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NATO relies on partners----any other interp wrecks the ability to shape doctrine effectively

Matlary ’14 [Janne Haaland; 2014; Professor of International Politics at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Defence University College, Norway; “Partners versus Members? NATO as an Arena for Coalitions,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London]

In this chapter, I discuss the importance of burden-sharing partnerships with NATO as a development that is, as I argue, symptomatic of the evolution of the Alliance into becoming an arena or platform for coalitions of the 'willing and able'. After the end of the Cold War, we live in an era where armed attacks against one or several Alliance members, obliging others to respond immediately (although not necessarily by military means), have become rare and unlikely. As a result, the organization has increasingly turned into a 'two-tiered' or 'multi-tiered' alliance. Current operations are mostly Article 4 and hence, unlike Article 5 cases, voluntary. This implies that partners, as well as members, may contribute. Moreover, few members seem to be willing and able to make a contribution,1 something that inter alia the Libya operation has shown - only eight allies were actually willing to contribute combat capabilities. In other operations, like ISAF, all members contribute, but only a few with risk-willing capabilities. All 'show the flag', but few are willing and able to contribute to sharp operations that require top skill and risk-willingness.

In NATO's currently valid Strategic Concept, the necessity for a part-nership policy is visibly highlighted: 'The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relations with countries and organizations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks' (NATO 2010). The section continues to underline how flexible NATO will be in the time ahead: 'We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together - across and beyond existing frameworks' (NATO 2010). NATO is also prepared to give partners in operations a 'structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute' (NATO 2010, my emphasis).

These are interesting new thoughts about coalition warfare. NATO clearly requires military contributions from its partners, but the same is true the other way round: in return for their contributions to operations, partner governments obtain political influence (Edstrem et al. 2011). The latter is what is 'offered' for the first time in a Strategic Concept in the quotation above. From the perspective of the US, such a partnership policy has been a reality for quite some time. The extensive policy of partnerships is a new way of ensuring political and military strength (Kay 2011). In many ways, NATO seems to be introducing the same kind of partnership policy - the willing and able can contribute to operations, whereas members of the Alliance can opt out, as they are entitled to. A vivid illustration of this on the political level was Germany's abstention on the UNSC resolution on Libya (res. 73/11) along with, inter alia, Russia and China. Although the Libya operation only became a NATO operation after five days, it is nonetheless illustrative of the current degree of a lack of common strategic vision in NATO that a major member did not agree with other close allies in this case. In short, in NATO there is very great variety in politico-strategic thinking today, to the extent that there is hardly anything in common beyond Article 5, and operations reflect this fact.

NATO has come to rely on partners. In ISAF, partners like Australia played key roles in the war-fighting in the South of Afghanistan. The partners that bring substantial military capabilities and economic resources to the table clearly benefit the Alliance. Partners themselves achieve NATO interoperability and close ties at the operational and tacti-cal level, and manage to transcend their neutral stances at home, in their domestic debates, as in the cases of Sweden and Finland, two prominent NATO partners. Neutrality as a policy is almost an 'untouchable' in these countries. But the ability of partnering with NATO has enabled them to redefine neutrality to allow for participation in sharp operations abroad. Thus, there are benefits for NATO as well as for partners.

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