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Executive flexibility is inevitable – even if they’re right – Congress will NOT re-engage due to political incentives – AND, gridlock enables executive power grabs – NO spillover

Daniel W. Drezner 21, Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 8-30-2021, " Why Congress will not reengage on foreign policy," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/08/30/why-congress-will-not-reengage-foreign-policy/, nihara

As more information comes out about the proximate causes of the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan, AEI’s Kori Schake has a good op-ed in the New York Times reminding everyone (including Trump administration officials hoping for national amnesia) about the February 2020 deal that the Trump administration negotiated with the Taliban that set the table for the horrible meal we are all digesting now.

That agreement led to “the release of 5,000 combat and political Taliban prisoners” and bypassed the Afghan government entirely. As Schake writes, “For someone who prided himself on his abilities as a dealmaker and displayed an ‘I alone can fix it’ arrogance, the agreement he made with the Taliban is one of the most disgraceful diplomatic bargains on record.”

The deeper point to Schake’s op-ed, however, is that President Donald Trump’s debacle is simply the most recent and most prominent example of a U.S. president believing that personal diplomacy can solve everything. Instead, “presidents should return to the practice of persuading their fellow Americans of the merits of agreements with foreign powers.”

If they do not, Schake advises Congress to reclaim its powers over foreign affairs:

Congress can begin by reasserting its role in diplomacy and requiring specific authorizations for the use of military force rather than continuing to acquiesce to claims that existing executive authorizations can be endlessly expanded. It should refuse the shifting of funds previously authorized and appropriated for other purposes (Mr. Trump made such shifts to construct the border wall). It should reject foreign policy changes enacted by executive order rather than congressional approval, and it should force the Supreme Court to clarify the extent of the president’s war powers.

Agreements with foreign powers, whether states, international institutions or organizations like the Taliban, should be submitted to Congress for a vote. The best way to prevent catastrophic foreign policy mistakes is to require the 535 representatives of the American people to put their jobs on the line, become informed, and support, reject or modify a president’s program. Congress tried to slow or block Mr. Trump’s planned drawdown of U.S. forces. Members who supported the Taliban deal should be explaining why they thought the outcome would be different than the tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan now. Apathy and unaccountability are the real enemies of good foreign policy. Presidents get around oversight by offering unilateral policy actions or claiming international agreements aren’t formal treaties. Congress shouldn’t let a president from either party get away with that.

As an analyst, I agree wholeheartedly with Schake’s diagnosis of the problem. One of the running themes in my own long-form writing on American foreign policy — see here, here, here, here and here — has been that a variety of factors has led to everyone treating the president as the last adult in the room. This is a real problem when Americans elect a petulant child to occupy the Oval Office.

Nor is this argument original to me. It begins with Arthur Schlesinger’s “The Imperial Presidency,” continues with Andrew Rudalevige’s “The New Imperial Presidency,” proceeds with Linda Fowler’s “Watchdogs on the Hill” and so forth.

The diagnosis makes sense — but Schake’s proposed remedy does not, for two reasons. First, most members of Congress have little incentive to act responsibly on foreign affairs. As Helen Milner and Dustin Tingley note in “Sailing the Water’s Edge,” what motivates Congress is the distribution of concentrated costs and benefits. Foreign affairs, which is mostly about advancing the national interest, has very little of this outside of the defense budget.

As a result, most individual members of Congress do not care about foreign policy, except as an exercise in partisanship. Neither do their constituents. The result is that when Congress does get involved in foreign affairs, it is mostly through displays of self-sabotaging symbolism, such as passing JASTA or impulsively flying to Kabul in the middle of a rescue mission or, as I noted in Foreign Affairs, imposing economic sanctions so that they “can tell their constituents that they are doing something about a problem even if that something isn’t working.”

Now it could be argued that if Schake’s proposed reforms were enacted, the shared sense of responsibility would focus the mind of Congress, leaving lawmakers no choice but to act responsibly. Alas, that is highly unlikely, for two reasons. First, even if Congress was blamed collectively for inaction in foreign affairs, individual members would not be punished by their constituents. Ordinary Americans barely consider foreign policy when voting for the president, much less their House representative.

Second, when a foreign policy crisis does emerge, attention naturally gravitates toward 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Congress has 535 individual voices; the president is a singular voice. During a crisis, the president will always have the incentive to act using executive power in the face of congressional gridlock. Furthermore, that very gridlock will enable the president to get away with power grabs more often than not. So long as a president’s party provides backup, there is little that Congress can do as an institution to constrain executive power.

This is normally the point in the column when the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts offers a better solution. This is a problem, however, that cannot necessarily be fixed given the current political incentives. The best I can offer is to try to further institutionalize consultations with congressional leadership in a manner akin to reading in the Gang of Eight on intelligence matters.

I grant that this is weak beer. The problem is structural. Presidents care about foreign policy because of the national interest and also because it’s the arena where presidents have the most latitude. Members of Congress do not care most of the time. And the reason they do not care is that their constituents really do not care. Until something changes in that last sentence, the status quo will persist.

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