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Neither side will “escalate to de-escalate” OR climb the ladder.

Oliver & Baklitskiy 18 – *Directs the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. **Arms control and nonproliferation consultant at PIR Center, Moscow. Olga & Andry, 2-20-18, "The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/

There is a  in the West that an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear strategy, which for nuclear weapons use to a terrifyingly low level. Importantly, it’s referenced as fact in the Trump administration’s new which argues that the United States itself therefore needs new low-yield nuclear weapons to deter Russia at lower levels of conflict. But the evidence of a dropped threshold for Russian nuclear employment is weak. Moreover, even if this was Russia’s doctrine, a shift to more American reliance on lower-yield nuclear weapons would be the wrong solution to the problem. Understanding Russian Doctrine What do people mean when they say “escalate to de-escalate?” The words themselves are not particularly helpful. Any action that is neither a perfectly symmetrical nor smaller response to adversary action is escalation. Any threat (nuclear or otherwise) to raise the costs of conflict is a threat of escalation. And countries both escalate and threaten to do so fairly regularly as they seek to convince adversaries to rethink plans. The fact is that most escalation is intended to, well, de-escalate. Western analysts have developed a range of descriptions of Russian nuclear strategy that all fall, with varying degrees of consistency and contradiction, under the “escalate to de-escalate” umbrella. The and political scientist hold that Russia intends to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict to attain an advantageous battlefield outcome. So does current Pentagon official Russia would turn to nuclear weapons in the face of imminent battlefield defeat: e.g., to make up for conventional inferiority in a conflict with the NATO alliance. that Russia simply likes escalation, nuclear and otherwise. The notion that Russia might use nuclear weapons on the battlefield may originate in arguments in a 1999 paper published in the Russian military journal Voennaia Mysl. The authors, military officers and analysts V. I. Levshin, A. V. Nedelin, and M. E. Sosnovskii, that the use of nuclear weapons in a heretofore conventional conflict could demonstrate credibility and convince the adversary to stand down for fear of further escalation. The argument for more nuclear steps on the escalation ladder has been made more recently as . It was even promised by a senior Russian official prior to the release of a new military doctrine almost a decade . However, neither thatnor the one that followed it in (the most recent) in fact lowers the nuclear use threshold. As one of us has argued , the official statements, followed by a doctrine that did not deliver on them, suggest that proponents of a lowered threshold ultimately lost a bureaucratic fight. To this day, Russian “escalation” advocates occasionally publish an article, still hoping to change the policy — but continue to fail. Nor does Russian doctrine call for the use of nuclear weapons if Moscow is losing a conventional conflict. To the contrary, military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons will be used only in response to an adversary using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and/or “when the very existence of the state is ” One can argue what does and does not qualify as existential jeopardy, but the scenarios in which Western analysts envision Russian nuclear escalation — most of which involve ending a conventional conflict — seem to fall short by most definitions. In the past, Russia’s bar for nuclear use has been both higher and lower. In 1993, it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2000, however, following the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia, Russia’s new military doctrine allowed for first use in case of large-scale conventional aggression against Russia or its . It is plausible that at this time, plans indeed looked something like “escalate to de-escalate.” But soon after that, proponents of reliance on nuclear weapons found their views eclipsed by Russian government decisions to instead invest in conventional . At the time, this was mainly because Russia believed . Today, however, Russia is that its conventional capabilities can play at least some of the strategic deterrence roles historically played by nuclear weapons. A Secret Plan to Escalate? Those who believe in a lowered Russian threshold for nuclear use thus believe that Russia’s formal doctrine is intentionally disingenuous. Indeed, speculation about a secret annex to the doctrine that clandestinely lowers the nuclear threshold . But as in in War on the Rocks, if Russia’s goal is deterrence, a stated strategy of restraint at odds with a real strategy of escalation seems counterproductive. Deterrence works best when the adversary understands which actions will trigger an undesirable response. Three categories of evidence are offered to support the argument that Russia’s true nuclear threshold today is lower than its doctrine indicates: exercises, capability, and rhetoric. Like other nuclear states, Russia runs exercises that involve . The vast majority of these test strategic readiness, command and control, and