Governance Fails---1NC
Other states will inevitably deploy militarized AI and future tech---attempts at norm-setting just signal weakness and cede the race to adversaries.
Matt Bartlett 19, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland, focuses on the gauntlet of legal and policy issues raised by technology, particularly emerging technologies like AI, blockchain and cryptocurrency, “The AI Arms Race In 2019”,
This piece will show just how ineffective such activism has been, however well-intentioned. The arms race in AI is already underway — and has been for years. It is now 2019, and we cannot waste time pretending Pandora’s Box hasn’t already been opened. This is the time to take stock of the latent evidence of weaponised AI, and consider the geopolitical incentives that produced this quagmire.
Ready, Set, Gone
A tour of the countries driving the AI arms race may as well start in Moscow. Putin’s government, hardly one to , is categorically opposed to the creation of a new norm (against autonomous weapons). Moscow has even — successfully — states meet just to discuss the issue. Russia itself has that a limit on autonomous weapon development is inappropriate given “few such weapons have ever been developed”.
Selflessly, Russia is working hard on making a lie of such a claim. Leaked budgets for AI-specific research and development for 2019–2021 show state investment ( $490m USD) almost over the next three years. Russian intent in this area is no secret. Just ask General Gerasimov, a general and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Forces: with the state news agency as saying “robots will be one of the main features of future wars… [Russia] is seeking to completely automate the battlefield.”
For a taste of what to expect in future wars, consider this announcement from the crown jewel of Russian arms manufacturers: Kalashnikov (maker of the ubiquitous AK-47). The an entire range of autonomous weapons, each with a ‘neural network’ enabling the machines to pick out targets and decide autonomously whether to engage. Another Russian weapons manufacturer, Degtyarev, an autonomous ‘suicide machine’ called the Nerekhta. This drone is built to stealthily traverse close to a target, and then explode with the force to destroy fortifications or enemy tanks.
It’s important to emphasise here that the selected examples are just the tip of the Russian iceberg: we have not touched the , the ‘ or the The picture is pretty clear: Russia has a large and ambitious autonomous weapons program in place, and sees this program as central to its national security interests. It follows that nobody should be surprised to see Putin — already — on the offensive against the mere spectre of a global AI arms ban.
More surprising, perhaps, is just how aligned the Russian position on autonomous weapons is with that of the United States and China. Indeed, for a pair of geopolitical powers that struggle mightily to around contentious geopolitical issues, the United States and Russia have displayed any prohibitions on autonomous weapons.
Why might this be? No need to reach for the ; try a simple number (albeit one with a lot of zeros). The Pentagon to a $9 billion spend on American military AI, explicitly citing the need to keep up with Russian and Chinese military technology. While the American budget for AI represents just a fraction of overall defence spending, much like in Russia, the figure has doubled in recent years.
Unique among the global powers, the US deploying autonomous vehicles in turbulent combat areas, in large numbers and with significant roles. Autonomous naval vehicles have begun to patrol the South China Sea — with larger, more powerful machines . Most striking of all, American aerial drones have all over Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Obama administration. It is absolutely clear why the United States have opposed all moves towards a prohibition of autonomous weapons: America wants to win the arms race, not stop it.
For its part, China has actually indicated in April last year for a ban on battlefield use of autonomous weapons. However, discerning readers ought to take the Chinese statement with several grains of salt: the very same day, the Chinese air force for an ‘intelligent-swarm’ design for a new autonomous drone. In a similar vein, even in the last year the Chinese autonomous weapons program has churned out success stories. that China is taking an unassailable edge in the arms race; somewhat at odds with Beijing’s support for an AI weapons ban.
Elsa Kania for Lawfare that the Chinese are pursuing a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ with military AI: displaying rhetorical commitment to concerned human rights groups without sacrificing any real flexibility to develop cutting-edge lethal autonomous weapons. After all, becoming the global leader in AI (including arms development) is ; and Beijing to be too bothered with human rights groups when a strategic interest is at stake.
In other words, the three biggest military powers in the world have already:
Identified autonomous weapons as crucial to their military strategy;
Scaled up their resourcing and development of these weapons; and
Characterised the need for more advanced weapons in the context of other powers’ technological development.
We have to call this what it is: a serious .
A Reckoning for Elon and Friends
In my view, continued activism to block the development of lethal autonomous weapons is untenable in light of the evidence available. Elon Musk and the Future of Life’s well-intentioned to forestall an arms race in military AI have failed. At this stage, Russia, China and the United States (not to mention ) are significantly invested in lethal autonomous weapons, and view them as fundamental to the future of armed conflict. We can expect resourcing for military AI to continue to escalate, and for states to begin to deploy sophisticated drones in greater numbers.
