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NATO consensus is impossible---a number of issues ensure political disagreements are insurmountable.

Joubert 12 – Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Geopolitical Studies of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, UQAM

Vincent Joubert, “Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: lessons learned for NATO?,” NATO Defense College Rome, Research Division, Research Paper, No. 76, May 2012, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep10366.pdf

In addition, the potential for NATO to play a bigger role in defending the information infrastructure by implementing a credible cyber deterrence strategy is limited by political disagreements on the conditions and circumstances which would prompt any collective response to cyber attacks. NATO is currently focusing on implementation of an active cyber defence strategy, with improved security standards and requirements. While improved defence will to a certain extent dissuade potential aggressors, this is of course not enough for it to be considered as a real deterrent in its own right. For actual cyber deterrence (by punishment), there is the prerequisite that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be considered applicable to cyber attacks. In this respect the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence reiterates that any collective defence response is subject to political decisions of the North Atlantic Council, and that NATO will remain flexible on how it will respond to cyber attacks. This flexibility can be interpreted in two ways: as a deliberate position calculated to keep potential aggressors in a state of uncertainty regarding the consequences they might face, or as a sign that the Alliance has difficulty in achieving consensus on a firm response option. In the first case the aggressor might indeed be dissuaded from attacking NATO’s information networks by fear of an unforeseeable retaliation. Unfortunately, however, leaving response options unspecified creates a degree of ambiguity which might be perceived as reflecting political disagreements among the Allies on when and how NATO should intervene. If this were indeed the case, it might actually give an adversary good reason to favour cyber attacks over other forms of action against the Alliance’s – or the individual Allies’– critical infrastructure. In other words, the rationale for a cyber attack would be that political and conceptual divergences within NATO might delay the consensus required to trigger a collective response. Here, an interesting historical parallel is often drawn with the ambiguity regarding NATO’s nuclear deterrence in Europe during the Cold War: the point made by some analysts is that the experience of nuclear deterrence as practised by NATO and other actors can be usefully applied to the cyber domain, insofar as nuclear deterrence doctrine prevented nuclear conflicts. Unfortunately, nuclear and cyber deterrence differ significantly in both technical and strategic terms. Attackers might thus interpret the perpetuation of ambiguity in NATO’s nuclear and cyber retaliation posture as additional proof not only of political disagreements, but even of strategic misunderstanding.

Such an interpretation must unfortunately be taken seriously. Cyber attacks can take various forms, depending on their objectives and techniques – ranging from espionage, organized crime and disruption to outright destruction. Determining which category a specific type of attack falls into will largely depend on legal and political considerations at the national level. Interpretations might thus vary from one country to another, to the extent that a given action might be considered an act of war by one member state but not by another. This severely jeopardizes the political consensus required to initiate collective defence measures. The resulting difficulty in defining a threshold for collective response and an appropriate form of retaliation might in turn lead to a considerable weakening of NATO’s strategic credibility in cyber defence.

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