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O’Mahony et al., '22 – associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND (O'Mahony, Angela, David E. Thaler, Beth Grill, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jason H. Campbell, Rachel Tecott, and Mary Kate Adgie; "Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies: Framing Army-to-Army Partnerships"; RAND Corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf; 2022, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

As the Army prepares for the possibility of near-peer conflict and focuses on increasing its expeditionary agility, developing and maintaining the ability to interoperate quickly and effectively with highly capable allies will become increasingly important. A key reason that U.S., British, and Australian personnel have been able to work together so well in recent operations is the steady state interactions between these allies, ranging from high-level embeds, multinational exercises (e.g., joint warfighter exercises), education and training programs,10 and officer and unit exchange programs (e.g., the Military Personnel Exchange Program). However, the British Army explicitly states that the integration skills jointly developed during nearly five years in Afghanistan are perishable and that a comprehensive defense engagement program to preserve these lessons should be developed: “The challenge during this fallow period before the next coalition operation is how to start the next operation as an integrated coalition, capitalising [sic] on those coalition synergies from the start.”11

Implications

Given the relative dearth of SC activities during ongoing operations, the low likelihood that these will become more common in future operations, and the importance of steady-state SC activities for preparing units and personnel to work together rapidly and effectively in the absence of predeployment training, we identified the following implications:

• Steady state SC activities between the United States and highly capable allies should continue to focus on providing opportunities for developing and exercising operational partnering. As discussed, such efforts are a central aspect of security relationships between the United States and its closest partners. These activities should emphasize not only developing soldiers’ skills and familiarity but also developing procedures for shared communications, processes, and logistics. Waiting until an operation occurs is too late to develop operational partnerships.

• Mission-essential tasks related to multinational interoperability should be considered for steady-state U.S. unit training to enable swift, effective operational partnering. For units that engage in multinational training, incorporating interoperability and operational partnering into unit mission-essential task lists could help ensure that the appropriate activities are highlighted in exercises with highly capable allies that prepare them to work together not only in near-peer conflicts, but also contingency operations in other contexts.12

United States and Allies Share Information, But Only Opportunistically

At a basic level, most SC is about sharing information. Although most information sharing through SC occurs outside ongoing operations, we analyzed activities that were designed to share lessons with highly capable partners during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As with predeployment training, formally organized cooperative activities to share operationally relevant lessons were rare. That said, throughout our research, we sought examples that demonstrated how valuable it was for U.S., British, and Australian forces to share operational lessons with each other. A few representative examples stand out.

As previously mentioned, the United States and United Kingdom occupied a shared battlespace in Afghanistan’s Regional Command Southwest and integrated their air and targeting efforts to prevent seams and help optimize support for ground forces. At a more micro level, U.S. and British personnel consistently shared lessons learned and incorporated them into their evolving TTPs. For instance, a procedure routinely used by Royal Navy pilots that was seen as good operational practice was adopted by the rest of the United Kingdom’s Joint Aviation Group as well as the U.S. Marine Corps’ Air Combat Element, which extended to briefing formats and general mission business.13 U.S. Marines deployed to Regional Command Southwest credited the United Kingdom with helping them refine their targeting practices, particularly how best to use the varying capabilities of multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms tasked with tracking one or a group of potential targets.14

Given that distribution of lessons learned within the Army—much less at the joint and combined force levels—is highly problematic,15 these types of information-sharing activities tended to emerge organically rather than as part of an institutionalized sharing process. When we followed up with operators on how lessons tended to be shared, we were told that information sharing generally occurred through three pathways. First, personnel found themselves in the same place at the same time and informally discussed their operational experiences with each other—that is, they “talked shop.” Second, if personnel were aware of each other’s operations, they might reach out for insights in the face of current challenges. Third, embedded partner personnel would act as formal or informal liaisons to share lessons with personnel from both countries. Operators noted that sharing lessons was helpful, but it generally only occurred opportunistically. This raises the concern that fewer lessons are shared with allies than is optimal during operations.

On the other hand, the Combined Joint Task Force in OIR experienced severe difficulty formally sharing information among coalition partners, largely because of differing communication systems and problems with classification. It was not until the joint operations center began to use Global Command and Control System–Joint that coalition personnel could fully see the required common operational picture needed for the operation. An insight reported by the Center for Army Lessons Learned suggested that plans for information sharing across the coalition should be in place before an operation starts.16

When we asked interview respondents about potential shortcomings in operationally relevant information sharing, many thought that developing a mechanism for sharing operationally relevant observations across coalition partners would be useful—particularly if these mechanisms were made available to units prior to deployment.

Implications

Documenting lessons learned and sharing information between different offices and across time is a perennial challenge for the Army. Our first two implications focus on enabling bottom-up communications between units undertaking similar missions of operating in similar environments. The third and fourth focus on shared communications infrastructure:

• Develop updated guidance for deployed U.S. units on lessons learned for communications with allied units. Communications sometimes happen naturally in an operational setting. However, the Army could formalize guidance to deployed units on identifying allied counterpart units that have conducted or are conducting similar operations in the combined battlespace and initiating interactions designed to share experiences. Such exchanges could help each unit address challenges that have arisen during operations.

• In instances in which the United States and an ally have developed clear interoperability workarounds in the field, ensure that they are incorporated into interoperability plans and roadmaps. Successful workarounds are important to capture and archive for use in future operations and exercises with the ally; they could also be improved and expanded to include other allies.

• Formal, pre-established information-sharing mechanisms should be in place to increase lines of communication on combined lessons learned during operations. DoD efforts toward establishing and exercising mission partner environments can serve as the foundation for a shared communications network.17

• Capturing allied lessons learned would be useful as part of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. Building a separate allies and partners lessons learned information system might be unnecessary; including such a lessons learned portal as part of an operational communications infrastructure might be useful. Within this portal, providing a template for contributing observations and a list of common topics for tagging observations would increase the value of captured data.

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