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Cybersecurity policy must expand protections for the confidentiality, integrity, AND availability of data on computer systems and networks---plans that don’t address all three explicitly don’t meet.

Cybersecurity law promotes the confidentiality, , integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks

Kosseff ’18 [Jeff; March; Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity Law, United States Naval Academy. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.P.P., B.A., University of Michigan; Iowa Law Review, “Defining Cybersecurity Law,” 103 Iowa L. Rev. 985, lexis]

In late 2015, after years of attempts, Congress passed legislation to enable companies to voluntarily share information about cybersecurity threats - such as attempted hacks - with the federal government and other companies. The bill, entitled the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, was tucked into a massive omnibus appropriations bill as Division N. 1 The Cybersecurity Act occupies 136 of the 2,009 pages in the omnibus bill, and it in detail establishes rules for operators of private networks to defend their networks, monitor possible threats, and collaborate with the federal government. 2 The new law also bolsters the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") cybersecurity efforts. The focus of the legislation, not surprisingly, is cybersecurity; indeed, "cybersecurity" appears in the bill nearly 200 times. 3

There is just one problem: The Cybersecurity Act does not define "cybersecurity." The statute allows companies to take certain actions for a "cybersecurity purpose," which it defines as "the purpose of protecting an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability." 4 The statute defines "security vulnerability" as "any attribute of hardware, software, process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the defeat of a security control." 5 The statute defines "cybersecurity threat" as

an action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, on or through an information system that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system. 6

The statute also defines "security control," 7 "malicious cyber command and control," 8 and "cyber threat indicator." 9 Although these definitions help to illuminate the purpose of the legislation, the Cybersecurity Act does not directly explain what lawmakers meant by "cybersecurity."

The statute fails to provide a concrete definition that sets forth the scope and goals of cybersecurity law. Although the new statute can function without the definition - and as described in Part III of this Article: , is a significant improvement over existing law - its omission of this key definition is illustrative of a larger problem: When policymakers talk about cybersecurity, they are not always talking about the same concept.

A day rarely passes without another report of a major cybersecurity incident. Hackers routinely breach the systems of retailers, stealing consumer credit card data, social security numbers, and other valuable personal information. 10 Attackers launch distributed denial-of-service attacks, knocking some of the most popular websites offline for hours or days. 11 Home security webcams become remote spying devices. 12 Even the U.S. electoral system is compromised by hacks of the email accounts of political officials and attacks on state elections systems. 13 In the increasingly frequent news coverage of these attacks, commentators, and lawmakers demand immediate and swift legal solutions to prevent further damage. 14 The constant media coverage begs the question: How well do our existing laws address cybersecurity threats?

The short answer: Not well at all. The slightly longer answer: The patchwork of U.S. statutes and regulations that constitute cybersecurity law is an uncoordinated mishmash of requirements that mostly were conceived long before modern cyber-threats. Modern U.S. cybersecurity law stems from century-old privacy norms, torts, and criminal laws that bear little relation to the protection of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems, networks, and data.

In short, the U.S. legal system lacks a consistent definition of the term "cybersecurity law." This Article: aims to fill that gap by defining "cybersecurity law." Although "cybersecurity" is a commonly used term in legal circles, no scholarship has stepped back to define exactly what "cybersecurity law" is and the goals of statutes and regulations that aim to promote "cybersecurity." By defining the scope and goals of this new legal field, policymakers can then examine how lawmakers could improve existing laws. Part II of this Article: briefly describes the cybersecurity challenges that the United States faces by examining the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Part III broadly examines current cybersecurity threats to the United States and defines "cybersecurity law" as a legal framework that "promotes the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks, through the use of forward-looking regulations and incentives, with the goal of protecting individual rights and privacy, economic interests, and national security." Part IV of this Article: explains the current U.S. legal regime for cybersecurity and concludes that many of the most prominent cybersecurity laws only address a small portion of the broader legal framework. Part V examines the gaps in current U.S. cybersecurity law and suggests which areas of cybersecurity law policymakers could better address.

One might argue that it is unnecessary to define a legal field. By proposing a definition of "cybersecurity law," I seek to offer the definition as a broad taxonomy for policymakers and courts as they develop statutes, regulations, and court rulings that could shape cybersecurity for generations to come. By defining "cybersecurity law," I suggest the types of subjects that the law seeks to secure, the methods by which cybersecurity law protects those subjects, and the reasons behind cybersecurity law. Moreover, I intend this definition to do more than merely add to a legal taxonomy; a clear definition of "cybersecurity law" will provide policymakers with goals and guideposts as they debate new laws to protect information, systems, and networks.

