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Transatlantic AI innovation is surging now.

Edward Hunter Christie 22, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence Cooperation in Artificial Intelligence: Bridging the Transatlantic Gap for a Stronger Europe,” European View, vol. 21, no. 1, SAGE Publications Ltd, 04/01/2022, pp. 13–21

Investment challenges

As noted in the introduction, there is a significant gap between overall US and European defence spending levels. This general pattern also holds for defence research and development spending. In 2020, EU spending in this area amounted to €8 billion (EDA 2021). For the US, with caveats as to comparability, expenditure for ‘research, development, test and evaluation’ totalled approximately €90 billion3 in the 2021 fiscal year (from October 2020 to September 2021), or about 10 times more.

Investment challenges go beyond issues of scale. The US also has greater experience in the setting up and operation of structures to promote both military and dual-use innovation. While the best-known institution is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, other US government structures are also relevant in discussions on fostering innovation in AI for military applications. A much-discussed example is In-Q-Tel, which was originally set up as the state venture-capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. To illustrate the influence of the In-Q-Tel example, one may note that both its current Chief Executive Officer, Chris Darby, and one of its former Chief Executive Officers, Gilman Louie, served among the 15 commissioners of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.4 This was a temporarily created expert commission mandated by the US Congress to provide policy recommendations for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach for US AI policy.5

With In-Q-Tel, the idea is to learn from private-sector practices in the area of venture-capital investment and repurpose them for state needs and more patient time horizons. A supported company should pursue product development strategies aimed at serving both civilian markets and government needs. In this way, rather than effectively taking over a commercial company and limiting its growth potential to future government contracts alone, the government body encourages an intermediate trajectory made up of mixed revenue streams, in the hope that this will generate greater returns to scale and higher efficiency thanks to the disciplining effect of private-sector competition. Conversely, the advantage of this approach as compared to not intervening at all is that the commercial company will integrate current and likely future government needs into its product and business-development strategy, rather than ignoring them and finding itself, at a later date, unable to supply the government sector according to the latter’s requirements.

A related issue which falls between what can be achieved with new investment instruments and new protections that can be assured through the screening of foreign direct investment is the provision of investment from trusted private investors to the technology sector. Certain technology companies that are not part of the traditional defence industry may be developing dual-use products that are of potential interest to the defence sector while having limited awareness of national security concerns. This may make them vulnerable targets for both licit and illicit attempts to acquire their technologies on the part of foreign state actors. At the same time, their business development needs may lead them to seek investment from any potential source, thus exposing them to potential risks. To respond to this challenge, the US Department of Defense has launched a scheme called the Trusted Capital Marketplace (US Department of Defense 2021a).

Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into.

DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities.

Regarding the NATO Innovation Fund, 17 Allies had opted into the Fund as of the date of its announcement in October 2021. The participating Allies will inject up to €1 billion into Allied innovation ecosystems over the next 15 years. The Fund aims to attract additional private investments due to the de-risking effect, both financial and technological, thanks to state co-funding and diligence and screening efforts. The funds are intended to be used for long-term support of ‘deep tech’ innovative companies, that is, for advanced research into AI, quantum and related technologies that may have both military and civilian applications. Due diligence and security screening practices will aim to ensure that both private investors and fund recipients are trusted entities.

The AFF saps funding for AI research AND eliminates beneficial dual-use technology.

Castro & McLaughlin 19 --- *Vice President, ITIF, and Director, Center for Data Innovation. **Research Analyst Information Technology and Innovation Foundation

Daniel & Michael, 2-4-2019, "Ten Ways the Precautionary Principle Undermines Progress in Artificial Intelligence," ITIF, https://itif.org/publications/2019/02/04/ten-ways-precautionary-principle-undermines-progress-artificial-intelligence/

Many groups have started movements to ban lethal autonomous weapons—autonomous robotics systems that can independently identify and engage targets based on programmed constraints—due to fears that they will lead to armed conflict on a scale greater and faster than ever before. For example, 116 founders of mostly small robotics and AI companies, including Elon Musk, signed a letter to the United Nations (UN) in 2017 that urges the body to ban lethal autonomous weapons.36 In 2018, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that “machines that have the power and the discretion to take human lives are politically unacceptable, are morally repugnant, and should be banned by international law.”37 Also in 2018, members of the European Parliament adopted a resolution asking member states and the European Council for “the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems.”38 If policymakers enacted such a ban, it would slow research into AI, as historically, at least in the United States, defense agencies have been a source of significant funding for technology advancement, such as the Internet. And much of the research to support autonomous weapons would yield dual-use technology that could be used for commercial purposes. For example, a fully autonomous tank will likely rely on large portions of the same algorithms and data used to develop a fully autonomous military transport vehicle.39 These same algorithms would be relevant to developing autonomous vehicles for civilian use.

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