NATO has cyber capabilities, but coordinating with the US is key to a credible deterrent
Laura Oolup, 2019, [MA candidate at the University of Tartu in the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, "CYBER AS A DETERRENT: UTILIZING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES IN NATO’S DETERRENCE POSTURE," University of Tartu, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/223009731.pdf]
The US has been widely acknowledged as the global cyber power which is at the forefront with the offensive cyber capabilities. Therefore, the US is extremely important asset for NATO to have credibility and capability imposing retaliatory threat in cyberspace. The US has not been clear in words either which capabilities exactly it possesses, but the actions give a taste of it. The SCADA-attack against the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz that caused kinetic effects is a significant reflection of it (Zetter 2014). What can be noted here is that the offensive cyber capabilities have been presented through their deployment.
Additionally, the existence of and participation in exercises like the Crossed Swords organized primarily by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence accredited by NATO, enables Allies to improve their offensive cyber capabilities and mirrors to the enemy which capabilities are being obtained. During this year’s exercise, the participants from cyber commands and special operation forces tested their offensive skills on attacking industrial control systems and also unmanned ground vehicles (CCDCOE 2019).
So far, we can see that in general NATO should have the potential for utilizing offensive cyber capabilities as a deterrent, because the necessary capability seems to exist. This is driven from Allies acquiring offensive cyber capabilities which have been also presented through previously conducted cyber campaigns, certain Allies have offered their sovereign cyber capabilities for the use of NATO, the skills for creating offensive cyber capabilities are being developed, NATO is working towards incorporating cyber component into force structures. However, when it comes to the credibility of the cyber threat from the viewpoint of the enemy, there are some problems.
First two issues have already been touched upon above as well which entail lack of knowledge regarding which kind of offensive cyber capabilities are exactly possessed or being developed by the Allies and secondly, ambiguous message by NATO’s Secretary General about in which cases and to what extent NATO would use the offered offensive cyber capabilities. Considering the conceptualized classical deterrence theory, the deterrer needs to be clear on its means, how they will be used and which effects they could cause (see i.e. Knopf 2009:41). Certain ambiguity could be acceptable in regards of the red lines, as otherwise, the enemy can play too easily around the boundaries. But the deterrent message should have more substance than just saying one is acquiring capabilities to carry out counterattacks in case of a necessity and that there have been few instances where those capabilities have been utilized. This does not seem enough to influence the decision-making equation of the enemy because it does not mirror what could be the costs in case of the aggression. It may especially turn out to be so if the adversary should happen to be risk-acceptant.
Third issue shadowing credibility of the potential cyber threat is stemmed from the previous two and this is that different ‘languages’ in the broader sense are being used by the member states offering their capabilities for NATO’s use. This does undermine the credibility of the deterrent threat, because in case of an Alliance, common language must be used by the members of it to ensure that there is no room for uncertainty and misperceptions. Talking about offensive cyber capabilities as a retaliatory measure, unified message by all the member states reflects the willingness to retaliate and gives the enemy the impression that the Alliance together stands by its words.