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Link – AI Integration

The integration of AI via security cooperation constitutes the unshackling the nation-state from the population at the level of economic and military power – that turns case – it paves the way for unchecked racialized necropolitics as a value that informs politics and replaces human governance with AI that kill with impunity and result in endless, endemic warfare

Grove 20 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai’I at Mānoa, PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University [Jairus, “From geopolitics to geotechnics: global futures in the shadow of automation, cunning machines, and human speciation,” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 432 –455, DKP]

The automation of war and the reduction of human troop sizes has a similar effect. Wars aided by drones and as a result significantly smaller numbers of soldier casualties continue on for decades in a kind of sustainable warfare.28 The political and material cost of casualties like the material cost of striking are being removed from the political equation making states less and less accountable in the case of social justice and the pursuit of violence outside their borders.

The feedback between these two trends is potentially catastrophic. At the same time that war becomes easier, governments become less accountable to their people, and people are deprived of the means to support themselves, it is also the case that people will matter less to their governments as they will not possess the labor power to cause pain to the economic productivity of the country by means of striking nor the capacity to refuse to fight. Zygmunt Bauman has spoken of disposable populations, a kind of human waste or surplus where the value of one’s existence is meaningless for the state.29 However, we ought to go further down this path by way of Achille Mbembe’s creeping necropolitics.30 It is not merely that chronically or even intergenerational unemployed people have no value; it is that the marginalization and even murder of people can now generate value. In what Mbembe refers to as the ‘enclave economies’ of war machines:

The concentration of activities connected with the extraction of valuable resource around these enclaves has, in return, turned the enclaves into privileged spaces of war and death. War itself is fed by the increased sales of the products extracted.31

In these enclave economies fueled by petroleum, diamonds, but increasingly things like lithium or even sand or water, the outright murder of people, clearing space, generates value even in the supposedly post-resource digital economy.32 However, beyond the instrumental value of security there is also the explosion of security services as its own economic sector rather than as a merely means to secure other economic sectors. International security corporations such as Wackenhut industries, once a private prison service provider in the U.S., now generate profits from refugee management in Australia and Europe.33 The nearly 200 billion dollar private security industry and $1917 billion dollar defense sector suggest that the economy of making death and deprivation is more than merely a means. What few normative and legal limitations exist on the lethality of these corporations and institutions could disappear. This is already taking place in the global South and amongst African-Americans and indigenous people around the planet.

However, one can foresee, with little imagination, the extreme injustices of the contemporary era as a general condition of global life. What requires imagination on our part is reaching a turning point where these crimes become themselves normative, that is, the ‘good’ the state pursues. Contrary to our sensibilities such ideologies already exist and are even gaining attention outside the obscure chat rooms where they began.

Under the heading of ‘negative messianism’, Mbembe reviews the growing movement of the ‘Dark Enlightenment’, ‘a political religion. . . [that] calls for the exit from democratic society and total corporate and absolute dictatorship’.34 The movement calls for a global, racial, culling of the population in the name of ‘human biodiversity’ and expounds the value of using racially inferior populations for radical experimentation to jumpstart technological breakthrough. If this sounds too implausible even for speculation it is worth considering the spate of recent terrorist attacks in the U.S. by the vanguard of the Dark Enlightenment. The mass shooter who killed 20 people in El Paso Texas in August of 2019 posted his Dark Enlightenment manifesto before beginning his rampage.35 In 2020, there have been multiple attacks by the so-called Boogaloos who have infiltrated the U.S. military and police forces and seek to spark the Dark Enlightenment by escalating the Black Lives Matter protests into a full scale civil war.36 And then there is the most famous and vocal theorist of the Dark Enlightenment, Steve Bannon, who in addition to being a key architect of the Donald Trump administration, works tirelessly to build the Dark Enlightenment movement amongst the burgeoning far right of Europe.37 Whether this world view succeeds or actually becomes normative globally is not really the point. Instead, as is the mode in the speculation here I propose that in the burgeoning Dark Enlightenment movement we can see a political community built around necropolitics as a value rather than a necessary evil.