III. Defining "Cybersecurity Law"

The Sony incident - and similar cybersecurity challenges that companies and governments have faced - provide us with a roadmap for defining this new area of law. A clear definition of "cybersecurity law" is necessary for lawmakers, regulators, courts, and commentators to offer solutions to these ongoing threats. This Part offers some elements of the definition based on the experiences with incidents such as the attack on Sony Pictures. This Part concludes with a suggested comprehensive definition of "cybersecurity law."

To form the definition, we must answer five fundamental questions that examine the underlying values that should shape our cybersecurity laws: (1) What are we securing?; (2) Where and whom are we securing?; (3) How are we securing?; (4) When are we securing?; and (5) Why are we securing?

After addressing these five framing questions, this Article: proposes a definition for "cybersecurity law" that takes into account the important considerations in the field of cybersecurity. This definition allows us to assess the current laws that are frequently associated with cybersecurity and explore the areas where they are lacking.

A. What Are We Securing?

At the outset of any attempt to define "cybersecurity law," it is necessary to understand the intended subject matter. In other words, what should the law seek to secure? Based on the ongoing drumbeat of significant and damaging cybersecurity incidents 44 and the increased vulnerability due to the connection of everyday devices to the Internet, 45 I propose that "cybersecurity law" broadly seek to promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, systems, and networks.

Cybersecurity often is conflated, particularly in legal circles, with data security. 46 Although data security is an important part of cybersecurity, it is only one part. Cybersecurity focuses not only on the protection of data, but also on the systems and networks of the public and private sector. In other words, cybersecurity involves more than merely the protection of data.

Consider, for example, the 2016 Distributed Denial of Service ("DDOS") attack on Dyn, a relatively obscure but exceptionally important company that provides a large portion of the domain name system that directs traffic on the Internet. 47 A DDOS attack floods a targeted server with traffic from multiple sources, causing a slowdown in traffic or a complete shutdown. 48 Due to the DDOS attack on Dyn, Netflix, Twitter, and other popular online services were unavailable for the majority of a day. 49 Although the attack resulted in some data being unavailable, it would not be characterized as a traditional data security compromise. Instead, it was an attack that compromised an entire network. 50 Laws focused exclusively on data - rather than networks and systems - will do little to prevent and remediate harms such as the Dyn attack.

To be sure, data security is a vital component of cybersecurity. For instance, the attack on Sony compromised a significant amount of the company's valuable data, including confidential emails and unreleased movies. That aspect of the attack attracted a great deal of publicity. 51 However, Sony also suffered great business harm due to the unavailability of its systems and networks. 52 The attack on Sony, in other words, was not merely an attack on the company's data security. It was a comprehensive attack on Sony's cybersecurity. The attack compromised more than just the confidentiality of Sony's information, though it certainly had that effect as well. The attack compromised the fundamental ability of Sony to carry out its routine business operations.

A focus on the security of systems and networks - and not just information - is necessary as physical devices are increasingly connected to the Internet. For instance, policymakers and regulators are understandably concerned about a cyberattack on a connected automobile that causes a highway crash, or a remote exploit of a factory's control systems that causes explosions, physical injury, and property damage. 53 By focusing exclusively on attacks on information, cybersecurity law would not address such threats to cyber-physical systems. Cybersecurity law should be flexible enough to address not only the incidents that already have occurred, but also potential future vectors of attack.

Therefore, when we develop the contours for cybersecurity law, we must develop a broader and more appropriate approach. The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies reflects such an approach, as its definition of "cybersecurity" is "the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation." 54 This definition captures the need to protect not only data, but also the systems on which data are stored and the networks on which data are transmitted. A definition of "cybersecurity law" that includes this important aspect will focus on the threats posed by cyberattacks.

We have established that cybersecurity law should focus not only on the security of information, but on systems and networks as well. However, the law does not provide much clarity as to what "security" means in the context of cybersecurity. Even though we know that we are securing information, networks, and systems, what do we mean by "securing"? Relatedly, how do we accomplish this task?

