OCO’s are attacks not protection – inherently offensive.
Aftergood ’14 Aftergood, Steven, directed the FAS Project on Government Secrecy from 1991-2021 and was the plaintiff in a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the Central Intelligence Agency which led to the declassification and publication of the total intelligence budget for the first time in fifty years “Offensive Cyber Operations in US Military Doctrine.” Federation Of American Scientists, FAS, 22 Oct. 2014, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/offensive-cyber/. //kinsey
A newly disclosed Department of Defense doctrinal acknowledges the reality of offensive cyberspace operations, and provides a military perspective on their utility and their hazards. Attacks in cyberspace can be used “to degrade, disrupt, or destroy access to, operation of, or availability of a target by a specified level for a specified time.” Or they can be used “to control or change the adversary’s information, information systems, and/or networks in a manner that supports the commander’s objectives.” However, any offensive cyber operations (OCO) must be predicated on “careful consideration of projected effects” and “appropriate consideration of nonmilitary factors such as foreign policy implications.” “The growing reliance on cyberspace around the globe requires carefully controlling OCO, requiring national level approval,” according to the newly disclosed , Joint Publication 3-12(R). That publication was first issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a SECRET document in February 2013 (as JP 3-12, without the R). But this week it was reissued as a public document. It is unclear whether the public document has been redacted or modified for release. The discussion of “offensive cyberspace operations” in the original, classified version of JP 3-12 led to adoption of that term in the official DoD lexicon for the first time in , where it has remained through . Offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) are “intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace. OCO will be authorized like offensive operations in the physical domains, via an execute order (EXORD).” The is fairly candid about the challenges and limitations of cyberspace operations. “Activities in cyberspace by a sophisticated adversary may be difficult to detect” and to attribute to their source. Yet such detection and attribution capabilities are “critical” for enabling offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. By the same token, “first-order effects of [US cyberspace operations] are often subtle, and assessment of second- and third-order effects can be difficult,” requiring “significant intelligence capabilities and collection efforts” to evaluate.