1NC --- Russia Turn
OCO sharing OR a NATO posture shift causes Russia to freak-out and undermines strategic stability.
Lewis 15 — James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Advisor to UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defense,” The Tallinn Papers, Available Online at )
Dissimulation is an essential part of hybrid warfare, and Europe and the US face a propaganda barrage that is much more sophisticated than the clumsy Soviet efforts of the Cold War. Despite this clumsiness, a good portion of the Western public has found it persuasive. Similarly, those critical of NATO will find new complaints about aggression and militarisation credible. Russia has already complained that NATO’s defensive cyber doctrine is destabilising warmongering and part of a larger conspiracy to advance western hegemony.11 The Snowden revelations have lent a powerful impetus to Russian propaganda.
Behind the rhetoric lies both a desire to conceal their own use of cyber operations and a real fear that Russia’s decline leaves it vulnerable to new military technologies. The intent is to hamper and complicate any Western response to Russian efforts to regain control in Crimea and the “near abroad”. The Russian position is that NATO’s new cyber doctrine is destabilising as it threatens to use conventional or even nuclear responses (in the Russian description of the new policy towards low-level cyber attacks).
Any announcement by NATO relating to offensive cyber capabilities would be greeted with alarm and vitriol in Moscow. However, the effect on stability would likely be less pronounced. NATO-Russia relations are already in steep decline. It is possible that any NATO announcement would accelerate this, but it is also possible that Russia could recalculate the risk of further adventures if it were faced with a stronger defence. In terms of opponent attitudes, there is probably little effect. Russia, along with NATO’s other potential military opponents, is likely to overestimate both capabilities and coordination among NATO member states and underestimate NATO’s will to defend. This is an unhappy combination as it makes aggression against NATO seem less risky.
NATO’s decision on how cyber attacks could trigger Article 5, while greeted with complaints, had a stabilising effect. It made clear to potential opponents that cyber attacks are not risk-free. Similarly, a clear enunciation of how NATO would use offensive cyber capabilities as part of any defensive operation would also change opponents’ risk calculations in ways that would force them to consider how offensive actions, even if intended to be covert, are not free of risk or cost.
The Cyber Club
Some level of cyber capability is being acquired by all advanced militaries, and perhaps a dozen countries can be identified from public sources as procuring offensive cyber capabilities. These countries include several NATO members. As with nuclear weapons, the capability to undertake offensive cyber operations is a club within a club in NATO, with largely the same membership – the US, the UK and France. Germany’s armed forces may also be developing offensive cyber capabilities.12 The well-developed procedures for release and for integration into NATO planning created for nuclear weapons do not exist for cyber attack, although it is currently far more likely that any NATO military operation will have a cyber component, while the use of nuclear weapons is almost unthinkable.
The US and the UK both possess elite cyber capabilities. They also have a close partnership in cyber espionage. This partnership is centred on a relationship between the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), both of which are intelligence agencies with a long history of supporting military operations. US military cyber operations are the responsibility of U.S. Cyber Command, whose commander is also the head of the NSA. Cyber operations blur the line between intelligence and military activities. The fact, however, that these are intelligence agencies has a created a certain reticence regarding the sharing of information on capabilities and plans, which complicates the integration of offensive cyber into NATO planning and doctrine.
Offensive cyber capabilities are still too new, with too many unknown risks that hold potentially profound political consequences. US policy is that only the President can approve a cyber operation likely to result in “significant consequences” that could produce loss of life or a damaging reaction, although the Secretary of Defense or the head of U.S. Cyber Command can take independent action in an emergency. US policy restricts independent action by tactical and operational commanders for this reason. A local commander may not know all the trade-offs or the risks that using a cyber attack could entail. That said, all of these problems are manageable with some decision-making model based on the precedent of the warning and request system used for nuclear weapons release.13
Until there are better predictive tools and judgments about risk and consequences, offensive cyber operations will require a politically sensitive decision as to when the benefit of an attack outweighs the political risk. Additional coordination mechanisms would be needed to decide when the benefits of an attack outweigh the risk of a loss of intelligence capabilities, or when a target justifies expending a weapon that might never work again. The inability to predict collateral damage and uncertainty over political effect encourage caution in the use of offensive cyber operations, but that is not the same as advertising possession of the capability.
That causes the Ukraine war to draw in the U.S. and NATO --- results in great power cyber war.
Healey 22 — Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs specializing in cyber conflict, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, 2022 (“Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After,” War on the Rocks, March 9th, Available Online at , Accessed on 06-19-2022)
With the world worried about the risk of nuclear escalation between Russia and the West, now might also be a good time to worry about the risk of cyber conflict escalating to war as well.
