The DOD defines security coop as the authorities governed by Title 10 of US Code
Anderson ’19 [Melissa Dalton and James Anderson; April 25; Director of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities Dr. James Anderson, served for three years as the vice president for academic affairs at the Marine Corps University, doctorate in international relations and master of arts in law and diplomacy from the Fletcher School at Tufts University; CSIS Keynote Address, “Shifting the Burden Responsibly: Oversight and Accountability in U.S. Security Sector Assistance,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/shifting-burden-responsibly-oversight-and-accountability-us-security-sector-assistance-0]
JAMES ANDERSON: Good afternoon. I want to start by thanking Melissa Dalton for the invitation to speak here today. I have had the pleasure of working with Melissa and am very appreciative of her research efforts and her team regarding security cooperation. It is an honor to speak here at CSIS where many of my current and former colleagues have come from.
This report could not be more timely. I have been briefed on the report’s main findings, and I appreciate the thorough CSIS review of oversight and accountability in the U.S. security sector assistance. This report reminds me of the important role that our friends in the think tank community play, especially when the department is embracing a new approach to the topic.
I’ve had the pleasure to serve in my current capacity as assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities since last fall. Our SPC office casts a wide net to include policy oversight of security cooperation, our National Defense Strategy, the plans necessary to implement the strategy, as well as nuclear deterrence and missile defense.
Security sector assistance is a vast enterprise, and it one of the U.S. governments most effective tools in shaping U.S. foreign policy outcomes. At DOD we represent a key component of that effort that we call security cooperation: the authorities governed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which relate to engaging with allied and partner militaries to affect outcomes related to our mutual security.
I want to focus my remarks here today on how we are reforming security cooperation within the department and creating a more holistic, strategic security – (audio break) – major lines of efforts for DOD as we implement our National Defense Strategy. The security interests of the United States and allies are best addressed together cooperatively. The United States has a critical leadership role in encouraging allies to be more militarily capable, interoperable, and lethal.
With these principles in mind, I’d like to proceed along the following path. I’d like to talk about where we are coming from and how the FY ’17 reforms, the security cooperation, and the National Defense Strategy are changing the way we are doing business. I would also like to talk about some of the gaps in our execution and highlight with some examples some places where we are successfully executing our mission and creating security through cooperation.
The United States has realized that the primary security challenge of our generation – great power competition – requires a strong network of allies and partners. At the same time, this administration feels strongly that allies and partners need to contribute their fair share towards common security interests.
Security cooperation is one of the best tools for our growing ally and partner capacity to contribute more militarily. With smart, limited investments in our partners, we can amplify military effects to deter aggression.
Today the United States is an exporter of security cooperation. However, as a young republic – or even before we became a republic, we were the recipient of security cooperation. For all the noble ideas the United States was founded upon, ideas cannot hope to make up for a shortage of gunpowder. The first thing that might be considered a foreign military sale the United States conducted was an important purchase: gunpowder covertly supplied by our friends, the French. And that arms transfer made a difference. Our first act of foreign military sale helped to win – helped us to win at Saratoga and turn the tide of the Revolutionary War.
Clearly things have changed greatly in the post-Cold-War environment. The reality is today that we are confronted by an array of emerging requirements and ever-present risks. Because of this, operating by, with, and through allies is not simply a goal; it is a necessity. It is the only path to sustainable progress in combating terrorism or countering any other international security threat including the reemergence of great power competition.
The release of the National Defense Strategy in 2018 marked a turning point for the whole of DOD. We live in an increasingly complex global security environment and, after many years without an update to our fundamental strategic guidance, the time had come to acknowledge changes in the international security environment and the priorities for the Department of Defense. The NDS emphasizes the need to shift the weight of our security cooperation resources from countering terrorism, which has of course been the primary focus of the department’s efforts over the past – nearly the past two decades to a renewed focus on deterring and potentially responding to threats from near-peer competitors.
Security cooperation relates to all three lines of effort in the National Defense Strategy. One, building lethality. Security cooperation allows us to improve our effectiveness in coalition efforts, to cover down on gaps in our posture, and to ensure that our partners pack a punch in the first few hours of conflict, or days of conflict, if it comes to that.