It would be too much to draw a direct line from the Dark Enlightenment to all of the neo-nationalist, neo-authoritarian, and neo-fascist movements around the planet. However, the accelerating global right wing has been institutionalized at the highest levels of power in liberal democratic nation-states such as the United States, U.K. and India, suggesting that liberal institutions cannot subsist on autopilot. Neo-authoritarian politics have also moved from shaping domestic polities to the shaping of the international order.38

In such an order, what would liberal democratic states look like? The constraints on the genocidal dictatorships of the twentieth century was of course that they needed a substantial portion of their populations. Genocide could only be pursued against minority populations. State behavior even in the extremes of the Nazi state among others still required full mobilization and therefore at some level the necessity of willing obedience even if not quite legitimacy that could be supplemented through terror.39

What of the behavior of future states for whom their people are in some sense an afterthought? At a minimum the basic conceits of survival that underwrite practices like deterrence or coercion would change dramatically. The very logic and mechanics of biopolitics would have to change. Without a necessary or strict relationship to the nation, would states differ significantly from some kind of corporate entity? Would the state more closely resemble the ancien regime? What would become of territoriality? These are the grammatical questions raised by the dark imagination of an automated future sufficiently comprehensive to create the material condition whereby a state could survive without the majority of their population’s cooperation.

Can we not already see the outlines of such a future in the decisions of Bolsanaro, Trump, Xi, Modi, and Duterte, who blithely write off millions of their own citizens in the face of COVID-19 and the nearly 50 per cent unemployment rate it has created where the virus has been allowed total freedom of movement?40 One need not be conspiratorial to see how quick authoritarian leaders have been to give up on disease containment once the data came back regarding the overwhelming racial disparity in COVID fatalities.41

If we consider the ways in which the shift from coal to oil changed the character of economic and labor relations with states in the twentieth century, the nearly 50 per cent loss of jobs due to computerization in the twenty-first century,42 combined with a corresponding decline in the necessity of humans for military power, then these new conditions could change the very nature of what a state is. The biopolitical raison d’être of the nation-state which emerges in the nineteenth century and becomes truly geopolitical in the twentieth century is premised on the mobilization and securing of a national population.43 The revolutionary states emerge from and rationalize the hyphen of the nationstate as essential both in terms of democratic values and military-economic necessity. What will emerge in the aftermath of such necessities and values is the horizon of alternative futures we must consider.

Section 3: from Bergsonian machines to cunning machines

“Hello,” whispered Montag, fascinated as always with the dead beast, the living beast. . . Montag touched the muzzle. The Hound growled. . . “It doesn’t like me,” said Montag. “What the Hound?” The Captain studied his cards. “Come off it. It doesn’t like or dislike. It just ‘functions.’ It’s like a lesson in ballistics. It has a trajectory we decide on for it. It follows through. It targets itself, homes itself, and cuts off. It’s only copper wire, storage batteries, and electricity. . .

–Fahrenheit 451 A Wiener Filter or The Yellow Peril

The equation above is called a Wiener Filter. In mathematical terms, Norbert Wiener used it with a number of other steps to calculate the future. Despite the claims in the first section that the future does not exist, the territory or probable limits of the future do, at least most of the time. What Wiener was representing mathematically was that even with little data on which one would normally make a prediction you can define the space of possibility or in Wiener’s terms the distribution of probabilities even for non-linear or non-existent causal systems. In practical terms it meant that artillery could be automated to shoot where planes were going to be rather than where they were when the radar signal returned. The mathematicians did this by considering and then modeling the limits of the system being predicted.

It is impossible to predict what an individual pilot will choose to do but it is possible to describe in mathematical terms what a pilot is capable of doing and similarly what a plane with a particular maximum velocity was capable of doing. The predictions made by the Wiener Filter allowed the artillery guns to fire in a significantly more restricted area with minimal radar information rather than just blasting away at the sky in hopes of hitting something. According to Steve Heims, more predictable systems like the V2 rocket could be successfully targeted and shot down 99 out 100 times by the Wiener Filter.44 The seemingly ‘dumb’ artillery could adjust or read their environment and work in concert adjusting further as information from rudimentary radar systems or the assemblage of radar, operators, and canons. The artillery was in the most basic sense becoming aware.

Wiener’s ‘solution’ which made unpredictable systems targetable was another version of what Claude Shannon very soon after solved for communication with his theory of information. Shannon developed the techniques which allow the efficient transmission of information through imperfect media such as telephone lines by similarly modeling the range of noise and compensating or repeating signal to exceed it. Rather than predicting the noise which is impossible because of its chaotic nature Shannon was able to treat all noise as a system rather than individual events of noise such that the range of noise could stand in place of the individual incidents. In both cases, the breakthroughs of Wiener and Shannon created the world of computers, the internet, automation, and machine learning we now inhabit. All systems after Wiener and Shannon could be treated in some sense as information and communication problems to be solved.45

