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They’re coordinating with civilian institutions, accelerating political response times, and boosting overall resilience to hybrid threats.

Oguz 16 – Ph.D, Security Expert at the International Strategic and Security Research Center

Safak, 2016, “The New NATO: Prepared for Russian Hybrid Warfare?” Insight, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26300458.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A54f0cb5a96b9cf9c79b2b9b43d8623b9

The Special Operations Forces are expected to provide strategic and operational support for the Alliance’s efforts, most especially in effectively countering irregular warfare elements, as they are more effective in this realm than regular forces. For this reason, the integration of special forces into the NRF and VJTF constitute another key measure adopted in the New Strategy. The first demonstration of this integration took place during the Noble Jump exercise of June 2015, when NATO deployed VJTF based on scenario that Poland was under threat of irregular warfare. The deployment made clear in terms of potential aggression against Alliance members, Russian irregular warfare is seen as far more likely than conventional warfare.

Arguing that Russia resorted to massive and effective cyber assaults against both Ukraine and NATO countries, the Alliance enhanced its cyber warfare capabilities as well. A February 2016 technical agreement launched a joint program with the European Union, which initiated the exchange of information and incident data, in order to boost situational awareness of cyber threats.35 The Alliance also began to study the legal background of the relation between cyber assault and common defense. The statement by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that “a major cyber attack against the Alliance could trigger a collective response”36 has made clear that cyberspace is likely to be an important operational domain in future.

Additionally, NATO opted to counter hybrid threats by pursuing a comprehensive approach across all military, diplomatic, economic, information, and social levers available to the international community. Cooperation and coordination with other partner countries and international organizations, especially with the European Union and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is recognized as key to countering hybrid threats; in particular in this regard, the critical civilian assets and civil issue capabilities of the European Union.

Both during and after the Cold War, Russia enjoyed an advantage over NATO in speedy decision-making and deployment of forces, as well as in the use of special forces. Ever since the establishment of the NATO Alliance, authority to deploy troops, and the use of these troops, has constituted a critical issue between member nations and NATO officials. During the June Defense Ministerial meeting in 2015, leaders decided to grant authority to SACEUR to prepare troops immediately when the Allies deem it necessary, thereby accelerating the military reaction process. As a result, when SACEUR sees an unfolding crisis he is authorized to mobilize NATO’s new VJTF and send troops to the nearest flight line, to await final orders for takeoff. Authority from the Alliance’s highest decision-making body—the North Atlantic Council—must be granted before actually deploying the troops.37 In this way, member countries retained final authority for use of the troops.

The new measures were adopted to deter, dissuade, and challenge Russian hybrid warfare in addition to a Russian conventional assault against the Alliance—the latter scenario described by Putin himself as only a madman’s fantasy.38 The Alliance is militarily stronger, swifter, and more capable of responding to any Russian hybrid threat, particularly against a member country. Nevertheless, political determination will remain a key factor in challenging Russia.

NATO is effectively deterring Russian hybrid threats---upgraded defenses and enhanced coordination.

Rynning 20, is Professor of War Studies and Vice Dean for Research at the faculty of business and social sciences, the University of Southern Denmark (SDU) in Odense, Denmark. Sten Rynning founded the Center for War Studies at SDU in 2011 and headed it until 2019. (Sten, “Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice,” NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020, https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/43303/2021_Book_NLARMSNetherlandsAnnualReviewO.pdf)

Deterrence by denial (i.e., an ability to deny Russian objectives by defensive measures) is only possible for NATO at the lower rungs of this ladder, and NATO has not been idle here either. In fact, most of the early measures taken by NATO in response to the annexation of Crimea fall into the deterrence of denial category and centre on rapid reaction capacities, especially in the shape of a NATO Response Force (NRF) upgraded for deterrence purposes. The NRF now has a reinforced, quicker spearhead—a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force potentially up to 13,000 troops strong, and then two complementing brigades with support (each 13,000 strong) forming a layered, sizeable reaction force explicitly linked to collective defence purposes and regularly exercised in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states.35 In 2016, in response to the foreseeable difficulties of projecting mainly Western forces into zones of conflicts close to Russia, NATO decided to established an “enhanced forward presence”—four multinational battalion-sized battle groups —in the Baltic states and Poland, and a “tailored forward presence”—mainly naval forces—in the Black Sea region. Whether these forces can credibly “deny” Russian objectives in the case of limited war is a bone of contention. Most observers and sometimes NATO itself employ the descriptor “tripwire” to these forces, thus indicating that they are triggers that promise to unleash NATO’s big guns and therefore part and parcel of deterrence by punishment. However, US diplomats (interviewed on background) feel more confident that the US battalion embedded (in Poland) in the collective forward presence posture would actually be able to fight and survive, and thus deny Russian objectives. That may be so, in which case the conclusion is that NATO has a moderate-to-low—and geographically focused—capacity for deterrence by denial and then a more general and impressive capacity for deterrence by punishment. NATO’s unquestionable capacity for deterrence by denial is rather found at the level of grey zone, non-kinetic conflict. In this regard, NATO has upgraded not only its cyber defences and enhanced intelligence coordination, as mentioned, but has enhanced coordination with the European Union on hybrid threats, with a 2016 joint declaration leading to a common work program and a collaborative Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, located in Helsinki, the 2016 adoption of societal resilience benchmarks that, while mostly falling outside NATO’s political-military remit, nations must meet, and finally the decision in 2018 to organize counter-hybrid support teams that can tailor assistance to individual allies and circumstances.36 NATO’s full range of actions in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea —a range to which this brief overview can do only limited justice—thus combines deterrence by denial (grey zone conflict, societal resilience, reaction and forward deployed forces to counter limited land grabs) and deterrence by punishment (the full chain of reaction and deployable forces, from conventional to nuclear). NATO’s strong suit is the military piece of this posture, but it has considerably adapted to grey zone conflict scenarios in an effort to achieve a comprehensive deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia’s unified (kinetic and non-kinetic) and uninterrupted (all domains, in war and peace) doctrine of “new generation warfare”.

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