Article 5 situations are incredibly rare---most NATO coop occurs under Article 4 and requires building effective partnerships with non-NATO allies
Matlary ’14 [Janne Haaland; 2014; Professor of International Politics at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; “Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]
If this is so, then NATO is important as an arena and increasingly so. But the main political dynamic is between the US, on the one hand, and remaining NATO members and partners, on the other. Moreover, if Article 5 contingencies remain unlikely as during the past two decades, then the boundary between members and partners will remain rather fuzzy. Even the border violations from June to November 2012 (of Turkey by Syria) have not resulted in Article 5 invocations by the former, which have twice called for consultations under Article 4. This was also the case when the Turkish border was violated in the 'spillovers' in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003. At that time, the Turks asked for NATO assistance under Article 4, something which severely split the Alliance. Hence, Article 5 situations are very rare, with September 11, 2001 being an exception when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) declared it an Article 5 but was rebuffed by the US which wanted full control of its response.
My point is simply that absent the threat of inter-state war in the Euro-Atlantic area, most NATO cases will be under Article 4, and thus voluntary. This makes for a political dynamic where those who fight together, stay together. Moreover, the fact that both members and partners find it useful and perhaps necessary to contribute begs the question of why contribute.
The importance of partner contributions
Once, when a small NATO member repeatedly voiced criticism at the NAC, the US ambassador bent over and asked his British counter-part: 'So what do they contribute?'2 In the Alliance, the burden-sharing debate around risk-willingness is the key one after the Cold War, and influence is gained on a one-to-one basis: those that contribute, gain influence, hopefully in Washington, but certainly in a given operation. They may gain security through this, or prestige, or meet national interest needs. Like the partnership policy of the US is a key to American global politics, the same partner concept seems now to develop at NATO. It can be argued that the partners contribute, in order to gain military interoperability, political influence in NATO and political influence in Washington. One may add that this is also why members contribute (Matlary and Petersson 2013).
NATO after Afghanistan is an alliance where the fundamental security contract, Article 5, still underpins the alliance and keeps it together, but where the political dynamics of the alliance have changed in major ways. The realities of coalition warfare have become very clear in terms of the demands for risk-willing, significant military capacities. Some European allies participate in ISAF despite high costs in terms of life and treasure, but many more offer only token participation. States that want closeness to the US must contribute risk-willing, relevant military capacities to global operations. These states are part of the first tier of NATO, the inner circle. As stated, in NATO, states will first and foremost seek closeness to the US. Some states achieve this through their contributions to current operations. Others do not, who then are relegated to the second tier (hence the characterization of NATO as a 'two-tier' alliance).