After his experience in the war and further experiments after, Wiener began to describe a more general principle of informatics and machine technology. What he would later call the last science or the science of everything saw every system, whether physical, chemical, mechanical, biological, as computable and alterable. Following this insight Wiener believed humanity was at the cusp of something unprecedented. In 1948, he declared that a new kind of machine had emerged in the history of human evolution. Although still rudimentary, cybernetic machines of the 1940s were capable for the first time of simple self-regulation based on interactions with their external environment. Unlike thermodynamic machines that sought equilibrium, cybernetic machines could pursue a goal or objective in the world. Wiener referred to these new machines as Bergsonian machines, after the French Philosopher Henri Bergson and his idea of elan vital.46 For Wiener, machines possessed for the first time the spark of a vital impulse. While these Bergsonian machines have so far disappointed the expectation of those hoping for and others fearing human-like artificial intelligence, machinic intelligence, whether learning algorithms or self-steering and targeting weapons systems, have exploded into a variable rainforest ecology of new species.

What is important for the purposes of this article is that Wiener was able to demonstrate that very simple feedback mechanisms could produce complex emergent results or what ‘appeared’ like intelligence even if the machines were not conscious of that intelligence. What I explore throughout the rest of the section is how even small advances in machine intelligence could produce dramatic changes in what we think of now as human dependent drones. Already AI platforms have the capacity to strategize and win complex games like Go, AI via drones have the capability to target or execute operations on their own, robots can 3D print and construct other robots, that is, a simple form of reproduction. The only thing missing is what in philosophical terms we call will or desire. However, the insight from Wiener is that the difference between rudimentary will and a command code is insignificant in effect if a feedback exists between the machine and the external environment which can shape or direct the now desiring machine. To put it somewhat simply, we do not need human general intelligence for robots to change the world and geopolitics; the world could change overnight if mechanical life emerged or was released into the wild and was as sophisticated, resilient and procreative as the cockroach.

We are already experiencing the burgeoning capability of cunning machine. If one considers to the underlying political and economic pressure to move away from human combatants not unlike the globalization of the labor market more broadly, the incentives for innovations continuing are difficult to deny.47 Even before 9/11 combat was becoming too costly in both economic and political terms and therefore required an alternative in order for empires and smaller states to stay afloat in lean times. The globally modeled War on Terrorism brought the crises of military expenditure still lingering after the Cold War to a head. However, the drive to cut costs and political liability has not stopped at the battlefield. Attempts to remove humans further and further from the battlefield follows this inhuman trajectory into the arena of decision-making and contestation.48 The reliance on algorithmic warfare creates the opportunity for increasingly unilateral warmaking. Cunning machines, not machines of reason but machines capable of hunting and trapping, represent the possibility of the command and control developed for nuclear arsenals with the micro-scale to pursue and kill of assassins or special forces.49

This process of automating politics as well as war creates further incentive for the development of increasingly autonomous machines and actually undermines security as it makes the capacity to wage war cheaper and more accessible around the planet. The drive for more autonomous machines is heading toward ‘sustainable warfare’, a kind of weird parallel to sustainable development. Like sustainable development, sustainable warfare really makes warfare endemic rather than providing a real alternative to war making. So war as we know it may be coming to an end but a permeating martial transformation is just getting started.

As the transformation in domestic policing, military planning, and combat takes place, the tactical landscape will also mutate, amplifying the corrosive effects on politics. A security complex indifferent to the differences between the war and policing, battlefield and lifeworld will increasingly target Internet exchanges, servers, monitoring, and listening stations, civilian communication and media infrastructure. As populations cease to matter to states, either those attacking or being attacked, infrastructure becomes the whole of the strategic landscape. Also, as the size of autonomous machines shrink, the incentive for hacking or indiscriminate attacks such as electromagnetic pulse attacks will become more desirable as drone to drone or human to drone combat will be prohibitively difficult.

After all, how reliably can one expect to track a drone the size of a dragonfly or as low to the ground as a snake? Thus, we face the possibility of a confluence of unaccountable decision-making, even the absence of human decisions at all with the saturation of living spaces with the dissonance of combat, killing and destruction. Rather than simply automating the ‘hunt’ for enemies chosen by political processes, already reliance on things like signature strikes signal a shift to the automation of the political decision of who is and is not an enemy in the first place. This shift from what Human Rights Watch has termed ‘human on the loop’ practices to ‘human out of the loop’ practices pushes the posthuman50 character of war further into the nightmare zone in which everything is an object to be targeted but never encountered or recognized. An algorithmic cunning replaces enmity and martial judgment in the recognizable terms.

