“Security cooperation” could use any of the USFG.
Zaccor ’5 [Albert; August; Colonel in the US Army and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow; the Atlantic Council of the United States, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005_08_Security_Cooperation_and_Non-State_Threats.pdf]
It is an oft-repeated mantra that in order to defeat transnational terrorism, and by extension other related non-state threats, the United States must apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.34 The OSD SCG directs that DOD Security Cooperation “will be integrated with other elements of national power…in order to achieve national security, defense, and foreign policy objectives.”35 This formulation, while helpful, obscures two key facts. First, Security Cooperation includes activities that by their very nature involve the simultaneous application of more than one element of national power. Security Cooperation at a minimum requires the combination of diplomatic relations, military assistance, military-to-military contacts, and public diplomacy. In other words, Security Cooperation is itself an application of at least three of the classic elements of national power.36 Second, DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives, broadly understood. There is, however, no common USG, or interagency, definition or concept of Security Cooperation.37 We will return to this issue in the final section of this paper. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper offers the following working definition of Security Cooperation:
Footnote 37.
37 Even within DOD there are programs, notably directed against WMD proliferation, that are not covered under the rubric of Security Cooperation. See the discussion of the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, below.
Footnote 37 ends. The article continues.
Security Cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.38
Footnote 38.
38 The application of the Security Cooperation paradigm to the entire USG requires a precise definition of security. Defined too broadly, Security Cooperation would simply be a surrogate for foreign policy. Limiting the objectives to specific enumerated defense and security objectives and assistance to foreign establishments playing a role in national security or defense is necessary to circumscribe the issue adequately.
Footnote 38 ends. The article continues.
This expanded definition of Security Cooperation will help us to see how the USG may leverage its programs and activities to fight terrorism and related non-state threats.
The role of Security Cooperation in countering non-state threats is clearly reflected in U.S. strategy. The NSS states that the U.S. will cooperate with nations to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation, assisting those that are willing but unable, and persuading those that are able but not willing.39 The National Military Strategy (NMS) develops the concept of forward defense, or “Countering Threats Close to Their Source.”40 This is the recognition that the United States’ first line of defense is abroad, and that it is necessary to “patrol strategic approaches” and extend U.S. defensive capabilities beyond our borders to create an active “defense in depth.”41 In this context, Security Cooperation is best understood as a set of tools that can shape the strategic battlespace by creating the conditions necessary to accomplish U.S. security and defense objectives.42 As the NMS’s focus on forward defense indicates, these activities are by their nature anticipatory, preparatory, and defensive.43 They are best used as part of a long-term comprehensive strategy to put in place the relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access to facilitate future offensive and defensive actions to counter non-state, as well as more traditional, threats.
Security Cooperation Goals
Before turning to a detailed discussion of the contribution that Security Cooperation can make to fighting non-state threats, let’s briefly examine the four main goals of security cooperation in that context.
Relationships
Fighting strategic criminals will require the cooperation of a variety of governments, including those outside our established alliance relationships. We are not capable of compelling the kind of “willing and competent cooperation” that we need.44 Security cooperation provides powerful tools to persuade foreign governments to work with the U.S. in support of common objectives. Senior U.S. commanders, notably current and former Geographic Combatant Commanders, regularly stress the critical contribution that Security Cooperation activities make to building the kinds of relationships with foreign leaders that set the stage for successful U.S. operations. The example most often cited is the role that US Central Command (CENTCOM) Security Cooperation activities played in persuading Central Asian leaders, notably in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan by granting access to bases and overflight rights.45 In addition to granting access, good relationships aid in building a common threat perception, which is a necessary precondition for any substantial cooperation. Relationships with foreign defense leaders can also provide the U.S. with influence over the policy direction of key partner states, including efforts at defense reform and the shape of force structure changes. Finally, good relationships make it more likely that foreign governments will share information with the U.S., including, in the extreme case, early warning of potential attack.46
Intelligence and Information Sharing
Relationships built on trust and mutual interests are also necessary to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in the area of Intelligence and Information. It is useful to separate the distinct, but related, issues of Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation. Intelligence Sharing is a critical element in the fight against non-state threats, or strategic crime. By its nature, however, such sharing involves sensitive sources, methods and arrangements, normally in the context of a bilateral relationship. Its sensitivity requires delicate handling in highly restrictive channels. Intelligence sharing, in practice, falls outside the scope of Security Cooperation. Intelligence Security Cooperation, on the other hand, involves the development of interoperable and cooperative intelligence systems and processes designed to enhance the ability of one partner to work with one or several other partners. The core activities in Intelligence Security Cooperation are analytical and expertise exchanges, familiarization, training, and traditional Security Assistance. Both Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation are mutually supporting. It is clear that the quality and reliability of intelligence we get from our partners depends on the competence, capability, professionalism, and trustworthiness of their national intelligence services and how compatible their operations are with ours. Intelligence Security Cooperation provides the tools to develop long-range relationships with foreign partners to improve both the quality of the intelligence we share and our ability to work together.
Access
The National Defense Strategy stresses the requirement to secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action for U.S. forces.47 This includes obtaining permanent and deployment basing and overflight. Security Cooperation directly supports access by developing relationships with foreign partners based on trust and mutual interests. Senior officer and other official visits contribute to this by demonstrating U.S. commitment to a defense relationship and staying abreast of host nation priorities, concerns, and requirements. Some Security Cooperation activities directly support access by improving host nation infrastructure, notably airbases, ports, and troop facilities, to support U.S. forces during operational and training deployments. Other activities improve host nation capabilities through training, equipping, and exercises. The NMS recognizes that access has an informational dimension that goes beyond the purely physical access to a partner’s territory, facilities or airspace:
“…theater security activities with multinational partners provide access to information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats.”48
This insight is important in determining the contribution Security Cooperation can make to countering non-state threats. While DOD and the military services remain understandably focused on the physical dimension of access and its support to current and future operations, the fight against strategic criminals requires that we pay greater attention to securing strategic access to information and information networks controlled by our partners, allies, and adversaries. In some cases “virtual access” to databases, data flows, raw and finished intelligence, sensor data, and other forms of information may be more critical to the success of military operations than the ability to access an airfield, port or overflight corridor. Security Cooperation tools can also support the attainment of this non-traditional form of access.