Clear Cyber norms shape cyberspace—created by public and private sector
Myriam Dunn Cavelty & Andreas Wenger 22, Myriam Dunn Cavelty is a Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy for Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. She studied International Relations, History, and International Law at the University of Zurich. She was a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies, and Andreas Wenger is professor of International and Swiss Security Policy at ETH Zurich. He studied History, Political Science and German Literature at the University of Zurich. He holds a Doctorate from the University of Zurich and was a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. “Cyber Security Politics: Socio-Technological Transformations and Political Fragmentation,” 1st ed., Routledge, 01/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.4324/9781003110224 https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/52574/9781000567113.pdf#page=201
Early internet pioneers, including John Perry Barlow, regarded cyberspace as a virtual environment not requiring formal rules or external controls (Barlow 1996). However, growing numbers of cyber security events affecting private as well as public information and communication technologies (ICTs) have undermined these non-interventionist positions. Over the course of the past two decades, voluntary norms of responsible behavior “have emerged along with confidence- and capacity-building measures as the principal policy tools of choice to meet the […] vision of an open, secure, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment” (Kavanagh 2017: 10).
Defined as shared expectations of appropriate behavior, norms can be of regulative (i.e. describing obligations, prohibitions and permissions) or constitutive (i.e. creating categories of actors and actions) nature (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wiener 2017; Björkdahl 2002). “By shaping agents’ understandings of their social environments, associated interactions, and possible outcomes”, they foster coordination and predictability, and in turn reduce contextual ambiguities to manageable levels (Ferguson 2019: 1). In contrast to formal legal provisions, norms rely on softer means of enforcement and implementation.
According to Finnemore, the move to voluntary cyber security norms can partly be attributed to concerns about the suitability and effectiveness of binding treaties in fast-moving environments, as well as to fears of legal lock-in among leading cyber powers (Finnemore 2017: 3). Abbot and Snidal have argued that when circumstances are fundamentally uncertain, that is, when even the range and/or distribution of possible outcomes is unknown, [formal legal agreements] may not be desirable. In particular, if actors are ambiguity-averse, they will prefer to leave agreements imprecise rather than face the possibility of being caught in unfavorable commitments. (Abbott and Snidal 2000: 442) Despite perceived needs to reduce threats and corresponding levels of uncertainty, and more than two decades of concerted diplomatic efforts relating to the formulation of norms of responsible behavior for the digital domain, advancement has been slow and political compromise short-lived. In the wake of political contentions among governments surrounding debates about existing and emerging perils emanating from the digital realm and possible normative measures to address them, a number of non-state actors have stepped up and started to more actively make their voices heard (Grigsby 2017; Mačák 2017; Väljataga 2017).
International relations and international law literatures have taken note of the rise of private actors involved in global steering and rule-making processes, and have systematized and subsumed ideational efforts conducted by non-state actors under the umbrella of norm-entrepreneurship or soft-law, respectively (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Abbott and Snidal 2000). Norm entrepreneurs (or protagonists of soft-law instruments) challenge prevailing patterns of behavior, by suggesting normative ideas and mobilizing like-minded stakeholders or networks within and across states to endorse them (Sandholtz 2017: 2). “These alliances [then] bring pressure to bear from above (transnationally) and below (domestically)”, and help the standards proposed get more widely accepted (Sandholtz 2017: 2).
In order to reap the benefits of these fragmented processes, however, initiators need to deliberately plan for “complementarity” and “cross-pollination”. The next section summarizes leading norms-based efforts launched by Microsoft, Siemens, Telefónica, and Kaspersky Lab, and assesses the effectiveness of their activities along three dimensions: Output, outcome, and impact. Analyzing the effects of regulatory efforts has remained extremely challenging and has incited numerous scholarly debates. There are no unified approaches for assessing the success of norms or regimes. This chapter draws on the work conducted by Flohr et al. and Wolf who have proposed assessments along the dimensions mentioned above (Flohr et al. 2010; Wolf 2010). Only proposals with explicit normative nexus and only proposals launched post-2017 were selected for analysis.