Cybersecurity professionals commonly think about security as covering three general categories of goals: (1) confidentiality; (2) integrity; and (3) availability, known in the industry as the "CIA Triad." 55 Confidentiality refers to the "the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of information." 56 Confidentiality often is associated with data breaches because attackers seek to obtain information without proper authorization. Integrity refers to "the guarantee that the message that is sent is the same as the message received and that the message is not altered in transit." 57 The defacement of a company's website, for example, is an example of a threat to data integrity. A threat to integrity also could refer to the modification of a business's financial records, as such a modification would cause internal chaos for the business's operations. 58 Availability refers to "the guarantee that information will be available to the consumer in a timely and uninterrupted manner when it is needed regardless of [the] location of the user." 59 A DDOS attack that knocks a popular website offline, for example, is an attack on that site's availability.

The Sony Pictures attack threatened all three prongs of the CIA triad. The hackers compromised the confidentiality of employees' personal information as well as the company's highly sensitive business information. By altering the interface of the Sony Pictures internal computer systems, the attackers compromised the integrity of Sony's systems. The attack also harmed the availability of Sony's information and systems, as employees were unable to access the network.

Likewise, the reports of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections demonstrate attempts to attack the entire CIA triad. The hack of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta's emails was a classic compromise of confidentiality. 60 But Russia at least attempted to do more than access private emails. According to media reports, Russian hackers accessed voter databases and other elections systems in 39 states. 61 These attacks may have been attempts to compromise the integrity of U.S. voting data. Had the hackers knocked the voting systems offline on election day, the attacks would have compromised the availability of information systems and networks that are fundamental to U.S. democracy.

As Part IV of this Article: explains, U.S. cybersecurity-related laws heavily focus on only one prong of the CIA Triad: confidentiality. This focus is because many of the statutes and regulations that intersect with cybersecurity are outgrowths of privacy law, which has a much more established field of jurisprudence and theory that has developed over more than a century. 62 The conflation of privacy and cybersecurity is understandable, 63 as many highly publicized cybersecurity incidents have involved breaches of sensitive information. While cybersecurity law should be concerned about preventing privacy violations, that should not be the unilateral focus of our approach to cybersecurity law. To be sure, we want to make sure that cybersecurity law attempts to prevent breaches of confidentiality that invade individual privacy and exposes corporate intellectual property and other sensitive information. However, cybersecurity law should not focus on confidentiality to the exclusion of integrity and availability. A comprehensive approach to cybersecurity law will consider all three prongs of the CIA Triad.

A focus on integrity and availability is particularly important in the Internet of Things era, as everyday devices, ranging from medical devices to kitchen appliances to automobiles, are connected to the Internet. 64 Imagine the chaos if hackers manage to disable thousands of pacemakers, or cause vehicles to accelerate to 100 miles per hours as they drive through Times Square. Such attacks have little to do with confidentiality of information, and instead involve the integrity and availability of systems and networks.

B. Where and Whom Are We Securing?

So far, we have determined that cybersecurity law should promote the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, systems, and networks. We also must examine which information, systems, and networks should be protected under cybersecurity law. Should U.S. laws focus on bolstering the security of military and civilian government systems? Or should the laws apply equally rigorous requirements for private-sector cybersecurity? This confusion leads to both overlapping legal requirements and blind spots, caused partly by the application of criminal and international law principles to cyberspace. 65 The security of public infrastructure often will face quite different legal requirements than the security of private infrastructure. However, the policymakers should consider the security of both types of systems and networks comprehensively, and understand how the security (or lack thereof) of one affects the other.

The fundamental design of the Internet would make it impossible to effectively address cybersecurity exclusively through the information and infrastructure of the public sector. Government systems intertwine with private networks and rely on the infrastructure of telecommunications companies, cloud storage providers, and others in order to operate. In 2006, the Government Accountability Office recognized that one of the "key challenges" of securing Internet infrastructure was the diffuse control among the private and public sectors. 66 As described in Part IV of this Article: , cybersecurity-related laws largely have not adapted in the decade since that report.

Often, it is difficult to isolate a target of an attack as private or public sector, just as it often is difficult to attribute an attack to a state or nonstate actor. 67 DDOS attacks, ransomware, and other common attack vectors can quickly disperse around the globe, and many do not discriminate between governments, companies, and individuals. 68 Accordingly, any effective cybersecurity law regime will seek to secure both the public sector and private sector. As seen after the Sony Pictures attack, even if the initial target is a private company that lacks strong links to the government, the fallout of an attack on that company can have significant ramifications for the federal government and international relations. Therefore, it would be short-sighted for cybersecurity law to focus exclusively on the public infrastructure and government information.

