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NATO’s cyber policy is rooted in defensive actions – reluctance to discuss pre-emptive warfare within current cyber norms

Saltzman 13 (Dr. Ilai Saltzman is the Israel Institute Visiting Assistant Professor of Israel Studies at the University of Maryland and previously served as a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College where he taught classes in International Relations, Israeli foreign and security policy as well as US foreign policy. “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” 11 March 2013, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2013.771031) //NB

Both agencies represent a highly defensive reaction to NATO's security challenges involving cyber warfare. As the Bucharest summit declaration proclaimed, the official cyber policy ‘… emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack’.109 Yet Russia's continued use of cyber warfare during the war in Georgia highlighted its escalatory nature and the possible negative implications on conventional military conflicts. In April 2009, as part of the Declaration on Alliance Security, NATO moved further to identify cyberattacks alongside terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the key global threats to member states and the international community.110

But the major breakthrough in NATO strategic thinking regarding cyber warfare, which went beyond the strictly technical aspect of network protection, occurred during mid 2010. A team of leading experts in matters of security, headed by former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was asked to prepare a preliminary report to be used as a basis for NATO's new Strategic Concept. According to this report, entitled NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement and submitted in May:

The next significant attack on the Alliance may well come down a fibre [sic] optic cable. Already, cyber attacks against NATO systems occur frequently, but most often below the threshold of political concern. However, the risk of a large-scale attack on NATO's command and control systems or energy grids could readily warrant consultations under Article 4 and could possibly lead to collective defence measures under Article 5. Effective cyber defence requires the means to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from attacks.111

Still, the recommendations reflected the defensive posture that was already advocated and implemented thus far by NATO. Furthermore, and extremely relevant to the Alliance's strategic planners, the Albright Commission was reluctant to engage the question of whether cyberattacks against NATO member states would constitute a direct act of aggression that would trigger the collective security clause. Instead, it defined a rather ambiguous principle according to which such a decision must be made considering ‘… the nature, source, scope, and other aspects of the particular security challenge’.112 The same defensive reasoning can be observed in the ensuing final version of the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon summit six months later. In the words of the document, NATO will:

develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations.113

Yet again, the numerous references to cyber warfare as a security threat were extremely narrow to include at best espionage, hacking, or disruption and there was no discussion about the possibility to conduct pre-emptive or retaliatory cyber warfare.114 In fact, Stephane Abrial, commander of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) responsible for leading the Alliance's transformation of capabilities and forces, was against defining the Strategic Concept's notion of ‘in-depth cyberdefense’ as a ‘military-only, or even a military-centric, strategy’. Instead, Abrial focuses on NATO's ‘permanent mission [which] involves countering the daily attempts made by hackers to break into our systems, which are by necessity interconnected, making a weakness in one country's systems a weakness in all’.115 Other key NATO officials, including General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen, continued to conceptualize cyber warfare in defensive terms, arguing that recent cyberattacks ‘… increased the urgency to strengthen cyber defences not only at NATO, but across the Alliance as a whole’. There is no public discourse involving NATO officials that suggests treating cyber capabilities as an offensive feature of the Alliance's cyber strategy. The most proactive proposal to date was the option to dispatch NATO's cyber Rapid Reaction Teams in order to assist member countries suffering from cyberattacks, or ‘incidents’ as Rasmussen calls them, should they ask for such assistance.116

It appears that NATO is focused on prevention of attacks on its institutional assets and member countries rather than initiating cyberattacks against others. As the American representative to the CCDCOE concluded, when it comes to NATO, its major contribution to cyber defence will probably involve eroding the ‘… hacker's greatest advantages – anonymity’.117 NATO's strategic thinking will continue to utilize its pooled capabilities in order to promote defensive solutions to cyber warfare of various kinds and it will continue to treat it as a threat rather than as an offensive feature to be proactively utilized.

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