It is important to note that this behaviour from large states is right in line with their rational incentives (rather than, for instance, ). It is not in any of the great powers’ interests to unilaterally support an AI weapons ban and de-escalate weapons development. If one were to do so, the possibility that another power might take the opportunity to develop an unassailable edge in weaponised AI is nigh on inevitable. Battles between autonomous drones by which side has the more powerful software and autonomy. Machines that are able to ‘think’, react, manoeuvre and engage on their own accord will prevail over slower machines, let alone sluggish humans.
Emerging tech regulation fails and AFF can’t solve.
Greg E. Marchant 20, Regents Professor and Lincoln Professor of Emerging Technologies, Law & Ethics, and Faculty Director, Center for Law, Science & Innovation, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, “Governing Emerging Technologies,” Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 73(6), 2020, p. 1863-1865
I. THE WICKED PROBLEM OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE
Emerging technologies—such as synthetic biology, gene editing, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, internet of things, 3D printing, drones, applied neurotechnologies, and blockchain and cryptocurrencies—present a common set of governance challenges.5 Perhaps most significant is the “pacing problem,” where the pace of technology development far outstrips the capability of regulatory systems to keep up.6 Powered by growing market demand and intense business competition, new technologies are being developed, deployed, and commercialized faster than ever before.7 At the same time, traditional governmental processes of legislation, regulation, and judicial review have been slowed by increasing bureaucratic requirements and the increasing politicization of technological disputes.8 The result of accelerating technology and decelerating regulatory oversight is a growing governance gap. Any new statutes or regulations affecting these new technologies are likely to be outdated before the ink dries. As technology governance expert David Rajeski has noted, “[i]f you think that any existing regulatory framework can keep pace with this rate of change, think again.”9 Facing such a bleak prospect, regulators often sensibly defer regulation, waiting for a more stable technology plateau that may or may not ever come.
A second regulatory challenge of many emerging technologies is that they present risks and concerns outside the scope of existing regulatory agency jurisdictions.10 Regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, are restricted to regulating the safety and efficacy of products. But many applications of emerging technologies raise broader ethical and social concerns relating to human enhancement, “playing God,” autonomy, dignity, fairness, equitable access, privacy, and longer-term impacts on society.11 These issues are largely outside the safety and efficacy scope of current agency jurisdictions and thus often escape any regulatory oversight.
Yet another challenge to the regulation of emerging technologies is their breadth of application. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and blockchain span the entire industry spectrum, as well as many nonindustrial activities and sectors. They are sometimes referred to as “enabling” or “platform” technologies that, like computers or the internet, have the potential to affect virtually every industry sector.12 There are thousands, if not tens or hundreds of thousands, of ways these core technologies are used, each with their own context of risks and benefits. These broad applications not only involve many different types of industries and businesses, but also affect many other types of stakeholders and nongovernmental organizations with particular interests in specific applications. The broad applications of these technologies also span many different regulatory agencies, each with their own organic statutes with different requirements, criteria, and goals. The end result of this multitude of applications, regulated parties, stakeholders, and regulators is tremendous regulatory diversity and complexity. Further complicating the regulatory challenge, emerging technologies are inherently international in application, creating the need for some type of international coordination.13
Finally, the unprecedented uncertainty about emerging technologies also impedes effective regulation.14 Because the technologies are so new and moving forward so quickly, there is enormous uncertainty about the trajectories, benefits, and risks of these technologies.15 Given these uncertainties, it is possible to paint unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic visions of the technology at issue, thus fostering public controversy, conflict, and unease.16
In summary, the governance of emerging technologies is characterized by complexity, diversity, and uncertainty. These same characteristics—complexity, diversity, and uncertainty—are the defining characteristics of a wicked problem.17 As a wicked problem, the governance of emerging technologies is unlikely to be solved by a single or simple solution. Traditional government regulation will not be sufficient, or many times even appropriate, for emerging technologies.18 Rather than traditional regulation—consisting of enforceable rules unilaterally imposed by a regulatory agency—emerging technologies will require a “governance” approach that expands the categories of responsible parties beyond government to include the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks and also expands the relevant oversight mechanism beyond enforceable government regulations.19 Four alternative governance approaches for emerging technologies are discussed and evaluated in the next Part.