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US ‘cooperation with NATO’ includes informal channels for which there are explicit and purposefully created frameworks for deliberation, exchange, and joint action---that limits out unintentional norm diffusion---and it’s crucial to aff ground---any other interp is hopelessly outdated

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni ’14 [Mette; 2014; Lecturer in International Studies at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, UK; “Informal cooperation beyond the alliance,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]

A large literature charts NATO's post-Cold War transformation from a close-knit, defensive alliance to a more versatile, multifaceted security organization. This literature focuses mainly on changes to the formal institutional makeup of the Alliance, such as the adoption of new Strategic Concepts, inclusion of new member states, and reform of command and decision procedures. Less analytical attention has been paid to changing patterns of informal cooperation within and around the Alliance. Indeed, while scholars have identified a growing tendency to supplement formal NATO cooperation with ad hoc, flexible forms of collaboration this tendency is often cited as a sign of disintegration of the Alliance (for example, Noetzel and Schreer 2009) rather than an integral part of NATO's post-bipolar institutional practice, which is conducive to the continued functioning of the Alliance.

This chapter focuses explicitly on forms of informal cooperation involving NATO members, but occurring beyond the official institutional boundaries of the Alliance. Perhaps the most visible instantiation of ad hoc, informal cooperation are the short-term 'coalitions-of-the- willing' that have brought together NATO and non-NATO countries to intervene militarily in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 'extramural' security cooperation also takes other, less visible forms, including Anglo-American special intelligence-sharing, the G8's informal Counter-terrorism Action Group or the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). What characterises these initiatives is that they bring together prominent NATO members (often in concert with powerful third-party states) in order to address issues that fall generally within the institutional scope and mandate of NATO but that are nonetheless pursued outside the formal institutional boundaries of the Alliance.

In what follows, I adopt a broadly rational institutionalist approach to explore factors that may encourage greater reliance on informal cooperation among NATO members. Assuming that shifts in institutional design and practice are primarily explained by reference to the changing incentives of dominant member states, I focus mainly on the role of the US in initiating informal cooperation.

I advance three arguments. Firstly, growing reliance on ad hoc cooperation is driven by systemic changes in the post-bipolar strategic environment, which place more diverse and less predictable demands on military resources - especially those of the US - than was the case during bipolarity. These changes have generated demand for flexible forms of cooperation, which allow allies to enlist the capabilities and expertise of third-party states on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, a new strategic focus, combined with a rapid expansion of membership, has resulted in a broadening of NATO's institutional scope and mandate and in enhanced centralization of decision-making. This process of 'internationalization' and 'institutionalization' has in turn served to push some issues outside the formal boundaries of the Alliance where institutional constraints on decision-making remain low. Thirdly, the end of bipolar- ity has shifted the balance of power among NATO members further in favour of the US, thereby reducing Washington's incentives to provide institutionalized voice opportunities or assurances to European allies. This has reinforced the inclination by the US to evade NATO's formal institutional constraints.

To focus my analysis, I examine cooperation on non-proliferation as a lens through which to illuminate broader changes in cooperation within the Alliance. Non-proliferation is a central component of America's post- Cold War security strategy. Yet, Washington has shown considerable reluctance in channelling core aspects of its global non-proliferation policy through NATO. Instead, ad hoc initiatives such as the PSI and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have been focal points for cooperation between the America and its NATO allies. The rest of this chapter seeks to illuminate why this has been the case.

Formal and informal institutions in international relations

Although informal institutions have attracted growing attention from IR scholars, there is little agreement on what separates informal from formal structures. Often, informal institutions are defined simply as agreements that lack binding force (that is, 'soft law') or more broadly as agreements enforced by unwritten conventions or norms of behaviour (see Brie and Stolting 2011: 19-20). By contrast, formal institutions are generally characterized by being to some degree legalized. International lawyers define legalization in terms of 'obligation' (implying that actors are bound by a rule or commitment under international law), 'precision' (implying that rules are detailed and precise), and 'delegation' (meaning that third parties are granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules of agreements as well as to resolve disputes) (Abbott et al. 2000). In practice, of course, few international agreements impose detailed legal obligations on states or delegate significant authority to institutional agents to implement agreements or adjudicate disputes. However, we may think of formal institutions as agreements and practices that are instituted according to rules and procedures, which are recognized as legal in clearly defined contexts (Brie and Stolting 2011: 19). Such agreements tend to be written down in detailed documents specifying the precise obligations of state parties.

Informal institutions or agreements, conversely, exhibit low levels of legalization. They are typically not constituted by treaty or executive degree, and the rules that govern interaction are neither legally nor pro- cedurally binding on states. Informal agreements may be unwritten. Even when written, rules and objectives tend to be stated in vague, general terms that make them open to broad interpretation. A further difference pertains to the mode of decision-making. While formal institutions are often configured as representative organizations where official votes are taken and majority rule may apply, informal institutions tend to rely purely on deliberation and consensus-seeking without formal voting taking place.

When conceptualizing informal cooperation, it is helpful to distinguish two views of informal institutions according to how they emerge and what their relationship is to formal institutions. The first describes informal institutions as indigenous to formal institutions. On this view, informal institutions comprise social interactions that occur 'alongside formalized interactions in international organizations' (Brie and Stolting 2011: 20; Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 726). These informal institutions (conventions, norms of behaviour, stable expectations) are not consciously shaped and controlled by actors but arise endogenously from exchanges within formal frameworks (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 730). They tend to complement zand strengthen formal institutions by creating incentives to comply with formal rules.

The second conceptualization views informal institutions as exogenous to formal institutions. On this view, informal institutions comprise explicit rules, norms, and decision-making procedures (written or unwritten) that arise outside officially authorized channels. In contrast to indigenous informal institutions, this second kind of informal institution is deliberately created and maintained by actors for the purpose of achieving joint political objectives.

In this chapter, I am interested in the second kind. Thus, I define informal institutions as explicit and purposefully created frameworks for deliberation, exchange, and joint action. Such informal institutions may stand in different relationships to formal international organizations. Sometimes, informal institutions may arise alongside the official decision-making bodies of IOs in order to improve their functioning. An example is the exclusive 'negotiating clubs' that operate within many IOs, where powerful member states debate issues informally before they are considered jointly with other members (Conzelmann 2011: 221-222). Gegout (2002) describes how a 'Quint' consisting of the US, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy conduct unofficial negotiations on EU foreign policy issues before they are placed before the Council. Elsewhere in this volume, Mayer and Theiler draw attention to informal aspects of NATO cooperation, which include regular lunches dur-ing which national representatives conduct off-the-record discussions. Such 'negotiating clubs' are mostly complementary to official decision- making structures. Although they operate without a formal institutional mandate, and although they favour representation from larger states, informal negotiation clubs are a prerequisite for consensus-building and effective implementation in many large IOs. They provide the 'oil', so to speak, that makes the heavy machinery of formal organizations turn.

Informal institutions may also operate independently and partly in contradiction of existing IOs. In this case, rather than complementing formal frameworks for decision-making and implementation, informal frameworks may emerge with the explicit purpose of sidestepping or subverting formal decision processes. The coalitions of the willing that fought in Iraq and Afghanistan provide an example. Military action by these coalitions was not ancillary or complementary to official deliberation and action by NATO. Rather, these coalitions presented alternative sites for cooperation that bypassed NATO altogether.

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