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US coop is key – it has the most advanced cyber capabilities within NATO – examples prove.

Laura Oolup, 2019, [MA candidate at the University of Tartu in the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, "CYBER AS A DETERRENT: UTILIZING OFFENSIVE CYBER CAPABILITIES IN NATO’S DETERRENCE POSTURE," University of Tartu, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/223009731.pdf]

The US has been considered the cyber power who “has the most advanced cyber capabilities within NATO” (Arts 2018:2). Therefore, it is not surprising that when the Defence Secretary Mattis at the time pointed out during the announcement of the US offering its cyber capabilities for the use of NATO is already willing to do so today (Mattis 2018). The US new cyber strategy allows military to carry out cyber operations to protect its systems, networks and national critical networks in general (Nakashima 2018). Furthermore, it seems that the utilization of the offensive cyber capabilities is not considered limited to deterring only cyberattacks as it is said, the intention is also to “ensure the US military’s ability to fight and win wars in any domain, including cyberspace” (Department of Defense 2018:1-2).

The offensive cyber capabilities the US is developing, have the purpose to counter cyberattacks, but at the same time be considered as any other means during war time. The offensive cyber capabilities should be flexible. This means, the US should have in its use various offensive cyber capabilities that can cause different types of effects depending on the situation and necessity (Department of Defense 2018:3). They are aimed to use as retaliatory measures in kind to cyberattacks but also as means to enhance the US military advantage in any way. Therefore, in the strategy it is mentioned that “during wartime, US cyber forces will be prepared to operate alongside our air, land, sea, and space forces to target adversary weaknesses, offset adversary strengths, and amplify the effectiveness of other elements of the Joint Force” (Department of Defence 2018:1).

However, there is not that much information out there what exactly are the capabilities the US obtains. Although, certain public announcements give some ideas in this regard. For instance, it has been announced that the US is procuring a Unified Platform that should support as a mission capability the US cyber command in its defensive and offensive cyber operations (Pomerlau 2019; Northrop Grumman 2018). Moreover, to develop the offensive cyber capabilities and to in general improve the work and operability of the US Cyber Command, it has allocated $75 million – which is 70% more compared to previous year - in the fiscal year of 2019 to do that (Pomerlau 2019).

The US has examples of conducting offensive cyber operations that reflect both the capabilities and willingness to create logical and kinetic effect. The most recent example concerning logical effect is related to the US cybercommand’s actions in regards of the Russian Internet Research Agency. The US assault on Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) located in St. Petersburg was a pre-emptive approach to prevent Russia’s troll factory to conduct information operations and thereby meddle with the US midterm elections in 2018. The strike entailed cutting the IRA out of internet. This was a notable operation, because it was the first kind of the US to launch that kind of offense against Russia (Nakashima 2019).

The Stuxnet case that has been brought up in this paper for several times now is the example of the US being able to conduct an offense that relays kinetic effects. This was the US-Israel operation against Iran by using the worm called Stuxnet that was configured to target only certain computers targeting Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges to halt the Iranian nuclear bomb development program. It was successful in the sense it caused physical destruction, was first of its kind, and set the Iranian nuclear program behind by two years (Zetter 2014).

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