2NC --- Info-Sharing Fails
Even if the U.S. successfully shares OCOs, NATO can’t use them.
Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)
C. Capability and Force Development Priorities Assuming NATO can overcome conceptual and policy hurdles, significant effort will still be required to develop the necessary forces and capabilities across all domains, but perhaps especially for cyberspace.
Operationalising MDO demands a ‘calibrated force posture’ with multi-domain formations strategically positioned, held at readiness and able to deploy over large distances, trained and equipped to operate across multiple contested domains (Grispen-Gelens, 2020). The vision is for different sensors and shooters to share and fuse data, build a common operating picture, inform rapid decision-making and deliver effects at a time and place of the commander’s choosing and to do so agnostic of domains, nation, service or platform (Niewood, Grant & Lewis, 2019). Forces must operate at pace and against an adversary contesting all domains. This tempo necessitates moving beyond NATO’s past focus on synchronisation of pre-planned effects in individual domains towards more agile targeting and more resilience against hostile attempts at ‘disorganisation’ or ‘systems attack’ (Thomas, 2019; Engstrom, 2018).
Linking all this together demands novel approaches to C4ISR, as reflected in investments in JADC2 (Harrigian, 2020). This US initiative leverages advances in information and communication technologies such as mesh networks, cloud and edge computing, open architectures, data analytics, AI and machine learning, autonomy and automation, software-defined systems, robotics, satellite communications and sophisticated cyber and EMS capabilities (Hitchens, 2019). Future JADC2 networks must be secure, robust, resilient, agile and more decentralised, with enough bandwidth to share data in a timely and secure manner despite cyber attacks, jamming, spoofing or physical destruction of communication nodes (Goldfein, 2017). Trust is also essential, handling data from different sources and at multiple security levels without making controls so arduous that Reliance on connectivity makes cyberspace, space and the EMS the ‘centre of gravity’ for MDO (Hess et al., 2019). JADC2 introduces obvious challenges from a cyber threat perspective, both in terms of the attack surface for different threat vectors and the cascading effects from hostile cyber activity—though, of course, existing centralised C2 hubs also have their own vulnerabilities to cyber or physical attack (Hess et al., 2019). Improved cyber capabilities are not only needed to secure and enable operations in other domains (Reilly, 2020). Investments by Russia and China to contest cyberspace and the EMS may also limit the ability of NATO commanders to employ offensive cyber capabilities at a time and place that will ‘converge’ with effects through other domains. Securing networks against disruption is critical at the operational and strategic levels given requirements for reach-back to headquarters, especially constraining organisations responsible for delivering offensive cyber effects, since these are likely to be physically located in the homeland (Watling & Roper, 2019; Nettis, 2020).
OCO cooperation can’t solve the aff.
Jacobsen 21 — Jeppe T. Jacobsen, Visiting Scholar at New York University, former Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, M.A. in International Politics from the University of London, M.A. in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, 2021 (“Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities,” International Affairs, May, Available Online at )
While NATO and its member states adapted to the new security environment after the end of the Cold War by scaling down the military investments and presence in eastern Europe and by focusing more on crisis management,53 much of the Cold War deterrence language returned when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014.54 What needs to be deterred today, much of the literature agrees, is not only a full-scale military invasion but to a larger extent the use and support of pro-Russian militant separatists who are willing to apply insurgency tactics in NATO's post-Soviet member states.55 As a result, the allies' military investments have been increasing again,56 a number of initiatives such as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland have been introduced,57 and the discussions—and disagreements—on the nuclear deterrence (of non-nuclear threats) have re-emerged.58 Such responses are often presented as a renewed attempt by NATO to reassert its deterrence and assurance posture by signalling strength, preparedness and willingness to punish ‘bad’ behaviour.59
At first sight, the introduction of CYOC seems to add to these deterrence efforts. NATO added an offensive cyber option to reinforce its ability to impose costs sufficient to dissuade adversaries from acting aggressively. On closer examination, however, it is not self-evident that requesting member states' delivery of offensive cyber effects in NATO operations constitutes a necessary or even a substantial addition to credibly signalling the ability and willingness to punish an adversary. NATO's conventional capabilities are clearly already far superior to Russia's—with or without fully integrated cyber effects. Thus, a deterrence failure, resulting for example in a scenario in one of the Baltic states similar to that which occurred in eastern Ukraine, will not be the result of NATO's lack of available cyber tools in its military toolbox; rather, if the Russian leadership were to consider it in its interest to pursue such a scenario, it would mean that Russia's decision-makers did not believe in the credibility of NATO's article 5 or in NATO's ability to mobilize its forces. The capacity to integrate cyber effects would do nothing to change that.
Furthermore, if the establishment of CYOC is an attempt to signal defensive strength and unity in cyberspace, it remains difficult to imagine that such signalling would dissuade adversaries from trying to penetrate NATO and allied systems. CYOC does not change the fact that NATO is not tasked to govern and secure national IT systems. In an operational setting, states might connect to each other through so-called federated mission networking;60 but there is no tradition of ceding control of the deployed national networks to NATO during military operations. Hence, CYOC can only realistically seek to become a hub for cyber-threat information-sharing and to support states' coordination and synchronization of various national responses to these threats. In other words, CYOC is unlikely to become an active defender in cyberspace that causes doubt in the adversary's evaluation of its own cyber capabilities. This also means that even if CYOC's coordination and information-sharing efforts manage to contribute to the denial of intrusions into allied systems, an adversary's military is unlikely to be deterred from trying to hack these systems. In fact, actively articulating that CYOC is supposed to deter (through denial) a perceived adversary such as Russia from hacking NATO and allied operational systems creates an incentive to do just that and thereby show that the alliance is incapable of doing what it says it seeks to do.