1NC --- Democracy Answers
Democracies don’t prevent war — there’s no statistical evidence.
Doorenspleet 19 — Renske Doorenspleet, Associate Professor in Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick, Former Research Fellow of the Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program at the Belfer Center for International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, holds an MA and Ph.D. in political science from Leiden University, 2019 (“Conclusion: The Power and Limits of the Democratic Peace Idea,” Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Edited by Jean-Paul Gagnon and Mark Chou, Published by Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 9783319916569, p. 98-99)
My chapter, though, did not look for specifc studies which could support one specifc argument (e.g. ‘democracy is a good thing’ or ‘democracy has instrumental value as it brings peace between states’). The aim of the chapter was to investigate the question whether democracy leads to interstate war or peace, by analysing dozens of statistical studies which have been selected in a systematic way. The analyses revealed many caveats.
The first caveat is that none of the studies which have directly tested the democratic peace hypothesis demonstrated that democracy is the only and most important factor when explaining interstate war. Some studies provided evidence that other factors are significant as well, and other studies indicated that alternative explanations are much more powerful, sometimes even showing that the impact of democracy is simply spurious. Geographical and economic factors, for example, play a key role as well, and tend to be far more important, so it is certainly not only democracy which matters.
Secondly, these findings are based on quantitative studies, which show correlation but not necessarily causation. While there is a lively ongoing debate about the causal mechanisms, it is still unclear how we can understand and interpret the expected absence of interstate war between democracies. The number of studies which criticize these ideas has increased considerably since the mid-1990s, not just theoretically but particularly empirically as there is no strong evidence to back up the ideas that norms and institutional constraints are the key mechanisms (see Hayes 2011). Moreover, the quest to find the underlying mechanisms should not get priority anyway in future research, in my view, as the statistical evidence for the democratic peace hypotheses is weak overall (see frst caveat above).
Thirdly, democracies are not more peaceful than dictatorships. While there might be some evidence for democratic peace among democratic states (or at least a correlation), democracies are not more peaceful in general. The evidence for a monadic link is not clear, not signifcant and certainly not robust. There is no clear support for the monadic peace hypothesis which states that interstate war is less likely in democracies compared to dictatorships in general. And democracies do fight with dictatorships—quite a lot.
Finally, ‘democratizing for peace’ seems a dangerous route to take, as democratizing states fight most—more than both democracies and dictatorships. Democracies might not fght with each other, but the countries that are democratizing are quite war-prone. Moreover, there is convincing evidence that hybrid systems (or semi-democracies) are more likely to be involved in interstate wars, not only compared to countries with higher levels of democracy but also to countries with lower levels of democracy. Democratization can be a very unpredictable and possibly dangerous process, and the fndings in this chapter show that democratizing for peace is likely to end in a deadly disaster.
Based on those fndings, this chapter comes to the controversial conclusion that eventually we cannot defend the notion that it really matters whether you live in a dictatorship or democracy, at least not with regard to the likelihood that an interstate war will take place in your country. In other words, democracy is not a panacea for peace in general, and we cannot be sure that people living in democracies have less chance to experience an interstate war compared to people living in dictatorships. People living in democratizing and hybrid systems seem to be most at risk, which means promoting democratization would not be wise, at least not when achieving peace is the ultimate goal. Hence, war is most likely in democratizing countries. Still, the chance of an interstate war is low in the other political systems—so not only in democracies but in dictatorships as well. In this sense, the idea that democracies make a signifcant difference is not convincing.43 The (instrumental) value of democracy cannot be found in being less war-prone and bringing peace between countries.