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AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Ukraine---Not Nuclear---Ext

Won’t go nuclear or draw in NATO

Tom Rogan 2/28, foreign policy/national security writer for the Washington Examiner, Bachelor of Arts in War Studies from King's College London, a Master of Science in Middle East politics from SOAS, and a Graduate Diploma in Law from the University of Law, London, “Why Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons,” Washington Examiner, 2/28/22, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/why-russia-is-highly-unlikely-to-use-nuclear-weapons

As Russia struggles to conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has moved his strategic nuclear forces to a heightened alert posture.

Satellite imagery also indicates that the Russian Northern Fleet has moved more ballistic missile submarines into Arctic and Barents sea patrol sectors. While U.S. nuclear forces remain at standard readiness levels, the U.S. military has a greater baseline readiness and redundant nuclear strike capability than does Russia.

I suspect the ultimate intent of Putin's public nuclear threat is to dangle the risk of escalation so as to deter Western unity on further sanctions. This would not be the first time — in October 2020, Russian state media threatened to turn Germany into a "radioactive desert" following that nation's hosting of NATO nuclear exercises. The pressure worked. Nudged by left-wing elements in his Social Democratic Party, Chancellor Olaf Scholz cooled Germany's nuclear commitments under NATO.

In Ukraine's case, Putin's nuclear threats likely come in his anticipation of massive Russian conventional attacks upon Ukrainian civilian population centers such as Kyiv. Russian forces are struggling to break through determined Ukrainian resistance. Putin's form in Chechnya and Syria suggests he will attempt to smash Ukraine's civilian morale and thus its government's will to resist. But Putin also needs the West to hesitate before further punishing him for the terror yet to come.

Regardless, the risk of a Russian nuclear strike remains very low for two further reasons.

First off, a nuclear strike would not be in Russia's or Putin's interest. The Kremlin appears to have been shocked by the significant Western sanctions already imposed upon its economy and against Putin's person. Yet were Russia to detonate a nuclear warhead over Ukrainian forces or Kyiv, it would likely precipitate total economic isolation. This would have a profound impact on Russian society, likely precipitating mass protests against Putin's rule and perhaps encouraging a palace coup. Even erstwhile Russian partners such as China would likely be pushed into supporting sanctions in such a scenario, fearing the catastrophic public relations damage of failing to do so. (China has a vested interest in strengthening its relations with the European Union.) Putin may be many things, but he is not stupid. And despite the speculation, I understand that there is no high-quality evidence to suggest that Putin is mentally ill or has otherwise lost his mind.

Second, it is far from certain that Russian military forces would actually carry out a nuclear attack order. Like the U.S., Russian nuclear command and control has traditionally relied upon two- to three-person release protocols to ensure a legitimate nuclear order.

The exact Russian nuclear release protocols are highly classified and unknown but would likely involve both Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov's authentication of Putin's order. While Putin's more recent centralization of power may have altered these protocols, the general staff would still need to distribute attack orders to nuclear forces. Those forces would then need to carry out the order. That matters because these personnel know that any nuclear strike would entail, as a minimum, catastrophic sanctions and the degradation of Russian military history and honor. In the worst-case scenario, a nuclear strike would risk an escalation spiral that ends with nuclear war against NATO.

Gerasimov isn't crazy. Nor are most of the security elite around Putin. They know that once one nuclear weapon is used, U.S., British, and French nuclear forces would immediately move to very high alert status. Russian forces would then do the same. The Russians know that this dynamic would greatly exacerbate the risk of miscalculation.

Consider, for example, that Russian ballistic missile submarines are almost constantly shadowed by U.S. and British attack submarines while on patrol. After a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine, one miscalculation might lead to one undersea battle. Fearing an imminent attack at scale, this might then lead to one nation's preemptive strike against the other nation's nuclear assets. This is just a hypothetical scenario, but it illustrates how even the hint of nuclear warfare could lead to a worldwide shooting war. The Russians know this.

The bottom line: Putin and his ultra-hawk spymaster Nikolai Patrushev might support a nuclear strike, but it's highly unlikely they will order one. It's even less likely that others in Putin's inner circle would support it. They would more likely strike him out before agreeing to fire off nukes.

There are intermediate steps in the escalatory ladder---ongoing conflict doesn’t necessarily mean nuclear war

Ryan Faith 3/11, former defense and national security editor at VICE News and congressional staffer, writes about defense and space policy, “Ukraine Isn’t World War III. It’s Not Even Close.,” Daily Beast, 3/11/2022, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraine-isnt-world-war-iii-its-not-even-close

However unnerving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, the fight is a long, long way from the titanic, globe-spanning conflict that would constitute a “world war.”

For Ukraine, this is an existential conflict for national survival. For the rest of the world, this conflict may seem terrifying, but that’s what all wars look like to anyone paying attention up close—especially one involving a nuclear-armed combatant. The world hasn’t seen a high-intensity conflict between two relatively modern militaries in Europe since World War II. Of course this is a shock to the system.

If the U.S. and NATO want to constrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine, there are many options short of full conflict.

For instance, during the Korean War, the Soviet Union sent both fighter aircraft and pilots to fly them against U.S. aircraft. This playbook could be repeated with NATO countries contributing equipment and troops. More recently, Russia deployed military “contractors” throughout the eight years of destabilization in Ukraine to provide Moscow with plausible deniability. The U.S. and NATO could likewise deploy contractors, even if they are used in limited non-combat roles such as supply and building fortifications. Plans for Pentagon cyberattacks have been on the books for a while. The point is, there are options for the U.S. and NATO to exert military pressure on Russia without escalating to an all-out war.

The problem now is that preemptively panicking over potential escalation effectively grants Vladimir Putin control over the size and scale of the conflict.

Crucially, just because a conflict could grow into a larger-scale, multi-nation fight doesn’t mean it necessarily will. The management of a conflict's size and scope are things that participants try to closely monitor and manage. Jumping to the conclusion that literally every move by NATO will lead to an apocalyptic war for the ages is grossly premature. It’s like forwarding matches from a dating app to a wedding planner. There are some important intermediate steps you can’t skip.

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