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NATO OCOs are key to deter Russian gray-zone aggression, but coordination is key.

Alexander Vershbow, 1-25-2021, [Alexander Vershbow is the Wolk Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House and a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. During his diplomatic career, he served as NATO deputy secretary general, assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs, ambassador to NATO, Russia, and the Republic of Korea, special assistant to the president for European Affairs at the National Security Council, and State Department director of Soviet Union Affairs., "REFLECTIONS ON NATO DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY," Texas National Security Review, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/90610/TNSRVol4Issue4Vershbow.pdf?sequence=2]

NATO thinking on deterrence today, even more than in the Cold War, should go beyond conventional and nuclear weapons to encompass cyber and other gray-zone threats. Offensive cyber capabilities offer the means to inflict strategic effects without the direct use of military force — such as by disabling nuclear missiles in their launchers or by destroying or disrupting reconnaissance and command-and-control systems. Cyber capabilities complement the more traditional basket of tools used by Russia to destabilize its adversaries below the level of armed conflict (such as political subversion, economic sabotage, disinformation, and fomenting separatism). Russia uses these so-called hybrid means to undermine states and alliances, damage infrastructure, and erode social cohesion, all while concealing the identity of the attacker.26 NATO has sought to deter cyber aggression, first of all, by declaring that even though the Washington Treaty refers to “armed attack” as the basis for

NATO action under Article 5, a cyber attack could inflict sufficient damage to be considered the functional equivalent of an armed attack, triggering Article 5.27 Beyond this, deterrence in the gray zone may depend on developing the capability to inflict equal or greater damage in response to large-scale cyber aggression and to make clear that NATO reserves the right to react symmetrically (i.e., cyber versus cyber) or asymmetrically, to include kinetic and non-kinetic options such as sanctions. In this regard, the adapted NATO Command Structure includes a new 24/7 cyber operations center at its main headquarters and allies have agreed that NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe can turn to nations with offensive cyber capabilities if needed in a conflict.28

Deterring gray-zone threats poses a more difficult challenge. Efforts to define a “red line” of conflict that must not be passed by nature encourage adversaries to take action perceived as below the red line. On the deterrence side, ambiguity and flexibility can help, but more important will be to strengthen allied nations’ own resilience — to harden critical infrastructure, reduce societies’ vulnerability to subversion and disinformation, expose and shut down the movement of dark money and other sources of corruption, and improve internal security and intelligence sharing within governments and across the NATO alliance. Allies also need to be more effective in pushing back against Russian disinformation and propaganda.29 NATO-E.U. cooperation on combating disinformation and establishing centers of excellence, such as the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Finland), the NATO Strategic Communications center of excellence (Latvia), and the NATO Energy Security center of excellence (Lithuania) are all important steps in this regard.

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