1NC --- No Integration
Allies will resist---a litany of constraints ensure disagreement.
Häussler 10 – Assistant Legal Advisor of Operational Law at the Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT, Norfolk/Va., USA)
Ulf Häussler, “Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty,” International Cyber Security, Legal & Policy Proceedings, Chapter 6, 2010, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2010/01/LP_Proceedings_2010-2.pdf
Political Policy and Institutional Arrangements
The fact that a given cyber threat or incident crosses the threshold of political concern is without prejudice to its political and legal characterisation for the purpose of developing an appropriate response. Much will depend on political policy perceptions – are cyber threats and incidents predominantly perceived as human rights (i.e. data privacy) issues, matters of law enforcement and/or homeland security300, or matter of national security and defence – and the different roles played by the government agencies involved on the examination and assessment of cyber threats and incidents, and competent to adopt or contribute to actual responses. Accordingly, it may be for multiple reasons that NATO faces challenges in developing consensus regarding the full integration of cyber security and defence in its respective mechanisms, as well as the necessary institutional arrangements.
First, in an environment where any security and defence discourse is to a great extent predetermined by the level of political concern, there may simply have been a limited number of opportunities to actually put cyber security and defence prominently on NATO's agenda. Second, quite similar to threats arising from international terrorism, threats arising in and out of the cyber space may give rise to both internal, or homeland, and external security concerns, and thus trigger the oftentimes complex delineations of competence between the defence, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors which many NATO Nations have developed into strong checks and balances amounting to a separation of powers en miniature within their executive branches of government. Whilst obviously such domestic arrangements lack the capacity to affect the interpretation and application of the North Atlantic Treaty301, they may nevertheless de facto challenge NATO Nations' Defence Ministries' as well as Armed Forces' ability to put cyber security and defence on NATO's policy, concept, and doctrine agendas. To date, no well-entrenched method, structure or process for overcoming this de facto challenge – e.g. through involvement of foreign intelligence, homeland security and/or law enforcement stakeholders – exists within NATO. Third, there is a near complete lack of NATO-wide, standardised doctrine for cyber warfare. The resulting absence, amongst NATO Nations, of a militarily agreed and legally cleared (Article 36 of GP I) understanding concerning the means and methods of cyber warfare may also contribute to the lack of political policy consensus. The appetite for engaging in hostilities which might be perceived as potentially involving legally doubtful means and methods of warfare may be limited. Ultimately, the absence of consensus regarding jus in bello may thus have repercussions on the likelihood that consensus can be reached concerning jus ad bellum as well as collective security and defence.