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Pernik, '21 – Piret Pernik is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training (Piret Pernik; "Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice"; Hybrid CoE; https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf; 10-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Credible cyber deterrence was associated with international cybersecurity cooperation and Estonia’s efforts to strengthen international cyberspace stability. In this respect, this document communicated a view of the Estonian Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030, but provided more details. For example, hosting international cybersecurity events and cyber exercises in Estonia, establishing NATO-associated facilities (such as NATO’s cyber range and NATO CCDCOE located in Tallinn) and other allied infrastructure in the country are considered important for fostering credible deterrence. In like manner, binding agreements with key allies and regular cyber defence exercises and training sessions are seen as mechanisms for implementing cyber deterrence in practice.84 Notably, Estonia has bilateral cybersecurity and cyber defence agreements with several NATO allies (the US and France), and has established a joint platform for secure cyber threat intelligence-sharing with the US. Thus, operational-level and technical bi- and multilateral cooperation, including information- and intelligence-sharing and technical exercises, are viewed as critical components of strategic deterrence against cyberattacks.85 This reflects a pragmatic understanding that high-level political declarations and commitment cannot deter cyberattacks, but timely cyber threat intelligence can.

In accordance with the strategy, a necessary element of deterrence is an ability to attribute cyberattacks. The strategy prescribes developing a procedure to attribute attacks, which includes political, legal and technical criteria (this mechanism 23 was established in 2019) and measures to attribute cyberattacks in the grey zone (below the threshold of armed attack). Estonia must actively attribute attacks together with partners and implement collective countermeasures.8

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