Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Disclosing OCOs moots their efficiency and undermines any potential stability

Borghard and Lonergan 18 (Dr. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Shawn Longergan Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. “Confidence Building Measures for the Cyber Domain,” Fall 2018, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2166950058/abstract/4B6C015E3058436BPQ/1?accountid=11091)

However, rather than solely observing defensive exercises, the spirit behind the exchange of observers in the Helsinki Final Act was to provide reassurance among potential adversaries regarding each other's offensive forces-in other words, those that could pose a threat to stability. However, building offensive cyber operations into existing defensive exercises is fraught with difficulties. Currently, cybersecurity exercises typically have a defensive focus and are used to identify both technical and procedural vulnerabilities on internal networks.58 For example, most exercises spearheaded by the United States typically do not showcase the units that would conduct offensive operations or their capabilities and, therefore, are not designed to signal confidence in the command and control and efficacy of their offensive cyber forces. 

It is possible to incorporate offensive actions into existing defensive exercises. For instance, a state could build into a defensive scenario a counterstrike that targets an infected server commanding the attack. However, any capability for access and attack that would be used in the scenario would most likely be limited to publicly available open source tools or would be fictionalized so as not to give away to the adversary the specific vulnerability in the target system it would be exploiting. Again, this reflects the fundamental requirement of secrecy for operational success. The ephemeral nature of offensive cyber capabilities and accesses means that revealing information about them effectively renders them moot.59 If a state used real cyber weapons from its arsenal, it is likely that any observing state (including allies) would develop hardware and software upgrades to render the demonstrated capability inert. Similar to the paradox presented by cyber arms control, this may undermine the very stability CBMs seek to create. However, public notification of the successful execution of such an exercise could increase the adversary's confidence in the actor's ability to command and control cyber capabilities, thereby serving a confidence building purpose. 

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.