In recent years, a number of scholars and practitioners have argued that cyber conflict should be seen as an intelligence battle or pressure-release valve rather than something that could escalate into actual conflict or war. Indeed, to date, no state has responded to a rival’s cyber attack with a kinetic reprisal. But that does not mean it will not happen now. As geopolitical circumstances change, the escalatory potential of cyber capabilities is likely to change as well.
Moscow, for example, might respond to Western sanctions with intensified cyber attacks. Or Western leaders, recognizing that no-fly zones are too risky, might approve cyber interventions to prevent civilian massacres instead. In either case, they could well assume this escalation would not meet with a direct military response. And in either case, they could be wrong.
Minimizing this risk requires both recognizing and respecting the latent but strong escalatory potential of cyber attacks. It also involves delving deeper into the psychology of the situation, as escalation will be driven as much by the perceptions and misperceptions of the participants as any technical aspects of cyber warfare.
The Great News
So far, cyber attacks have not proven particularly escalatory or effective on the battlefield. Even the most provocative incidents that came closest to resembling kinetic attacks, such as Stuxnet or the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, have not led to particularly menacing crises, much less war. If anything, over the past decade cyber capabilities have helped de-escalate crises, acting as a “non-kinetic option for leaders who feel pressure to act in a crisis, but who are wary of using force.”
The U.S. conflict with Iran offers a clear example. After Iran attacked several oil tankers and downed a U.S. drone in June 2019, President Donald Trump canceled punitive U.S. airstrikes at the last minute out of concern that the casualties could prompt further escalation. However, he allowed nonlethal cyber disruption of Iranian computer systems, anticipating Iran would not respond violently. Indeed, Iran’s supreme leader “blocked any large, direct retaliation,” limiting the country’s response to the cyber realm.
Scholars have offered different explanations for the non-escalatory nature of these attacks. Cyber effects are “uncertain and often relatively limited” and “offer great powers escalatory offramps [and] signaling mechanisms” to de-escalate. In the “cyber strategic competitive space short of armed conflict,” states have “tacitly agreed on lower and upper bounds” and accordingly “have mutual interests in avoiding escalation to violent conflict.” Cyber conflict also has characteristics of an intelligence, not military, contest.
The Bad News
Cyber conflicts have flourished during a relatively peaceful time when major powers generally did not invade one another. Perhaps cyber capabilities acted as a pressure release simply because in the post-Cold War period states usually wanted to de-escalate and the geopolitical stakes were not that high anyway? What happens now when Moscow feels that the stakes are much higher?
Already there have been warnings that if Russian forces face further setbacks, Putin may lash out in desperate and ultimately self-harming ways. A major cyber power has never faced such a crisis before, so past performance may be a limited indicator of future potential. In fact, the very perception that cyber attacks are non-escalatory might itself increase the risk of unintended escalation.
There are multiple ways cyber conflict around the Ukrainian invasion might escalate into a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, possibly as a result of either side’s offensives.
First, Russian offensive cyber operations might spark a wider war. President Vladimir Putin has declared sanctions “are akin to a declaration of war” and may see aggressive cyber attacks as the perfect response, particularly since they are reversible and non-lethal. Russia has been entangled with Western economies for decades, especially in the realms of energy and finance. But now, as ties are being severed quickly and viciously, Russia no longer has to fear the backlash if its cyber forces were to disrupt Western banks or liquified natural gas terminals. If you are dealt out of the game, why not just flip the table?
Russia’s cyber generals may be just as enthusiastic as their Army counterparts. They may assure Putin their forces are ready for battle and can quickly and bloodlessly get the West to back down. Putin could be convinced disruptive attacks against the West are no big deal, a low-cost signal that the West should de-escalate or just the next natural move in a non-escalatory intelligence contest. After all, U.S. research found that in response to cyber attacks, “Americans are less likely to support retaliation with force” compared to a more traditional strike.
This can lead to escalation in two ways. The United States — along with countries like the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands — might well decide to defend forward against such attacks. Gen. Paul Nakasone, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, has insisted his forces “must take this fight to the enemy, just as we do in other aspects of conflict.” His then-deputy has also argued that the United States “cannot cede any territory” to adversaries as the “Russians will keep pushing until we push back on them.”
Worse, Dmitri Alperovitch recently warned that if Russia launches cyber attacks after “[h]aving already exhausted the power of economic sanctions, America and its European allies would have few choices other than to respond to these attacks with offensive cyber-strikes of their own.” Such dynamics can feed a spiraling escalation in cyberspace that might take on a life outside of the control of policymakers.
