NATO key to democracy—especially important in supporting fledgling democracies
Poast and Chinchilla 20 (Paul Poast & Alexandra Chinchilla, Paul Poast is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Chinchilla is a Rosenwald Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy and International Security and Niehaus Postdoctoral Fellow at The John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO expansion,” International Politics, 04/30/2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00236-6)- LH
In what way should one expect NATO to enhance democratic development? After all, as highlighted above, democracy is a core principle of the institution. Much of the existing work on NATO and democratic development points to several avenues of possible influence: socialization, guidance from NATO about how to create and implement reforms, NATO pressure to implement reforms, and legitimizing new democracies by helping them provide the public good of security through NATO membership. It is important to note that each of these mechanisms for how NATO could prompt reform should begin operating before full NATO membership is achieved. Once prospective members are given a promise of membership in the form of the MAP, they will be brought into close contact with NATO members and therefore exposed to the socialization mechanism. If domestic reform is a necessary condition for NATO membership, prospective members participating in the MAP should begin reforming so that they can reap the benefits of membership. Finally, if democratic reforms made to gain NATO membership persist, NATO membership should also be associated with higher levels of democracy in new member states. Below we discuss each of these means for NATO influence proposed in the literature.
First, NATO may have a subtle impact on future member states by socializing military and civilian leaders from states seeking membership to respect democratic norms. Democracy is dependent not only on the formal institutions of a country, but also on whether elites are willing to abide by democratic constraints on their power rather than undermine or dismantle them. The example of Poland’s recent democratic backsliding despite the former presence of formal democratic institutions illustrates this point. Even when democratic reforms preceded NATO involvement, NATO could still have a democratizing influence by socializing military and civilian elites to respect democratic reforms—particularly civilian control of the military. NATO created the conditions for regular, institutionalized interaction between elites from partner states and longtime member states within the institutional framework of the alliance and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), making socialization possible. NATO taught military officers and civilian defense policymakers who had served most of their professional lives under a communist system about the norms of a democracy and their role in it (Gheciu 2005b). This socialization logic outlined by Alexandra Gheciu and others is not in conflict with our argument, as we measure changes in democratic institutions rather than changes in elite attitudes. However, recent democratic backsliding in some NATO countries indicates that either the right elites were not socialized by NATO or the main effect of NATO socialization was teaching elites to value civilian control of the military and continued engagement with NATO.
Elite socialization began well before NATO membership, with collective briefings, individualized MAPs for each prospective member state, NATO-led workshops, military advisers from NATO member states, and professional education programs (Gheciu 2005b). NATO used these cooperative activities to teach the goals and norms of the alliance and assess the commitment of PfP countries to them (Gheciu 2005a). Joint military exercises, in addition to augmenting the capability aggregation of the alliance, allowed military elites from NATO states and prospective member states to interact. Military education programs—such as the NATO Defence College and programs through partner states such as the year-long International Fellows program at the US National Defense University—played a similar role in building military capability while creating space for socialization through military-to-military interactions.
Second, even when countries intended to make democratic reforms on their own initiative, they often lacked institutional knowledge about how to reform. NATO stepped in to provide assistance and advice to prospective members regarding how to enact democratic reforms. Democracy advising was provided through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the associated Rose-Roth seminars. According to Trine Flockhart (2004), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Rose-Roth seminars brought together parliamentarians from NATO and partner states to ‘familiarize legislators with key security issues and debates, to promote the development of appropriate civil–military relations, and to facilitate the sharing of expertise and experience in parliamentary practice and procedures.’ These seminars also played a ‘very important social function’ as policymakers from NATO and partner countries built professional networks with one another (Flockhart 2004). Civilian defense policymakers and military officers from NATO partner countries were also able to participate in the NATO-adjacent George C. Marshall Center, which has over 13,300 alumni. Courses at the Marshall Center include discussion of international law, democracy, rule of law, and human rights alongside more traditional security topics (Marshall Center 2019).
Third, NATO provided pressure for specific reforms through direct communication with a country’s NATO liaisons and naming and shaming countries slacking on reforms. For example, a US Congressional Research Service report released in 1995 raised concerns that Poland was not ready for NATO membership. The report stated: ‘Initiation into NATO nevertheless may hinge even more on publication of a democratic Constitution and the legal basis for civilian control. Meanwhile, the Minister of Defense and many senior officers who set policy and shape opinions have become mired in political wrangling over control of the armed forces’ (quoted in Epstein 2005, 254–285). As Rachel Epstein notes, this report was widely publicized in the Polish media with the effect of shaming Polish officials into complying, given that NATO membership was by this time an established national foreign policy goal. When the chief of the Polish General Staff, General Tadeusz Wilecki, opposed increased civilian control of the military, an unflattering New York Times article put sufficient pressure on Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski that he removed Wilecki (Epstein 2006, 280–281).
By utilizing naming and shaming tactics and building alliances with pro-reform domestic politicians, NATO successfully shepherded a select group of partner states through enacting civilian control of the military and more internationalized defense policies (Epstein 2005). Although Poland joined NATO in the 1999 wave of enlargement, one could argue that the logic of pressure for reforms was still relevant for the countries that joined NATO in 2004. The smaller reforms of hiring personnel supportive of democratic norms and building political coalitions in support of democracy that Epstein highlights are consistent with what we find in our quantitative analysis. Some states that rapidly enacted democratic reforms after transition to democracy in the early 1990s made small improvements under NATO tutelage, even though their average democracy scores after reaching NATO applicant status and membership remained similar to what they had been before. Other NATO-induced changes, such as the firing of Wilecki in Poland, may have been crucial for continued progress even though our quantitative data do not measure them. NATO’s value, then, may be in encouraging states already democratizing to persist in maintaining democracy despite challenges from domestic elites. However, any democratizing effect of NATO would be concentrated on the premembership period, as democracy is in practice not a condition for remaining a NATO member.
Finally, NATO can assist in providing the public good of security, which can be critical for the legitimacy of some new democracies. Poast and Urpelainen (2018) argue that leaders in transitional democracies use, and often must create, international organizations to consolidate democratic rule and improve their ability to distribute public goods to the populations under their rule. Public goods are broadly defined as policies that benefit large constituencies in society. Examples of public goods include internal and external security (Loader and Walker 2007; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999), public infrastructure that increases investment (Henisz 2002), free and fair elections (Donno 2010), reduction of corruption (Banerjee 1997), and environmental protection (VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001). Providing such goods is critical to the survival of leaders in democratizing states. But because autocratic developing countries have little need or capacity to improve the provision of public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Wintrobe 1998), democratization leaves leaders in newly democratic regimes with a unique challenge; they face high expectations for public good provision, yet their administrative apparatus has little experience providing public goods (Haggard and Kaufman 1997). Therefore, newly democratic governments can benefit from outside expertise on public goods provision, namely that offered by international organizations (IOs). IOs can assist democratizing states in the provision of public goods. IOs provide a venue through which members can pool limited resources or coordinate on policy reforms even with limited institutional capacity. IOs assist in highly technical tasks, including advising on governance capacity, monitoring elections, and facilitating learning about democratic institutions. IOs can help governments of transitional democracies govern effectively and acquire the resources to supply public goods to the newly expanded electorate.