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NATO cooperation over emerging tech can be either Title 10 or Title 22---and even if the status quo authority is confusing, the plan can clarify it

Bowne ’18 [Andrew; 2018; Major and Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army; Military Law Review, “Defending the New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against the Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147, lexis]

However, funding non-Article 5 activities contingent upon the demonstrated commitment to defense spending and collective security can promote NATO member spending and influence increased defense spending across the Alliance. 208 Such conditions would demonstrate the prioritization of collective defense. Conditioning foreign assistance on matters unrelated to defense capabilities can encourage allies to increase their own defense spending in order to maintain or improve their status with the United States. While maintaining the paramount importance of deterrence strategy through collective defense in NATO, the United States should tie some of its foreign assistance spending in Europe for non-Article 5 activities to a country's defense spending. Examples of such activities include counterterrorism training, refugee support, or even trade incentives.

Congress already places conditions on the appropriation of authorized funds on foreign assistance; however, it has not utilized this powerful foreign policy tool to influence NATO member defense spending. When drafting future conditional authorizations, Congress should look to its own example in the FY17 NDAA, for its specific and technical conditions imposed on Ukraine in the Extension and Enhancement of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative. 209 While $ 350 million was authorized to be appropriated in Fiscal Year 2017, Congress made available not more than $ 175 million in funds to be used for the authorized purposes. The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certified that Ukraine "ha[d] taken substantial actions to make defense institutional reforms, in such areas as civilian control of the military"; increased transparency and accountability in defense procurement; improved transparency to decrease corruption; and sustained improvements of combat capability, among other requirements. 210 By limiting the amount of assistance, and placing measurable requirements on the beneficiary as a condition to receiving a portion of the funding, Congress is able to maintain some control over the purpose and amount of spending that, absent such conditions, are within the exclusive purview of the recipient.

Congress can use similar conditions on future authorizations towards NATO members to influence the amount and purpose of ally defense expenditures. One possibility is to condition some or all Title 10 and Title 22 funding going to each NATO member on their certification, through its annual reporting requirements to the NATO Secretary General, that they have increased their defense spending, or met both defense spending and spending on military equipment targets. Absent certification, the Secretary of Defense can waive the conditions based on his determination that such waiver is in the best interest of the national security of the United States. 211 Another possibility is to focus conditions on the NATO members' commitment to improving combat capability through its spending on research and development or even buying specific weapon systems that promote interoperability with other members of the Alliance, such as cyber defense or intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms that are important in countering Russia's hybrid warfare capabilities.

Conditional authorizations for funding foreign aid recognize the reality that there are many other issues, both internal and external, impacting NATO members. The refugee crisis, incidents of terrorism, and nationalism erode the foundations of the European Union. This could lead to decreased military spending and lack of political will to spend precious resources to come to the aid of another NATO member, placing the principles of Article 5, and indeed the very purpose of the Alliance, in question. 212 Fairly leveraging those threats is a prudent course of action that Congress can take to offer support to U.S. allies, albeit with strings attached, in order to refocus NATO on Article 5 deterrence and boost defense spending. Certain NATO members may see less of a need to meet the NATO defense spending targets, particularly those in the south or the west that have less to fear from Russian aggression than the Baltic States or Poland. Those members would face receiving little to no support from the United States in their respective efforts to manage an influx of refugees from the Syrian conflict or train counterterrorism security forces. 213 By using a carrot to entice additional defense spending throughout the Alliance, Congress can reinforce a diplomatic truism: that supporting causes, such as the defense of the Baltic States' sovereignty from Russian aggression will earn goodwill from the rest of the Alliance--or more simply, supporting NATO results in NATO support. 214

In the FY17 NDAA, Congress hinted that it may consider individual NATO member contributions in future foreign assistance authorizations. It decided against expressing the sense of Congress that NATO allies' investments in developing and employing security capabilities should "meet or exceed U.S. efforts in this regard." Instead, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to present to the armed services and foreign relations committees an accounting of European investment in security capabilities and efforts to contribute to global security outcomes. 215 This requirement, along with the reforms to the security cooperation framework that also require country-specific reporting, 216 indicates Congress may consider implementing conditional funding for NATO members, as they did with Ukraine.

Conditional spending provisions from Congress could also create secondary effects that positively impact the amount of defense spending throughout NATO. It is reasonably foreseeable that the European community could exert its own diplomatic pressure on an ally failing to meet the Wales Summit targets, especially if the loss of U.S. dollars consequently causes a state to struggle to contain their non-Article 5 security threats within their borders. This would serve as a secondary line of influence towards increasing defense spending. For example, if the Czech Republic, a NATO member that consistently spends less than one percent of its GDP on its defense, 217 were to lose the millions of dollars it receives from the United States in foreign assistance, 218 and fail to effectively manage internal security threats, neighboring NATO members, such as Germany or Poland, may exert their own diplomatic pressures on the Czech Republic to increase defense spending.

The United States' national security interest is better served when its NATO allies focus on discrete capabilities to defend and deter Russian aggression than if it were to encourage each of the Baltic States to be independently capable of defending against Russia. Given their size and resources, it is impossible to expect any of the Baltic States to match the strength of the Russian forces aligned on their eastern borders on their own. By influencing their defense spending, Congress can better ensure that the Baltic States' forces provide complementary and integrated capabilities, rather than incompatible or duplicative ones. 219 By avoiding the duplication of systems and capabilities between multiple allies, limited resources are better managed. Thoughtfully crafted conditions on security cooperation authorities can also leverage existing capabilities, such as encouraging Estonia to build upon their already sophisticated cyber defense capabilities. 220[220]In 2007, Estonia suffered weeks of cyberattacks from Russia, directed at Estonian government, businesses, and media outlets. Benjamin Oreskes, Why Trump Makes this Small Country so Nervous, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 10, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/trump-russia-worries-estonia-214511. As a result, Estonia focused considerable efforts towards cyber defense and is on the cutting edge of cyber security.Id. Tallinn is also the host of its own brain-child, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), dedicated to enhancing the capability, cooperation, and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations, and partners in cyber defense. NATO, CCDCOE HISTORY, https://ccdcoe.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2019)[End Footnote 220] Such influence will improve interoperability as Congress can ensure strategic oversight and leadership remains within the purview of the DoD.

Carefully drafting funding authorizations to maximize U.S. influence in improving NATO's defense capability, through conditional foreign aid and other economic incentives, will encourage defense spending and strengthen individual NATO member ties to the United States. 221 The resulting increase in ownership of collective security by the European contingent of NATO should improve individual defense capabilities. However, to create a meaningful deterrent to Russia and effectively counter its A2/AD capabilities in Eastern Europe, the whole of the Alliance must be greater than the sum of its parts. By focusing on improving NATO member forces, networks, and weapon systems, Congress can positively influence interoperability within NATO as well as ensure that U.S. dollars spent on defending NATO allies are effective.

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