2---Intrusions---Squo policy of unilateral OCO frameworks cause network intrusions from allies that undermines trust, cohesion, and cooperation --- Integration solves
Smeets, 20 (Max Smeets, Max Smeets is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative., 2-15-2020, accessed on 6-18-2022, Taylor & Francis, "U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward: implications for the alliance and intelligence collection", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2020.1729316?journalCode=fint20)//Babcii
Benefits and the creation of partnerships The strategy of persistent engagement and defend forward can help less capable cyber actors defend themselves against adversaries. Both the U.S. Cyber Command vision and the DoD cyber strategy stress the importance of working closely with international and private sector partners to successfully operate in cyberspace.xxix The DoD strategy states the following: “Our strategic approach is based on mutually reinforcing lines of effort to build a more lethal force; compete and deter in cyberspace; expand alliances and partnerships; reform the Department; and cultivate talent.” xxx On international partnerships, it more explicitly states: “Many of the United States’ allies and partners possess advanced cyber capabilities that complement our own. The Department will work to strengthen the capacity of these allies and partners and increase DoD’s ability to leverage its partners’ unique skills, resources, capabilities, and perspectives. Information-sharing relationships with allies and partners will increase the effectiveness of combined cyberspace operations and enhance our collective cybersecurity posture.” xxxi The United States has also signed several memoranda of understanding and over the years addressed cyber cooperation in some way, shape or form. In 2008, a MoU was signed between the Department of Defense and the German Federal Ministry of Defence about computer network defense and information assurance.xxxii A year later, a similar MoU on computer network defense was signed with South-Korea. xxxiii More recently, the Cyber Command worked alongside Montenegrin cyber defenders with as aim “to increase interoperability, build partner capability, and deter malign influence on the democratic processes of our allies, partners and the U.S.” xxxiv It was reported that U.S. Cyber Command personnel operated in the networks of Ukraine and Macedonia as well to help those countries defend against malicious cyber activity.xxxv At the 2019 Cyber Command symposium, specific examples were discussed on how cooperation can also help in not just detecting or deterring adversaries but also cause friction in their operational activity.xxxvi For example, the U.S. might upload foreign APT malware samples on VirusTotal, an online malware repository and file scanning service, forcing adversaries to go back to the drawing broad and adapt.xxxvii One can think of several other scenarios how international partnerships (also with the private sector) can help to ensure more coordinated take down of adversarial operations - actions beneficial to both the US and its partners. Risks for Allies and Intelligence Collection This section addresses four connected risks associated with US strategy. The first risk is perhaps the most obvious: if U.S. Cyber Command directly operates in allied networks without consent, it creates friction by allies undermining trust. Operating instantly makes sense considering the potential operational tempo of adversaries: You cannot have protracted diplomatic discussions for two months with an ally about whether or not to take down some command and control infrastructure of an adversary hosted in the allied country. You don’t have days, let alone months. As a participant mentioned at the 2019 Cyber Command Symposium on strategy: “Opportunities within this domain are fleeting.” xxxviii Operating seamlessly could also make sense if an ally does not mind the U.S. coming into its networks to address the malicious activity. In this vein, the U.S. can continue to build partnerships with countries that do not have the capacity to defend against cyber attacks on their own, as described above. But, what if an allied country is not keen on having the U.S. military in its networks, actively, seamlessly, and continuously disrupting an adversary’s cyber operations? As the German case shows, this scenario will likely come up a lot more in the near future. Second, it is not just about cyber effect operations taking place in systems or networks in allied territory. There could also be a negative impact on allied intelligence operations and capabilities beyond these systems and networks. The U.S Cyber Command - and other military cyber organizations - are operating in a global environment historically dominated by intelligence agencies, and the Five Eyes has always been the most dominant actor in cyberspace.xxxix But the anglophone intelligence alliance is not the only intelligence actor operating across the world. Recent cases—such as the infiltration of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service into the Russia-based network of the infamous hacking group Cozy Bear—have illustrated the continued global prevalence and value of allies’ intelligence operations beyond the Five Eyes alliance.xl If U.S. Cyber Command increasingly take up the role of ‘disrupter’ it may negatively impact global intelligence collection of allies—particularly those countries that favor long-term access over immediate effect. It will also more likely uncover and burn allied capabilities. The risks of occurring are higher than one may think as intelligence agencies have a tendency and incentive to target and track the same entities. For example, in late 2014, cybersecurity company Kaspersky Lab reported on the so-called "Magnet of Threats”. The cybersecurity company discovered a server belonging to a research organization in the Middle East that simultaneously hosted implants for at least five Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors: Regin and the Equation Group, Turla and ItaDuke, Animal Farm, and Careto. xli All of these APTs have been associated with prominent national security and intelligence agencies. Equation group and Regin are connected to the Five-Eyes. As said, Animal Farm has been attributed to France's external intelligence agency. Turla Group has been associated with the Russian federal security service (FSB). ItaDuke is said to be linked to the Russian government too. Finally, it is theorized that Spain is behind Careto, also known as ‘The Mask’. Consider what would have happened if one of those five APT groups had sought to cause a disruptive effect - rather than collect intelligence - against the target in the Middle East. It likely would have resulted in much earlier discovery and analysis by threat intelligence companies (or other actors) exposing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of each actor group. Also, even the anticipation of more cyber effect operations in non-allied networks from one allied state could lead to a change in operations by another state. Indeed, states have shown in the past that the anticipation of early discovery of an operation has led to a change in their TTPs. