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Security cooperation includes both Title 10 and Title 22 programs

Kelly ’10 [Terrence K. Kelly, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Charlotte Lynch; 2010; RAND Institute; research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W748H-06-C-0001, “Security cooperation organizations in the country team: options for success,” ISBN 978-0-8330-4911-7]

Security assistance, as it is currently in law and practice, reflects an approach that is adequate in a stable environment in which efforts can be planned, resourced, and executed without major changes, but not sufficiently agile for a world in which challenges are more dynamic and flexibility is essential for success. To address this issue, the U.S. Army asked RAND to do a "quick turn" assessment of security assistance and propose alternatives for improving it. This technical report is the result of that project.

This research considers the missions and structure of security assistance organizations in U.S. Missions around the world and presents three options for improving the functionality of security assistance organizations based on best practices and what is known about the tasks they are likely to take on. This project was undertaken as a quick-turnaround study for the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The research took place from February to April 2008, with some adjustments based on input from Headquarters, Department of the Army, and from reviewers after this period ended.

Summary

The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners.

Security cooperation, in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, includes "normal" peacetime activities, such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the United States and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas. Security cooperation also can include conducting quasi-operational efforts, such as helping U.S. partners and allies manage their own internal defense.

However, current national security challenges both create significant demands for U.S. security cooperation programs and deplete the resources needed to carry out these missions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are occupying the regular, reserve, National Guard, and Special Forces trainers and advisors who would normally be called on to train and advise mili-tary counterparts. Furthermore, U.S. allies, who often complement the efforts of U.S. advisors and trainers, are also stretched thin by their own deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

In an effort to find ways to improve security cooperation planning, coordination, and execution, the U.S. Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an assessment of key facets of U.S. security cooperation—specifically, the missions, capabilities, and structure needed in the security assistance organizations (SAOs)2 that coordinate the military aspects of U.S. foreign relations, including security cooperation activities, at U.S. Missions around the world.

In its assessment, the RAND research team identified three levels of players that plan, coordi-nate, execute, and oversee U.S. security cooperation efforts. However, a number of challenges exist at each level that can inhibit the effectiveness of SAO efforts. 

Washington, D.C., Level

At the federal government level in Washington, D.C., anywhere from thousands to billions of dollars are allocated for security cooperation efforts in a given country through various pro-grams. Executive Branch agencies, particularly the departments of Defense and State, work together to ensure that funds are allocated according to the wishes of Congress and the Presi-dent. At the same time, Congress plays a pivotal role in these processes through its annual authorizations and appropriations bills, as well as its oversight and approval of the statutory framework that governs security cooperation.

At this level, two main funding authorities govern security cooperation:

• Title 22 funds are appropriated to the State Department, which often transfers them to DoD, which in turn manages and executes most security assistance programs. Title 22 includes Foreign Military Sales programs. Title 22 is less flexible in some ways, mainly because Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-country and by- program basis, and requires congressional notification and permission to move funds from one effort to another.

• Title 10 funds are appropriated to DoD and are intended for operations and maintenance of the U.S. military. These funds are often used to fund international participation in U.S. joint exercises, military personnel exchanges, or military-to-military contacts as a way to enhance the relationships between partner militaries and U.S. forces.

Because of the differences in funding authorities for Title 10 and Title 22, there is a general separation between the two, resulting in distinct organizations and cultures and leading to stovepiped approaches to working with foreign countries.

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