UQ- Cyber norms internationally shape cyber policy
Erica Borghard et al. 22, Dr. Borghard holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Reviewing US Cyber Posture: An Analysis,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.2139/ssrn.4077962
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Norms have played a large role in U.S. cyber strategies, dating back to the 2011 International Cyberspace Strategy. Norms, or a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity, often follow a lifecycle in which they first emerge, then receive enough acceptance to reach a tipping point for a norm cascade, and finally are internalized in behaviors. Norm emergence, the first stage of the lifecycle, advents with a norm entrepreneur who shepherds the idea and attempts to convince others to adopt it. These norms entrepreneurs play a critical role in framing the issues at hand. Struggles over framing have significant long-term consequences because the initial framing tends to be sticky and difficult to dislodge. This “stickiness” can create a first-mover advantage in struggles to frame new norms. Beyond framing, norm entrepreneurs often create organizational platforms from which they seek to promote and institutionalize norms.
Successful norm entrepreneurs diffuse their norm to a sufficient number of actors to create a “norm cascade” in which the norm is adopted across a plurality of pertinent actors. Scholars refer to this as the tipping or threshold point for significant norm adoption. Studies of norm adoption suggest that the critical mass usually occurs when one third of the relevant actors in the international system have adopted the norm. In some cases, some actors or states are so critical that a norm will not reach a tipping point without their endorsement. Therefore, identifying these critical actors as part of a norm diffusion strategy is essential to the successful development of the norm through the full lifecycle. The most mature norms are finally internalized so that they are taken for granted as appropriate and natural behaviors.
Not all norms complete the lifecycle, but some norms and norm entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed. Research has found that the norms that are most likely to be adopted are those that display the following three characteristics: specificity (clarify a definition); durability (length of time the norms have been in effect); and concordance (extent of acceptance).
During the Obama administration, the U.S. placed a strong emphasis on norm entrepreneurship in cyberspace. In a 2015 speech by then Secretary of State John Kerry, he articulated the United States’ vision for cyberspace norms, asserting that “the Internet should be open and accessible to everyone,” as well as “ interoperable, so it can connect seamlessly across international borders.” Kerry went on to detail that “people are entitled to the same rights of free expression online as they possess offline” and that the U.S. expected states to uphold these norms in cyberspace while deterring threats. Ultimately, Kerry argued that these norms of appropriate behavior in cyberspace would lead to economic growth, peace, and “a means for social empowerment that is also the most democratic form of public expression ever invented.”
Accordingly, the 2015 DoD cyber strategy called for the U.S. to “foster norms of responsible behavior to improve global strategic stability” and reiterated “The United States is committed to an open, secure, interoperable, and reliable Internet that enables prosperity, public safety, and the free flow of commerce and ideas.” While norms played a less central role in the 2018 DoD cyber strategy, the strategy continued to call for an open, free, and interoperable Internet.
Perhaps more notably for norm evolution, the 2018 strategy (and the 2018 Command Vision for Cyber Command) articulated a new implicit norm: that states could engage with each other in cyberspace, exchanging tit for tat responses in cyberspace, without escalating retaliation to the level of “armed conflict.” Specifically, the concept of persistent engagement relies on establishing acceptable forms of “agreed competition” between states in the cyber domain. The central premise is that, through a process of “tacit bargaining,” the U.S. can find consensus about acceptable behavior in cyberspace. What follows from this logic is that the cyber operations we observe states conducting should represent an “agreed competition” short of war—though this agreement may not be formally written down or accepted by states. Anything outside of the scope of this agreed competitive space should therefore be where interests diverge and where conflict can be anticipated.
But experts have raised the question of whether there are risks that how the DoD operates as part of defend forward and persistent engagement may be inadvertently undermining norms the U.S. seeks to promote. In particular, if agreed competition is constructed from tacit bargaining developed through iterative interactions over time, these agreements are only implied. There is a risk, therefore, that what the U.S. assumes is tacitly accepted by all parties is not, in fact, the case. A related concern is a lack of clarity about how confidence building measures (CBMs) could support the development of norms, particularly around promoting the stability of cyberspace. Unlike arms control regimes, CBMs are voluntary agreements that help promote transparency and clarity around cyber operations and intent. Explicitly linking CBM efforts with military cyber operations can not only promote stability, but also provide a mechanism for more explicit communication (especially with adversaries) about norms of appropriate behavior around offensive cyber operations.
Furthermore, the U.S. has agreed to international cyber norms through formal processes, such as the UN Group of Government Experts. To make meaningful progress on these, it is important to ensure that the words of the U.S. government match its deeds in cyberspace, to include how the DoD operates in and through the domain. Clarifying how the DoD restrains its own behavior and operates in a way that is consistent with the norms the U.S. seekstrying to promote will be essential for the diffusion of norms in the international system. In this sense, the DoD has the opportunity to act as a norm entrepreneur.