Two, strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships. Security cooperation is the primary tool for ensuring our alliances and partnerships are fruitful, meaningful, and that our relationships are a net security contributor, not a detractor.
Three, reforming how the department does business. Security cooperation is evolving with the department to become more strategic, more efficient, and more effective. In FY ’19, we dedicated the greatest amount of funding – nearly 25 percent of the total funding in the security cooperation account – to challenges in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility – nearly $260 million. This is an increase of nearly 75 percent over what we notified in the year prior, and this does not include regional initiatives such as the Maritime Security Initiative, which I will say more about in a few minutes. Consistent with the NDS, we also increased EUCOM’s allocation by nearly 25 percent from FY ’18 to approximately 250 million (dollars).
While CENTCOM continues to rely on separate authorities, in particular the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund and the Afghan Security Forces Fund, we reduced its FY ’19 Section 333 allocation by 30 percent from the FY ’18 Level. AFRICOM, NORTHCOM, and SOUTHCOM, for their part, combined received about 30 percent of the total funding.
The NDS specifies clear priorities, and our security cooperation resource allocations reflect and will continue to reflect those priorities. All that said, I’d like to note at this point that Title 2 funding is still providing robust tools for engagement and financing of our partner militaries, even in those regions that are not prioritized in the NDS.
With all the changes in the last few years, the question arises, how do we explain security cooperation? How do we define it? I think a good way to look at security cooperation in terms of where we are going is to consider all activities conducted by the Department of Defense aimed at enhancing the capability and willingness of U.S. partners and allies to operate in coalition with – or in lieu of – U.S. forces in response to shared security challenges. This formulation is largely consistent with how we think Congress envisions our future role in security sector assistance.
DOD has always had a robust role in security sector assistance enterprise, but until FY ’17 reforms, it was spread across the department. There were many purse holders, many different executors, and dozens of legal authorities scattered in a patchwork-like fashion across the U.S. Code that overlapped, sometimes acted independently, and weren’t looked at holistically.
Sometime security cooperation doesn’t get a lot of attention. Luckily, CSIS has some of the finest minds in the security cooperation business at work here, and I’m most grateful for the work of Melissa, Kath, Tommy, and others for their efforts on this topic.
Security cooperation is often behind the news we read at night but rarely the frontline story. Luckily we’re also blessed with another influential group that cares deeply about security cooperation – the Congress. In FY ’17 Congress undertook the largest, most sweeping, and most substantial reforms to security cooperation in our nation’s history. The FY ’17 NDAA consolidated dozens of authorities into a narrow band of activities in Chapter 16. It set up requirements for human rights vetting, institutional capacity building, and assessment monitoring and evaluation.
With lots of work in the trenches by both DOD and Congress, this all hit at once, and it was welcome. Implementing an ambitious vision remains a challenge, particularly for those activities that were funded out of service accounts or regional initiatives. Many security cooperation activities were not being looked at holistically across the spectrum. Programs were siloed and oversight sometimes limited.
Congress believed that the entire system needed oversight from a single executor with visibility across all the authorities and all the different pots of money. This is how we got the Title 10, Chapter 16, Section 382 in the U.S. Code. The notion that the secretary’s designee, the undersecretary of defense for policy – my immediate boss – shall have, quote, “the responsibility for the oversight of strategic policy guidance and the responsibility of overall resource allocation for security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense.” End quote.
This is where we are trying to go with security cooperation: a holistic DOD-wide enterprise with visibility across the spectrum of security cooperation activities, administered with policy oversight, and aligned tightly to strategy.
How we define security cooperation is changing as well. At one point security cooperation meant – basically meant train and equip programs. We’re moving away from that. Security cooperation enterprise now encompasses everything from equipment, to training, to conventional arms sales, to exercises with both high-end and developing partners.
Meanwhile, we are prioritizing interoperability and making arms sales quicker and more efficient. In the last 10 years the department has reduced the average time to process foreign military sales by 30 percent. And I know our colleagues at DSCA are working hard to streamline things even more.
We are also trying to move off of year-to-year planning. My office has been involved in a push over the last two years to align security cooperation planning with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle as well as the global force management cycle, planning two years out from the current fiscal year.