Second, Western offensive cyber operations might spark war. U.S. cyber espionage and operations against Putin, his cronies, or Russia’s military forces will appear far more ominous to Putin if he believes they are aimed at regime change. Could Putin turn the other cheek if the United States were to electronically raid the cryptocurrency wallets of Russia’s sanctions-avoiding kleptocrats? He might feel the need to escalate his own cyber operations as part of his own version of defending forward.
Escalation could happen on the battlefield as well. According to the New York Times, teams from U.S. Cyber Command are “in place to interfere with Russia’s digital attacks and communications.” Other teams are almost certainly collecting digital intelligence on the location and intent of Russian combat forces. The United States is sharing such intelligence with the Ukrainians but apparently not yet providing any real-time targeting. That may change soon, as the United States seeks to alleviate intensifying attacks on civilians. And with his KGB-bred paranoia, Putin might already see the presence of U.S. defensive and intelligence teams operating on or against Russian military networks as evidence of direct U.S. involvement in the war. Confirming his apparent belief that Ukraine is just a NATO puppet, this might force a response, either inside or outside of cyberspace.
Further, if Western governments have infiltrated Russia’s operational military networks, they may feel pressure to disrupt those networks to prevent civilian massacres. Because cyber capabilities are billed as non-lethal, reversible, and non-escalatory, tub-thumping newspapers may push decision-makers to take shots they might not otherwise: “We can’t create a no-fly zone but can use cyber capabilities to prevent civilian harm.” Some well-meaning national leaders may succumb to this pressure, potentially causing a larger conflict.
Goes nuclear.
Lonergan and Yarhi-Milo 22 — Erica Lonergan, Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, PhD in Political Science from Columbia University, and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the Political Science Department and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, former Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, PhD and M.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, 2022 (“Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/)
However, conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.
The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds, just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict, like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine.
How Cyberspace Is Creating Nuclear Risks
Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars, in turn, worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular, distinct from the military, are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools.
Cyber operations could have nuclear implications, especially because modern nuclear command and control systems, like those in Russia and the United States, are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command, control, and communications systems, which include early warning, information collection, and communications capabilities, alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). But their digital dependencies are creating opportunities for exploitation using cyber means. In a 2020 report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative found that “almost 9 out of 10 planned nuclear modernization programs involve at least some new digital components or upgrades.”
Vulnerabilities inherent in the digital infrastructure that undergird modern nuclear systems provide opportunities for actors to engage in cyber espionage — gaining access to a network or system to steal information — or even conduct cyber attacks. Hypothetically, a cyber power like Russia could conduct a cyber attack against a U.S. early warning satellite to degrade its functionality. This has become an urgent concern for practitioners. U.S. Strategic Command, for instance, is currently working to “operationally harden NC3 systems against cyber threats.” Congress has also gotten involved, requiring the Defense Department to evaluate the cybersecurity of major weapon systems. And the Government Accountability Office has published multiple reports decrying the state of cybersecurity and scope of vulnerabilities of weapon systems, including elements of the nuclear triad.
From an academic perspective, scholars have investigated how cyber operations targeting nuclear systems could exacerbate escalation risks. Focusing on nuclear forces, early research, such as work by Martin Libicki, was skeptical of the dangers posed by cyber operations. Nuclear forces were seen as being largely immune from digital attacks because they were “air gapped,” meaning that they were separated from information technology systems.
However, as nuclear systems have become increasingly intertwined with the digital environment — not to mention the dual-use nature of many elements of nuclear command, control, and communications systems (like early warning or position, navigation, and timing satellites) — the protection offered by being segregated from the internet is less robust. Jacquelyn Schneider, Benjamin Schechter, and Rachael Schaffer, for instance, ran a series of wargames demonstrating that decision-makers in hypothetical crises are likely to use their cyber exploits against an adversary’s nuclear systems. They found that this could have negative effects on states’ respective nuclear strategies, especially decisions to pre-delegate nuclear launch authority or automate nuclear responses. Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay argue that the clandestine nature of cyber operations means that one state could secretly gain access to an adversary’s nuclear command, control, and communications systems, giving the former an information advantage or even creating an incentive for the latter to use its nuclear weapons out of the fear that it may lose them. James Acton notes that the difficulties of distinguishing between cyber espionage and attack could lead a state to misperceive the intent behind a cyber operation, generating a similar “use it or lose it” calculus.