Furthermore, in a future with a receding human public and that states are indifferent to moral catastrophe, these changes in machine capability and autonomy as well as the deployment of such machines would not be political events. Switches would be flipped by military planners or software developers along technical rather than ethical or political lines. Lewis Mumford referred to this as the advent of ‘post-historic’ humanity in which a process that ‘began innocently by eliminating fallible human impulses from science will end by eliminating human nature from the whole world of reality. In posthistoric culture life itself is reduced to predictable, mechanically conditioned and controlled motion, with ever incalculable – that is, every creative – element removed’.51 I would add that what emerges in its place is a mechanic creativity allowed to thrive within the constraints of a limited martial logic. If we continue on this trajectory practicality could replace both strategic and moral thinking.52 Further, the fora in which such decisions will be made (if at all) are likely to be constricted as secrecy predominates in an environment charged by a dangerous mix of paranoia and real danger.

The expansion of even “friendly AI” builds a bridge to a post-human hellscape, where geopolitics is structured around techno-dystopic racialized violence

Grove 20 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai’I at Mānoa, PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University [Jairus, “From geopolitics to geotechnics: global futures in the shadow of automation, cunning machines, and human speciation,” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 432 –455, DKP]

In Cavell’s account the general economy of violence that characterized the sadism of slavery could return again but differently. Rather than a great chain of being or the superiority or some races over others, the very concept of violence as a category distinct from force or change could be lost. Although extreme, can we not already see this transformation underway in the extreme forms of instrumentality that characterize decisions regarding collateral damage, counter-value targeting, or economized discourse on immigration and refugees?56

More than a transformation of moral economies, the automation of humans and the augmentation of humans, represents the possibility of making physical and habitual what is now normative and discursive. Resembling Cavell, David Roden proposes what he calls the disconnection thesis, in which Cavell’s nightmare scenario unfolds only among some humans for whom the sentimentality of bodies, reproduction, and human connection impede further evolution of the species.57 Whether it is those who dream of a singularity in which human consciousness becomes digital or one of the U.S. veterans who have had mood altering computer chips implanted into their brains, some humans will increasingly alter or altered their brain-body networks to alter their cognitive and perceptive capacities.58

During the summer of 2018 researchers at the University of Washington and Carnegie Mellon successfully networked three humans via EEGs and transcranial magnetic stimulation. The three individuals were able to collaborate to play a simple video game resembling Tetris.59 The participants were able to communicate and sense each others’ thoughts without the use of language or even being in the same room. Similar experiments have successfully sent text message from one side of the country to the other making at least a limited version of brain to brain communication a reality.

In the dark light of geopolitics one can imagine what today takes the form of geographic and class divides in connectivity and medicine taking the form of different classes and territories of consciousness and communication. Given the already gossamer fragility of international solidarity and trans-border empathy one can further imagine cyborg cultures quite literally tuning out of the world left behind. Roden’s disconnection thesis argues that as these new forms of networks and augmentation develop so too will cultures and moral awareness diverge.60 For those without the need or desire to use oral language accelerating the pace of technological change within new kinds of communities it is not difficult to follow Cavell to the precipice of his posthuman horror. While the biological racial fictions of colonialism, apartheid, and settler-colonialism still hold on in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary how much more would real material differences in forms of life accelerate existing geopolitical violence?61 Even the beginnings of disconnection could intensify the already renewed fights between extractive industrial modernity and those indigenous communities fighting for their ancestral lands and ways of life. And what of the swelling numbers of multi-generationally unemployed masses who will lack the capital to upgrade? One can imagine class no longer being marked by linguistic markers or knowledge of wine but the physical ability to interface with white color working spaces. More and more companies have already begun microchipping their employees for security and tracking crossing the threshold of the skin in the process of making labor.62 The digital divide in labor of who can and cannot telecommute is already determining the patterns of employment and unemployment in the first 6 months of COVID-19 shutdowns. The speciation of interfaces and sensory capabilities could amplify the already growing trend.63

The point of Roden and Cavell’s thought experiments are to show that such a separation would be more than just a return to or intensification of racial or class divisions. Instead the very embodied character of moral appreciation, the shared languages and cultures, the perceptive capacities to experience beauty or tragedy could be altered to the point that the diffracted species of once human beings would live in a state more closely resembling that of Homo sapiens 100,000 years ago in which there were multiple species of upright anthropoids and none of them could live without the fear of predation by other non-human animals or each other. The medium of encounter fundamentally altered. However, in this speculative history of the future the divergence would not have been by happenstance but to lock in interests and geopolitical advantage. Difference by design.