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) created an "exploit orchestrator" called FoxAcid, an internet-enabled system capable of attacking target computers in a variety of different ways, depending on whether it is discovered—or likely to be discovered—in a given network.xlii FoxAcid has a modular design, with flexibility allowing the NSA to swap and replace exploits and run different exploits based on various considerations. Against technically sophisticated targets where the chance of detection is high, FoxAcid would normally choose to run low-value exploits. Third, allied friction could potentially be exploited by adversaries. Adversaries do not randomly choose which intermediate nodes to direct their operations through. If Russia has the choice to go through a network that would raise some serious diplomatic friction between the U.S. and a U.S. ally, or operate through a network that would cause no diplomatic friction for the U.S., what would it prefer? It would make sense for adversaries to operate through the networks of exactly those countries with which the U.S. has a strong relationship but that do not want the U.S. to operate within their networks causing any effects. Russia is already good at exploiting divisions between the U.S. and its allies. Cyber Command’s new strategy might give it another avenue to do so. Fourth, whilst allies can integrate their cyber efforts into U.S. strategy of persistent engagement, if allies would adopt their own strategy of persistent engagement - mirroring U.S. current doctrine and practice - it would likely further undermine the alliance relationships. If US strategy of persistent engagement leads allies to adopt their own strategy of persistent engagement, it would mean allies also seek “superiority in cyberspace”; “continuously engaging and contesting adversaries and causing them uncertainty wherever they maneuver”; and operating “seamlessly, globally and continuously” - as stated in the Cyber Command vision. More specifically, it would mean that allies seek to swiftly achieve effects in systems and networks that are potentially located on U.S. territory, without necessarily notifying the U.S. government before. In other words, it means that networks and systems turn into red space and gray space for allies - like allied networks are now gray and red space for the U.S. to actively disrupt and degrade adversarial operations. It is unlikely that the U.S. government would react positively if Germany, or any other allied country for that matter, hacks into a server hosting Russian propaganda that was located in the United States, with some form of notification but without Pentagon’s consent.xliii There are numerous reasons why the US government would be upset with this type of behavior. It would likely be seen as reckless from Germany - especially if the US was already on those same networks for intelligence collection purposes. An important dimension of this scenario is derived from the fact that the U.S. is a vast target rich environment, potentially even prioritized as a target by adversaries such as China, Russia, North Korea, Iran - as well as non-state actors. As stated above, red space and gray space are defined, according to U.S. Joint Publication 3-12 on Cyberspace Operations, based on what “nodes” adversaries “control”. There are many nodes adversaries (of US allies) want to control in the US. In other words, if US allies would seek to swiftly disrupt and degrade cyber operations in red space and gray space on a constant-basis, much of that would be in the United States. Last year the NATO alliance reached a landmark that went largely unnoticed: there are now more NATO member states that have publicly declared they are seeking to establish an institutional capacity within the military forces to conduct cyber effects operations than there are member states that have remained publicly silent on this issue.xliv Yet, most NATO members are still at the early stages of organizational development - and pour relatively few resources into their military cyber organizations to conduct cyber effects operations.xlv Their operational capacity is limited. France and Germany stand out for the extent of resources officially allocated to their military cyber organizations (beyond the Five-Eyes) - but public statements about these figures are generally hard to interpret and compare given distinct institutional design across military cyber organizations of states.xlvi This risk is therefore less significant for the short term, but is likely to grow in the medium to long term. Conclusion and Discussion The purpose of this paper was to provide a benefit-risk assessment of US strategy for its allies and intelligence collection. Whilst the U.S. government’s mission to persistently engage with adversaries may have benefits for allied states, the paper identified several avenues how the strategy leads to negative implications for the alliance. To conclude, it is therefore worth considering how these risks can be mitigatedFirst, the principles of persistent engagement and defend forward are often jointly discussed. How the two principles relate to each other, however, remains unclear. According to some, persistent engagement is an ‘operationalization’ of the defend forward concept. Others believe there is a difference between the two concepts. If the latter is the case, it is important to assess to what degree a strategy of persistent engagement necessitates ‘defending forward’ and contesting adversaries wherever they are. In other words, the question is whether sufficient friction can be created without causing disruption in allied networks. Second, terminology about terrain in cyberspace is frequently confused by policymakers and experts. The U.S. government needs to (re)assess how its terminology of terrain in the physical domains applies to cyberspace. Last, NATO allies should consider establishing memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.xlvii The goal of the proposed memorandum would be to reduce discord among the allies; enhance trust, transparency and confidence between allies; and improve the effectiveness of disrupting and deterring adversaries’ operations in cyberspace. The scope of the memorandum would include: i) developing a common notification equity framework for out-of-networks operations which seek to achieve cyber effects in allied systems or networks; ii) identifying procedures for communicating the consideration and conduct of offensive cyber effects operations between states against systems or networks in allied territory; and iii) identifying technical solutions and administrative documentation required for the continuous exchange of information on offensive cyber operations. In writing the memorandum, states first and foremost should agree on the equities involved in permitting signatories to conduct cyber effect operations in each other’s networks—and the relative weight of those equities. Equities that should be considered include: i) the ability of an actor to take action to negate known threats on or to the other parties’ networks and systems; ii) the likelihood that an action will negate known threats; iii) the imminence and scale of the threat; iv) the risk of collateral damage; v) whether the computer system or network is government-owned or privately owned; and vi) the certainty that the system or network will be used to achieve strategic effects by the adversary.xlviii Finally, though the memorandum of understanding may help in promoting stability and enhancing confidence amongst allies, it is not a silver bullet. It can only reduce allied concerns rather than mitigate them. Military cyber organizations may still conduct effect-based operations in allied territory without consent, leading allies to assert that their sovereignty has been violated.