No intra-NATO info-sharing – allies are reluctant to disclose info; they value autonomy and fear weaker countries cannot protect their info.
University of Exeter 20 – public research university in Exeter, Devon, South West England, United Kingdom. Its predecessor institutions, St Luke's College “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” 09-2020, Accessed 06-28-2022, https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/strategyandsecurityinstitute/pdfs/mstrat/James_Prideaux.pdf. //ILake-NoC
Nevertheless, the largest barrier to a joint cyber capability is national intelligence agencies’ tendency to keep their activities in cyberspace highly classified.182 As Chapter 2 discussed, effective cyberattacks are utterly dependent on excellent intelligence.183 Members have significantly stepped up intelligence-sharing over the last two decades. They established the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre in 2006, the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative in 2012 and the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) in 2017. The JISD’s first Assistant Secretary General, Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, says it has fostered a new culture of intelligence cooperation, increased efficiency and has helped avoid the duplication 37 of effort.184 Notably, he claims this new fusion of intelligence has ‘positioned the JISD to contend effectively with the… cyber… threats increasingly confronting NATO’.185
However, von Loringhoven’s optimism glosses over the great difficulty of intra-Alliance intelligence sharing. Divulging secret information is a trade-off between trusting a partner enough to share information that could endanger one’s own source against the benefits of doing so.186 Therefore, national agencies are reluctant to share it with international organisations, instead preferring bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis.187 It is shared between states with closely aligned interests, mutual trust and good diplomatic relations, as seen in the Anglo-American UKUSA Agreement.188 The exclusive ‘Five Eyes’ Alliance this evolved into is a rare example of multilateral intelligence sharing, involving NATO members America, Canada and the UK. These agreements tend to be more concerned with the security of the intelligence shared rather than its content, due to concerns over how other states will circulate the information. 189 Accordingly, wider intelligence cooperation within NATO would be much harder to achieve, primarily because many states do not share strong levels of trust, common interests and diplomatic relations with each other. For instance, France remains unsympathetic to intelligence integration in any multilateral environment, preferring strategic autonomy.190 This is compounded by an uneasy relationship with the Alliance, with President Emmanuel Macron calling it ‘brain dead’ in 2019.191 Furthermore, some allies fear that if countries with lower resilience are infiltrated, they could possibly compromise sensitive information shared between members.192 Consequently, apprehension about Italy’s weak cyber systems hinders allies’ propensity to share with Rome, since the potential for leaks undermines their trust.193
These concerns have resulted in a division between those member states that possess more advanced intelligence assets and those that do not. The former have been resisting serious intelligence integration, while the latter – including Belgium and The Netherlands – have even pressed for a CIA-style European agency.194 So far, NATO’s more powerful members have successfully repelled such initiatives. Following the 2015 Paris terror attacks, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel proclaimed the need for a ‘European CIA’.195 Nonetheless, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière shot this proposal down, claiming that ‘I cannot imagine we will be willing to give up our national sovereignty’.196
Unsurprisingly, NATO’s own collaborative efforts to date have also been heavily limited by national agencies’ desire for secrecy and autonomy. Pushback against greater transparency is especially strong on the part of the US, which owns a large share of NATO’s intelligence capabilities.197 not have access to all US intelligence, but NATO releasable information only.198 Such secrecy is a big practical obstacle to a joint offensive cyber capability. Although it is justified, elevating America’s role in Alliance cyber policy without increasing transparency would likely limit the tactical and strategic effectiveness of a combined offensive cyber capability.199 NATO’s intelligence fusion efforts have suffered from other, less important problems too. Different languages, cultures and infrastructures have proved to be structural constraints, while battlefield commanders have criticised the intelligence provided for lacking the strategic dimension.200 For instance, Lieutenant-General Mark Hertling judged NATO’s information on Islamic State too narrow and target-oriented, thus missing the bigger picture.201
Overall, the establishment of a joint capability would face some serious practical problems, both when confronting NATO’s internal politics and national intelligence agencies’ clandestine modus operandi. There would be significant legal hurdles to overcome too, which Chapter 4 discusses in more detail.