34 Fortunately, Moscow chose to give Washington the benefit of the doubt in this instance and to permit U.S. fighters to escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled U-2 mission was not aborted once the crisis began never has been revealed fully; the answer may be as simple as bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the chain of command by policy makers who failed to appreciate the risk of “normal” reconnaissance under these extraordinary conditions.
The significance of the preceding discussion and examples is underscored by the assessment of expert analyst Martin C. Libicki about the relationship between cyber war and crisis management.
To generalize, a situation in which there is little pressure to respond quickly, in which a temporary disadvantage or loss is tolerable, and in which there are grounds for giving the other side some benefit of the doubt is one in which there is time for crisis management to work. Conversely, if the failure to respond quickly causes a state’s position to erode, a temporary disadvantage or degree of loss is intolerable, and there are no grounds for disputing what happened, who did it, and why—then states may conclude that they must bring matters to a head quickly.35