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Distinction between prevention of attacks through deterrence by denial versus deterrence by punishment.

Nor et al. ’20 Jörg Noll, Osman Bojang, Sebastiaan Rietjens NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020, 2021 ISBN : 978-94-6265-418-1 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_7 Accessed 6/24/22. //kinsey

The security and defense policies of the Baltic states are strongly influenced by the Russian aggression of 2014. This also holds true for NATO. The alliance has deployed around 4,500 troops to Poland and the Baltic States since 2017. There is a large consensus amongst academics and practitioners that this mission, labelled Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), should deter Russian aggression. However, the strategy to do so remains highly ambiguous and unclear (see also Running’s chapter in this volume). While many official NATO documents as well as observers simply refer to the strategy as deterrence, others, either explicitly or implicitly, distinguish between deterrence by denial or deterrence by punishment. The exact nature of the strategy can have far reaching consequences in terms of allocation of resources, strategic communication, (perceived) effectiveness as well as the very foundation of the alliance itself: the trust of every ally that it is protected by NATO in case of aggression.

Traditional deterrence theory presumes a rational actor perspective. Over time the role of psychology and actor specific perceptions has become more appreciated, in particular in the third wave in the deterrence literature. Most of these studies have focused on the history of the deterrent relationship and the nature of signaling behaviour. However, although strategic culture has been widely acknowledged as an important shaping factor of strategic behaviour, the role of strategic culture has been largely ignored in deterrence studies. This contribution aims to address this gap. Specifically, this chapter focuses on how strategic culture influences the Baltic countries’ behavior towards deterrence.

While most of the literature analyses eFP from the perspective of NATO or the troop contributing countries, this chapter addresses the question how the host nations, i.e. in this contribution Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, perceive the strategy underlying eFP and their own strategies. Given the fact that NATO’s responses in the Baltics post-2014 were also intended to be ‘assurance measures’, such a perspective is important because similar or diverging perspectives can have far reaching consequences for NATO’s strategy and its credibility. We found that in Latvia official documents reflect the official NATO narrative based on deterrence by punishment. In Estonia and Lithuania, documents, officials and experts emphasize deterrence by denial as opposed or sometimes even parallel to deterrence by punishment. To understand these tendencies, this contribution contends that the respective strategic cultures of the host nations influence their perspectives on the NATO’s strategy. To that end, Sect.  briefly addresses the debate on deterrence and the different perspectives observers take on the eFP mission. Section  subsequently introduces strategic culture theory as a lens to explain the perspectives of the host nations. Section  outlines the methods we used. We discuss the results in Sect.  and provide a discussion and conclusions in Sect. .

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