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US-NATO info sharing is key to set global cyber norms and prevent miscalc.

David Mussington, 2019, [David Mussington is a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise at University of Maryland, adjunct member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and former senior adviser for cyber policy in the US Department of Defense, later serving on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as director for surface transportation security policy., "Strategic Stability, Cyber Operations and International Security," Centre for International Governance Innovation, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep26129.13.pdf]

As a response to grey zone conflict and offence dominance in cyberspace, many national governments, such as the United States, Germany and Canada, have concluded that a static defence is no longer adequate and have been adjusting to allow pre-emptive cyber operations intended to disrupt hostile actors before they can act (Herpig 2018; Nakashima 2018; Grigsby 2017). Organizations at the international level have mirrored this trend. In 2017, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adjusted its policy away from ambiguity on cyber effects to a more responsive stance, establishing a Cyber Operations Centre to integrate the cyber capabilities of its members into military operations (Ricks and Ali 2017). While this may be necessary to cope with the attribution problem and grey zone hostilities, whether or not this will re-enable effective deterrence or cause further destabilization through tit-for-tat escalation remains unclear.

Due to many of its members being on the receiving end of grey zone cyber attacks, NATO has been a leading light in trying to resolve the current uncertainty plaguing international governance of cyber conflict. It has attempted, through efforts such as the establishment of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and publication of the Tallinn Manual, to arrive at a clear interpretation of which acts in cyberspace are permissible or not under current international law (Arts 2018). The alliance relies on all members following through on their commitment to collective defence as stipulated under article 5 of the alliance’s treaty. This makes the attribution challenge in cyberwarfare especially problematic, as it can give members a plausible reason to demur on this potentially costly commitment. This is forcing NATO to consider what kind of activity in cyberspace would be serious enough to invoke the collective defence clause. While NATO has affirmed that article 5 could be triggered by a significant cyber attack, as of yet it has not determined a precise threshold (ibid.).

Implications and Policy Consequences

Global strategic stability is undermined by the failure of states to take seriously the erosion of defence capabilities caused by growing reliance on ICT technologies in critical infrastructures and weapon systems. At present, COTS and the ICT supply chain that services critical infrastructure present a particularly vulnerable point of entry for malicious actors. Existing governance and oversight mechanisms concerning the deployment of ICT will prove too lenient for the developing threat environment. Enhanced communication and tighter cooperation between government and the private sector will prove crucial to bolstering defences in this area. More arrangements like the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which facilitate intelligence sharing on cyber threats between the public and private sector, would be of great benefit (Lord and Mussington 2017).

Superior coordination and information sharing are also required at the international level. In the face of an offence-dominant environment, efforts must be taken to assuage the uncertainties felt by various actors as to each other’s capabilities and intentions. The technical and political difficulties in attributing cyber attacks, combined with their affordability, will continue to encourage attackers. Those defending against cyber attacks must therefore take a firmer, less equivocal stance than they have so far displayed. Absent an international consensus on what constitutes use of force in cyberspace, the United States and fellow NATO members must collectively decide upon a clear code of conduct for responding to grey zone activities, in order to banish ambiguity and the risk of miscalculation. A red line should be drawn around the most pernicious types of cyber hostilities now being perpetrated, such as attempts to sway foreign elections, the violation of which should trigger a measured yet firm response. Restoring clarity to the “action-reaction” dynamic is necessary both to dissuade hostile actors by guaranteeing reprisal for certain offences, and to solidify an understanding among allies as to when they must come to one another’s assistance. In the long term, the United States and its allies should promote more effective international governance by pushing to have these red lines enshrined as international norms in fora such as the United Nations. There is an urgency to this effort — failure to do so will only entrench the idea that the constant grey zone hostilities we are now witnessing have become a tolerable part of international behaviour

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