No impact to cyberwar- too expensive and difficult to be devastating
Maschmeyer Lennart & Dunn Cavelty Myriam 22, Lennart Maschmeyer is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto and an M.Phil in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Myriam Dunn Cavelty is a Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy for Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich , “Goodbye Cyberwar: Ukraine as Reality Check,” ETH Zurich, 05/2022, p. 4 p. https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-3_2022-EN.pdf
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a series of experts predicted cyberwar: the massive use of Russian offensive cyber capabilities to “shock and awe” Ukraine’s defenses and undermine their will to fight. Some even suggested Russia need not invade because it could achieve the same outcomes by going to cyberwar. When that did not happen, the same experts predicted that Russia would still use offensive cyber capabilities sometime later – not only against Ukraine, but also against the West and its critical infrastructure as a punishment for its sanctions and support of Ukraine. Three months later, this has not happened either. Some experts are still expecting cyberwar to come, just sometime in the future. Others say that they were right, and cyberwar is here, except that the threat in Ukraine was deterred, or that attacks were launched but then neutralized in time. In contrast, we claim that experts who expect cyberwar to happen keep underestimating the practical limitations of cyberattacks (also called cyber effects operations) and consequently overestimating their strategic value – despite ample empirical evidence that cyberattacks are not very effective at coercive and destructive action. We aim to correct the distorted cyber threat debate by better grounding it in observable reality. While cyber operations remain important for intelligence operations and mildly disruptive attacks, destructive cyberattacks on key military or civilian infrastructure are challenging to implement and ineffective when compared to conventional attacks. The reason is an operational trilemma that constrains the speed, intensity, and control that cyber operations can achieve – thus limiting their strategic value and rendering catastrophic attacks highly improbable. Policymakers should focus on countering and mitigating actual threats, rather than on catastrophic scenarios that are theoretically possible, yet exceedingly unlikely in practice.
Expectations and Fallacies
Doom scenarios about devastating cyberattacks have plagued policy debates for 30 years and have proven to be stubbornly persistent. There are two interlinked problems that keep the specter
of cyberwar alive:
The first problem is the inflationary use of the term “cyberwar” for all politically motivated cyber operations. This glosses over important differences concerning the perpetrators, capabilities, and strategic effects. Every incident is read as a proof for rampant vulnerabilities of modern societies and as a harbinger of doom. In this view, cyberwar is already here.
Second, there is no consensus about the likelihood of a high-level, destructive cyberattack on civilian critical infrastructures – the expert definition of cyberwar. By pointing to society’s vulnerabilities and from there deducing the high likelihood of doom to come, many still expect it to be imminent. For them, cyberwar will come or is almost here.
Such predictions are guided by four fallacies that stem from ignoring interaction-effects between technology and politics:
The “vulnerability” fallacy: The assumption that when vulnerabilities exist, they will be exploited. In reality, the existence of a vulnerability does not reveal anything about why, how, and when
it would make sense for an adversary to exploit it.
The “the hack is the success” fallacy: The belief that the network intrusion, or hack, itself is proof of success. In reality, the success of any operation can only be determined by the political or strategic effects that are achieved through that operation.
The “cheap and easy” fallacy: The belief that cyber tools (software) are a low-risk “weapon” for the weak. In reality, controlled, targeted attacks suitable to reach strategic goals are not cheap and easy but hard, complicated, and risky.
The “just pull the trigger” fallacy: The belief that cyber tools work like conventional arms. In reality, cyber operations usually take months if not years to prepare and deliver. They are not something we can simply “launch” at a whim, and their use requires planning and integration into chains of command.
Technology constrains what is achievable politically, whereas politics constrains what will be attempted technologically. Russian cyberattacks, clearly attributed to the Russian government, in Ukraine since 2014 are an excellent example to demonstrate this both in a hybrid conflict setting and in an actual war.