Private cyber security norm development efforts
Non-state actors, in particular technology companies, have been key contributors to the development and expansion of cyberspace.4 As operators of network infrastructures, designers of products, and suppliers of services, they have made important contributions to the “international […] architecture for the governance of cyberspace” (Radu 2014: 4). In addition to producing hard- and software, they have come to contribute to the promotion of global cyber security norms and standards. So far, their normative contributions have received little academic attention. This chapter seeks to contribute to richer understandings of the normative parts played by technology companies and unveil the governing qualities of their activities by evaluating them across the dimensions of output, outcome, and impact.5
As key providers of ICTs, technology companies have strong incentives to pursue normative strategies to sustain their business models. Through the eyes of technology companies, norms provide useful tools for tackling contextual ambiguities and pre-empt costly changes to legal frameworks, or governmentled market interventions. While the reasons for corporate norm-shaping efforts pertaining to the virtual realm may primarily be grounded in commercial considerations, i.e. reducing costs and risks, securing their operations, gaining access to new markets/safeguarding existing customer bases, and strengthening corporate reputation and legitimacy, less self-serving reasons, i.e. upholding good-faithcommitments and values such as user privacy, should not be forgotten (Gorwa and Peez 2018). Not all of the activities undertaken by technology companies in the context of norms of responsible behavior for cyberspace can be explained by rationalist arguments.
Microsoft
One of the first corporate entities to engage in debates about responsible conduct in cyberspace was Microsoft (Microsoft Security Response Center 2010). Valued at over USD 1 trillion (2019), the company ranks among the four largest technology giants globally, the other three being Apple, Alphabet, and Amazon. Following prior norms-oriented ventures between 2013 and 2016, in February 2017, Microsoft President and Chief Legal Officer Brad Smith introduced the idea of a Digital Geneva Convention to Protect Cyberspace (Microsoft 2013; McKay et al. 2014; Charney et al. 2016; Smith 2017). Grounded in the belief that deeprooted collaboration among states, and between states, the private sector, and civil society is needed to curb nefarious doings in the digital realm, the convention as outlined by Smith, asks governments, among other things, to:
Refrain from attacking critical infrastructures (including civil and financial systems)
· Abstain from engaging in espionage · Engage in vulnerabilities disclosure processes
· Exercise restraint in developing cyber weapons and engaging in offensive activities, and
· Assist private sector entities in securing cyberspace. (Microsoft 2017)
It also calls on technology companies to behave as neutral actors and recommends the setting up of an independent non-governmental organization capable of investigating and publicly attributing (nation-state) cyberattacks (Smith 2017; Maurer and Taylor 2018). Met with little enthusiasm by governments, Microsoft’s call for a Digital Geneva Convention was succeeded by the unveiling of a Cybersecurity Tech Accord bringing together “global technology companies committed to protecting their customers and users”, 14 months later
In September 2018, Microsoft unveiled a Digital Peace Now campaign, which calls on citizens to protect cyberspace, e.g. through measures of cyber hygiene, and urges governments to refrain from endangering the global digital environment (Microsoft 2018). Only two months later, Microsoft co-sponsored the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. Introduced at the 12th Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Paris, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (short Paris Call) constitutes one of the most widely endorsed multi-stakeholder instruments pertaining to peace and security in the virtual realm to date (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2018)
The Paris Call proposes the development of common principles for securing cyberspace through collaborative efforts across existing international platforms and mechanisms (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2018). Although at first sight a French initiative, the Paris Call was vitally influenced by Microsoft, both in terms of origin and content. According to information presented by Le Monde and WIRED, it was Microsoft’s political lobbying that gave rise to the initiation of the Paris Call (Matsakis 2018a; Untersinger 2018). The Paris Call advances nine principles intended to resonate with both state and nonstate entities. Specifically, it asks supporters to:
Prevent and recover from malicious cyber activities that threaten or cause significant, indiscriminate or systemic harm to individuals and critical infrastructure; • Prevent activity that intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core of the Internet; • Strengthen our capacity to prevent malign interference by foreign actors aimed at undermining electoral processes through malicious cyber activities; • Prevent ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sector; • Develop ways to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and practices intended to cause harm; • Strengthen the security of digital processes, products and services, throughout their lifecycle and supply chain; Support efforts to strengthen an advanced cyber hygiene for all actors; • Take steps to prevent non-State actors, including the private sector, from hacking-back, for their own purposes or those of other non-state actors; • Promote the widespread acceptance and implementation of international norms of responsible behavior as well as confidence-building measures in cyberspace. (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères 2018)
Rather than reinventing the wheel in terms of normative prescriptions, the Paris Call constitutes an attempt at realigning scattered discussions and improving the complementarity of cyber security norm formation processes
While the Paris Call has seen fairly broad uptake among governments, private industry, the technical community, researchers, non-governmental organizations, and civil society, there have been a number of notable public abstentions, including the United States, Russia, China, Iran, and Israel (Matsakis 2018b).