Exec circumvents AND Courts strikedown the CP
By Erica H. Ma 21, J.D., 2020, New York University School of Law; B.A., 2015, University of Pennsylvania, "Article: The War Powers Resolution and the Concept of Hostilities," Northeastern University Law Review, 13, 519, pp. 535-537, May 2021, Lexis, nihara
In line with the purpose of the resolution, the Senate report of the WPR noted that Section 5(b) is the "heart and core" of the resolution and "represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the constitution[al] balance which has been distorted by practice in our history." 87Executive branch officials, however, have challenged this provision in particular as an "unconstitutional infringement on the President's authority as Commander in Chief." 88Moreover, the executive branch has argued that this provision "interferes with successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field." 89While Section 5(c) of the WPR allows Congress, through a concurrent resolution, to direct the President to remove U.S. armed forces from situations of hostilities, the Supreme Court's 1983 decision INS v. Chadha, which struck down one-house legislative vetoes not presented to the President for signature, has cast doubt on the constitutionality of Section 5(c). 90
Because of the dispute over the constitutionality of Section 5(b), the meaning of "hostilities" under the WPR has become contested through the years, as the sixty-day termination clock is only triggered when U.S. armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." 91At the time of the WPR's passage, a report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee defined "hostilities" broadly: It noted that "hostilities" is "broader in scope" than an "armed conflict" (a term with legal meaning under international law), and that "hostilities" can include a "state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired." 92However, as Section II.C elaborates, subsequent presidential administrations--including the Ford Administration, the first to submit a forty-eight-hour report pursuant to the hostilities/imminent hostilities prong of the WPR--interpreted "hostilities" narrowly to encompass only situations where "units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces." 93This narrow interpretation of "hostilities" has allowed Presidents through the years to claim that there is a greater range of situations into which he can send U.S. armed forces without triggering the WPR's withdrawal mandate.