This may all seem too far-fetched. How could humans lose their most basic capacity for socio-emotional intercourse? I want to argue that things need not change that dramatically to see the beginnings of such a divergence. One can look around a crowded bus filled with people each glued to their smart phone, tables of families at restaurants each separated by their individuated devices or an office filled with screens each telecommuting the pilot to a drone in the field thousands of miles away to see the beginnings of such a speciation. Or we could return to the beginnings of international thought, the first moments of European geopolitics and remember its multispecies beginnings when just 50 years after the arrival of Christopher Columbus Bartolomé de las Casas pleaded with the Castille thrown to recognize the soul and therefore humanity of the ‘Indios’. Instead, of course, the extermination continued which treated the people of the Americas as ‘piles of dung in the middle of the road’.64 Geopolitics was in some sense founded on the premise of many human species rather than one human species.65 The inability for so many to see their human counterpoint at a moment of encounter in the new world speaks to the precedent of a truly dark enlightenment. That is, technological and martial advance without any corresponding moral awareness. A new such speciation that included the inability to even speak to one another much less recognize some common heritage or shared community of value would make the efforts of Las Casas and those who continue to fight against the finishing of the settler-colonial project entirely potentially invisible.

Conclusion: geotechnics and a planetary state of war

when utilized to perform work highly organized collective enterprises, I shall call it the ‘labor machine’: when applied to acts of collective coercion and destruction, it deserves the title, used even today, the ‘military machine’. But when all of the components, political and economic, military, bureaucratic and royal, must be included, I shall usually refer to the ‘megamachine’.

Lewis Mumford66

Mumford’s megamachine is instructive. What he is describing is an ancient past where the political, economic, military, bureaucratic, royal all converged to form the empires of the Aztecs and Egyptians. What I have in mind is this same convergence in the future but with a twist. The ‘royal’ may come to relate to the economic and political and the military such that what we understand as politics becomes indiscernible. The megamachine of the future presented here could better be called geotechnics. The global mobilization of people, the conditions of competition and coercion, who and what was doing the competing and their relations would be fundamentally altered. The relations would no longer be linguistic or even sensory in the way that humans hold experience in common even if their subjectivizations of that experience, that is the phenomenology of body of experience, may be singular.

In a world of possible full automation, cunning machines, and posthuman speciation the equality of Hobbes’ state of nature as well as the state of war is no longer operable. If these metaphors ever did more than underwrite one particular logic of international politics they would in the future be meaningless as the people of the leviathan, the metric by which order or disorder is experienced may no longer exist in the mortal meat suit so much of political theory rests. In some sense the enmity of war in the Hobbesian sense rested on the equal finitude of every mortal human as well as the general desire to live something we could agree was a good life free from the ever presence of murder. As Hobbes was recontextualized to imagine an international system of states similarly a sense of mortal equality was present. The ability to be killed underwrote the decision to kill.

And what of the English school’s society of states? If such sociality persisted amongst neo-authoritarian states without nations what dark vision of order would that be? Basic assumption about the international system even those based on other less dour models than a realist anarchic system similarly presumes some equality of communication, the good, or the desire to live in a particular way. The material limits of homo sapiens, the necessity of water, air, food, family, and sociality underwrites everything from deterrence to diplomacy. A geotechnical system populated with intelligent things and governed by nation-less states and further populated by incommensurate branches of humanity fundamentally alters the limits and therefore the possibilities of global life and order. By what rules those relations would be conceptually governed, that is, how we could describe such a planetary system would have to reach for ways of thinking well beyond even the most radical or critical theory of international relations. In some ways efforts to consider what geopolitics looked like at the peak of the Atlantic slave trade or during the first 100 years of the conquest of the Americas more closely resemble what could become of a posthuman planet than the highly rationalized cosmopolitan institutions of the United Nations.67

Just as IR is finally accepting that global politics is inhabited by more than just nation-states that is, non-state actors, we now must also come to grips with the fact that global politics is no longer populated solely by humans and could in the future not even be dominated by humans. What new forms of intelligence mean for the transformation of peace and security is murky at best. What is clear is that a theory of automation as mere means is no longer sufficient to understanding the vast infrastructure of machines and sensory data collecting systems and the new collaborations those systems will create for former humans with which we are already beginning to share our planet. The horizon of such a technical transformation has to be thought alongside the normative upheaval and radicalization of global enmity taking place simultaneously with the transformation of the very mechanics of political and military action.

To consider a future where the actors, relations, and order of the planet could be fundamentally reconfigured by the gradual accretion of robots, algorithms, bodily and political modification poses to us the possibility of systemic change well beyond whether the world will be unipolar or multipolar. No one of these trajectories will be total or play out as described here but all of these trajectories present us with the real possibility of altering the basic rules of human planetary existence from a geopolitical condition to one that is increasingly geotechnical. Hundred years from now, what new grammar of planetary relations could be prepared to describe such a world?

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