Addition of OCOs into frameworks like NATO risks misinterpretation and escalation
Long 17 (Austin Long is a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies at Columbia University. “A cyber SIOP? Operational considerations for strategic offensive cyber planning” in Journal of Cybersecurity, 18 February 2017, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/3/1/19/3003367) //NB
For a cyber-equivalent to the SIOP (i.e. a plan for strategic OCO), planners need similar objectives. Deterrence is an obvious parallel objective between nuclear and cyber but deterrence of what? During the Cold War strategic nuclear forces were intended to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks, while more recently unclassified guidance “directs DOD to strengthen non-nuclear capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” [17]. Are strategic OCO intended primarily to deter adversary OCO or are such operations part of a broader set of deterrent capabilities, including nuclear forces? The latter seems more likely but this is a policy choice different administrations may answer differently.
If deterrence fails, OCO planners need subsequent objectives. Here the parallel with nuclear operations, at least those from the Cold War context, may be less obvious. Is the next objective for strategic OCO the control of escalation? It could be but this might vary by adversary and scenario. Failure of deterrence regarding a great power like Russia or China might lead to a subsequent objective of escalation control but North Korea or Iran might be different, with the objective being the prompt neutralization of adversary strategic capabilities in order to limit (or eliminate) damage from enemy attack.
OCO could be a component of either objective, but would be planned very differently. For escalation control, planners would need to define targets that punish the adversary and/or deny objectives in order to demonstrate US resolve. Yet the targets would have to be of a nature unlikely to lead to further escalation by the adversary. The need to strike this balance – producing effects sufficient to show resolve without risking escalation – will be challenging to policymakers and planners alike. Inadvertent escalation was a major worry in the late Cold War with conventional and nuclear forces – a concern that is now returning in East Asia and potentially the eastern and southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [18–21]. The addition of OCO further compounds this problem by creating new pathways to inadvertent escalation.
A historical parallel to OCO and inadvertent escalation was the concern about the impact of electronic warfare (EW) in a conventional battle in Europe on Soviet early warning of a US strategic nuclear attack, particularly one directed at the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal [18]. EW in this context was not intended to threaten Soviet strategic forces, but could nonetheless generate pressure for Soviet nuclear use as they became fearful their forces were vulnerable.
Soviet exercises reflected this fear. In a 1984 Soviet strategic exercise, US bombers exploited damage to Soviet air defense as well as the massive volume of electronic warfare to strike key Soviet command centers. This initial attack was promptly followed by a devastating attack on Soviet strategic nuclear forces [22]. Thus conventional air operations, including electronic warfare, in an actual war may have made the Soviets extremely concerned about the survival of their nuclear forces and thus potentially pressured them to use nuclear weapons first.
Strategic OCO could create similar fears, as attacks on even nonmilitarily critical systems (e.g. power supplies) could impact military capabilities or stoke fears that military networks had likewise been compromised. Indeed, OCO effects could be more escalatory than traditional electronic warfare, which even if it compromises air defense is nonetheless generally observable – radar operators will often know they are being jammed even if they can do nothing about it. OCO, if done well, could compromise systems without the target knowing. An adversary thus might not be able to distinguish between a system failure due to OCO and a natural system failure. In a crisis or conventional war, if some component of an adversary’s command and control failed it could easily be misinterpreted as successful OCO, creating escalatory pressures. Targeting strategic OCO for escalation control without risking inadvertent escalation may thus be a major planning challenge.