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Only bilateral cooperation ensures multi-way info sharing – ensures adjusted burden sharing based on a state’s domestic priorities.

Gressel, '19 – senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office (Gustav Gressel; "Protecting Europe against hybrid threats"; ECFR; https://ecfr.eu/publication/protecting_europe_against_hybrid_threats/; 6-25-2019, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

The activities of Russian intelligence services increasingly pop up in public security debates. In some cases, the known activities of Russian operatives involve classical espionage. In others, their activities hint at much more robust subversive aims: cultivation of anti-system forces, the purchase and preparation of infrastructure for future military incursions, training for paramilitary resistance groups, and the assassination of perceived enemies. These actions are top-tier covert actions. One may assume that other actions that provide the basis for this sort of activity – such as strategic reconnaissance, cyber penetration and espionage, excavation of data, the placement agents in positions of power, and reconnaissance of critical infrastructure – have progressed as well. Europe has a mixed record of disrupting these preparations.

While EU member states on the eastern flank have adopted very robust counter-intelligence laws and invested significant resources in monitoring Russian operatives, other states are more reluctant to do so. France has the legal framework for such action, but counter-terrorism is its first priority. Germany and Austria – both countries that were under Allied supervision and occupation after 1945 – have comparatively weak laws, and their decision-makers maintain a ‘hands-off’ mentality. In the past, bilateral cooperation with US services addressed these imbalances. As a legacy of the post-war situation, US and British services have the right to engage in counter-intelligence work in Germany. And Berlin, which has historical issues with counter-intelligence, has been happy to outsource this politically toxic work. In doing so, Washington – and to a lesser extent London – became an external balancer in intra-European affairs. And while the Trump administration and its sometimes erratic personnel have significantly undermined confidence in the US government, the US intelligence community has remained much more stable and able to preserve working contacts throughout Europe. But if relations with Washington deteriorate further, there is no tangible policy or political actor that could replace the US.

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