Even small attacks could cause an escalatory spiral---that’s uniquely likely under times of crisis
Davis 19 – Member of the NATO parliamentary assembly and also a repetatur for the science and technology committee.
Susan Davis, October 13 2019, “NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security and Defence, Stabilizing Deterrence,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1 fin. fc
66. As argued, states most likely do not see a cyber attack as a viable option for a pre-emptive, disarming first strike. However, in a crisis or pre-war situation, states could perceive a significant “cost of going second” (Davis, 2014). In such situations, one side “may well be frightened of what would happen if the other side attacks and may be convinced that going first will be advantageous” (Davis, 2014). This could lead to high escalatory risks. 67. In short and intense conflicts, pressures to use cyber attacks on military targets are high, as they are just another tool in the box, and the probability of attacks on critical infrastructure is still low, since they would not degrade the defender’s capabilities quickly enough to make a crucial difference (Lewis, 2018). If the war is expected to last longer, the latter type of attacks could appear more tempting, however. 68. Another key problem is the difficulty of determining the intent of a cyber intrusion (Lindsay, 2015). When a defender detects a breach, he may not know whether the intruder wants to spy on him, pursue active defence measures, gain a foothold for future defensive measures, or prepare for an imminent or future cyber attack (Slayton, 2017). It is extremely difficult to gauge intent in cyber space, and, in such cases, states tend to assume the worst (Hennessey, 2017). As a result, this can lead to misperception and an escalatory spiral (Slayton, 2017).