The difference is vital and fundamental
Brian Collins 2, Lt. Col. In the US Air Force and a faculty member of the National War College in Washington, D.C., “Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 2, Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp. 51–56
The U.S. -led military action in Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September II raised a number of important issues regarding the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the relationship between the United States and its transatlantic allies. On September 12, , NATO invoked Arti- cle 5 - the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty - thereby committing NATO to help defend the United States from the perpetrators of the attacks. Shortly thereafter, NATO sent seven of its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, crews, and ground support personnel to assist in the air defense of the United States. In addition to demonstrating NATO's military resolve and buttressing the political declaration of Article 5» the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft also freed up U.S. aircraft for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
NATO also provided blanket air rights for U.S. aircraft, access to bases and ports, and other non-combat support. However, NATO did not lead Operation Enduring Freedom, nor did it develop the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed to Afghanistan in the wake of the American rout of the Taliban. The Europeans expected more of a say in the planning and execution of operations since the alliance had stood firm with the United States after the attacks. Since the understanding for fifty years had been that the United States would come to the aid of Europe and lead its defense, it was only natural to assume that Europe would play a large role if the United States was attacked. However, this was not the case; the United States preferred a coalition involving NATO members but not NATO itself.
European members of NATO asked whether this American unilateralism portended the end of the alliance. Americans vigorously denied this, and argued for a broader conception of NATO. Nevertheless, Operation Enduring Freedom was a landmark event because the United States chose to use a loose coalition instead of the NATO alliance, a decision that revealed an emerging U.S. -NATO relationship in which the United States consults with NATO on security issues but acts outside the alliance structure when it is in America's interest.
Why the United States Didn't Turn to NATO. In the aftermath of September II, the United States wanted the form of a coalition, but not the sub- stance, for several reasons. First, the attacks were on American soil, and consequently the United States had to lead the response. Although citizens from scores of countries were killed in the attacks, it was clear that the United States, its people and its homeland, was the intended victim. Therefore, a response to the terrorist attacks did not automatically involve NATO. Ultimately, there was no direct link to Europe. Consulting NATO would have been unrealistic, and no American administration would have waited for NATO to form a response.
NATO was also not the United States's first choice because there is no clear consensus on how to interpret the Washington Treaty in the post-Cold War world. For example, although the treaty does not place explicit restrictions on NATO operations in a geographical sense or require United Nations approval for its operations, many members have conceptual difficulty expanding NATO's role beyond the alliance's immediate periphery, especially in the absence of UN man- dates for such operations. Consequently, rather than get embroiled in discussions regarding the legality of NATO participation in Afghanistan, the United States sidestepped the issue and worked with its allies outside of official NATO channels.