Security coop is extremely broad---cyber coop can utilize Cyber Command strategy and apply it to allied engagement
Bilms ’21 [Kevin; January; career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; War on the Rocks; “What’s in a name? Reimagining irregular warfare activities for competition,” https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/whats-in-a-name-reimagining-irregular-warfare-activities-for-competition]
Merge “Civil-Military Operations” and “Security Cooperation” Into “Security Partner Engagement”
Civil-military operations and security cooperation are similar, but each term contains ambiguity that prevents non-practitioners from fully understanding how they fit in competition. For example, “civil-military operations” risks confusion with “civil-military relations,” the study of the dynamic between the military and civil society writ large. As a term, “security cooperation” is broad enough to encompass virtually anything involving a partner.
Both activities specifically emphasize the use of military forces to establish, maintain, influence, and leverage security relationships through increased defense interactions. Recent history exemplified the importance of non-standard (i.e., non-military) security partners to consolidate strategic gains, and the ability to manage complex and non-traditional security relationships could yield even greater impact in great-power competition. Concerted security engagements before conflict help align U.S. efforts with allies and partners, provide invaluable access and placement in event of crisis, and facilitate U.S. campaign and contingency plans. Both conventional forces and special operators are capable of engaging partners and allies to not only increase interoperability, but also enhance U.S. influence, as a low-cost contribution in competition below armed conflict.
“Security partner engagement” acknowledges the importance of security partnerships and ensuring that regular engagements will secure U.S. influence and preserve the United States as the preferred partner of choice. This terminology adapts U.S. Cyber Command’s concept of “persistent engagement,” where regular engagement helps to get ahead of problems and forestall opponents’ abilities to gain advantage. Applying this logic to civil-military security engagements acknowledges that the influence and advantages afforded by a deep network of security partners are neither predetermined nor indefinite, and require concerted effort to deter opponents that seek to make headway or generate fissures among partners and allies. Reshaping “security partner engagement” in this fashion could account for one way that the department operationalizes its Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships, which looks to maintain and sustain this asymmetric advantage in all stages of competition.