interoperability. In a handful of recent cases, various sources use was simulated in otherwise conventional Russian exercises, supposedly boosting the evidence for “escalate to de-escalate.” It does not, however, appear that scenarios for these exercises fit the model of a small-scale nuclear strike early in a conflict—as one of us has argued in the . If one believes the strikes happened, conditions of a battlefield defeat posing an existential threat to the state are more plausible. However, as Bruno Tertrais explains, the evidence for simulated nuclear use in large conventional exercises is itself not fully . Importantly, Russia’s most recent large-scale military exercise focused on its Western flank, Zapad 2017, did not have any evident nuclear , despite positing a conflict with the NATO alliance. Then there’s Russian capability, specifically smaller-scale, shorter-range nuclear capabilities suitable for the battlefield. Russia maintains a substantial legacy of nonstrategic weapons, which some may believe suggests a willingness to use them. Moreover, in recent years, Moscow has emphasized the development of new warfighting systems that can be deployed with either nuclear or conventional firepower, the oft-touted Iskander being one . Russia is also working on hypersonic . Finally, the “accidental” leak of plans (in the form of a presentation slide) for a nuclear in 2015 fueled speculation that Russia is thinking creatively about nuclear warfighting (although the destructive power of the purported weapon would surely have strategic, not merely “de-escalatory,” effects). Some may argue that capability is evidence enough of possible “escalate to de-escalate” plans, and the West should therefore respond in kind. This is wrong, for two reasons: First, weapons can be used for all sorts of things, and one cannot plan for all possible contingencies — only those that seem plausible. Russia could also, in principle, plan to set off all of its nuclear weapons at once, or fire some of them into space. If a possible strategy is not supported by the evidence, it should not drive planning. Second, the argument that capabilities prove intent works both ways. The United States also has low-yield nuclear capabilities (and will have more if proponents have their way). Should Russia therefore expect the United States to use nuclear weapons first if American conventional forces were losing, say in a fight against Russia over Ukraine? Indeed, such an approach would be consistent with the American doctrine outlined in the new Nuclear Posture Review. But while the review may make this scenario less ludicrous than it was in the past, Russia would still be dangerously paranoid to base its planning on the possibility. There is no evidence of U.S. plans to start an offensive war against a major nuclear power like Russia or China, much less to use a preemptive nuclear strike to “de-escalate” a conventional conflict once it went wrong. So what is Russia’s very large nonstrategic arsenal for, and why is it emphasizing dual-use systems? First, as regards the nonstrategic arsenal as a whole, Russia is quite simply loath to give up something it has a lot of without getting something else in return. Second, Moscow knows that its nuclear capabilities make Brussels and Washington nervous. Russians did not discuss a nuclear role for the Iskander—and, indeed, rejected the possibility—until the Western press started describing the system as To be blunt, if not reassuring, Moscow has noticed that an emphasis on dual-capable systems keeps the West off-balance, and sees that as a clear benefit. This brings us to the last category of evidence for a clandestine lowered threshold: Russian rhetoric. While some Russian pundits recklessly talk of turning countries to , senior officials, including President Vladimir Putin, have been far more careful with their threats. Putin may that the Crimea crisis could, in some contingencies, have led him to place nuclear weapons on alert. However, this never happened, and it is something of a stretch to interpret that as meaning he would have used a tactical nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict. Moreover, in the face of recent nuclear from America’s own president, the comments Putin has made seem almost circumspect. Putin’s rhetoric is meant not to signal plans to use nuclear weapons recklessly, but rather to remind any who may have forgotten that Russia is a nuclear weapons state. While this is prospectively destabilizing, it does not indicate a deep occult doctrine, much less a doctrine that has been consistently and publicly rejected. Russian rhetoric reflects the fact that Russia, much like the Soviet Union before it, sees NATO posing a threat that needs to be deterred. Moscow continues to believe, and Russian generals in private conversations emphasize, that any conventional conflict with NATO risks rapid escalation without “de-escalation” — into all-destroying nuclear war. It must therefore be avoided at all costs. This logic is consistent with that put forward by American scholars who have d nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War. The success of the nuclear peace, in this view, lay in the threat of extreme escalation, not the bespoke step-by-step deterrence the Nuclear Posture Review seems to advocate and that the postulated Russian “de-escalation” doctrine would implicitly endorse.

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