Accordingly, when policymakers develop cybersecurity laws, they should consider the security of both public and private infrastructure and information. As discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Article: , some U.S. cybersecurity laws focus exclusively on certain sectors and do not consider how they operate in conjunction with laws that address cybersecurity of other sectors. To the greatest extent possible, cybersecurity law should operate harmoniously across sectors. It is inevitable that highly sensitive information and systems - such as in the healthcare sector - may face more rigorous laws than in other areas, but those laws should not function in a black box.

C. How Are We Securing?

We have determined that we want to secure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks. A difficult question - particularly in the context of lawmaking - is how to achieve those goals. This debate often appears to be a binary choice: coercive laws that deter inadequate cybersecurity versus cooperative laws that provide incentives for companies and government agencies to invest in cybersecurity. 69 I propose that cybersecurity law focus on both coercive and cooperative laws, provided that the regulations and incentives for both systems are aligned to achieve similar goals.

The debate over coercive or cooperative laws is not new to the U.S. legal system. For instance, environmental-law scholars for decades have debated the most appropriate way to encourage companies to adapt their business processes to minimize harm to the environment. 70 Advocates of the coercive approach to environmental regulation argue that companies seek to maximize profits, and therefore their "decisions regarding compliance are based on self-interest; businesses comply when the costs of noncompliance outweigh the benefits of noncompliance." 71

A regulatory model based on coercion and deterrence assumes robust government oversight through "extensive government monitoring and inspections coupled with penalties for observed violations." 72 The penalties for noncompliance, therefore, must be sufficiently severe to encourage companies to invest in compliance and, in many cases, forego potential revenue. 73

Critics of the coercive approach in environmental regulation have developed an alternative model, based on cooperation and incentives. Under this model, the government's function is not "to accumulate evidence of violations for subsequent enforcement actions, but rather to provide advice to regulated entities as a means of facilitating compliance." 74 With this approach, companies are not only profit-maximizers, but also "institutions influenced by a mix of civic and social motives." 75 For example, an environmental inspector would suggest improvements rather than impose severe penalties.

The debate over regulation is not unique to environmental law. Policymakers and academics have long debated how to best regulate financial services, 76 consumer safety, 77 and other areas. 78 In most of these areas, the end result is not a binary choice. Legal regimes that apply to specific industries or sectors contain both coercive and cooperative elements. 79

Cybersecurity law should contain a mix of penalty-based regulatory deterrence along with cooperation and incentives. A unilateral focus on coercion through regulation would be misguided, as there are many opportunities for cooperative cybersecurity law. As described above, cyberspace is a combination of public and private infrastructure. A threat to a company's cybersecurity can harm the government, and vice versa. Unlike other regulatory areas, regulators cannot achieve an ideal level of cybersecurity exclusively through the actions (voluntary or otherwise) of the private sector. Although a company's adoption of cybersecurity measures could help to reduce the likelihood of a successful cybersecurity incident, the ultimate chances of a successful attack depend on many other factors, including law enforcement's ability to deter hackers, the security of the company's service providers, and whether the government and companies can quickly communicate with each other about cybersecurity threats and defensive measures. Accordingly, for cybersecurity law to succeed, it must foster effective collaboration between the public and private sectors. As I describe below, we have made some strides toward that goal, primarily with the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. That statute takes the first significant steps to encourage the private sector and federal government to work together to identify and defend against cybersecurity threats. However, the vast majority of the laws broadly considered to be related to cybersecurity are punitive, and they do little to actually encourage investments in cybersecurity.

The U.S. legal system should continue to penalize behavior that degrades our nation's cybersecurity. The regulations, however, should have the ultimate effect of encouraging companies to invest in cybersecurity. Consider the Sony Pictures data breach. Three years earlier, in 2011, Sony's Play Station network experienced one of the largest data breaches in world history when tens of millions of customers' accounts (including credit card data) were compromised by hackers. 80 The company faced costly class action litigation and regulatory inquiries, and it reported that through the end of 2012, the breach cost the company $ 171 million. 81 Despite those regulatory and litigation costs - which are far higher than those associated with an average cybersecurity incident 82 - Sony did not sufficiently change its organizational structure or invest in cybersecurity measures to prevent the Sony Pictures attack three years later. 83 Of course, Sony's failure to properly secure its networks does not mean that all companies would react similarly to the threat of significant fines and litigation costs. However, it demonstrates that for some companies, regulatory and litigation penalties alone will not deter bad behavior.

The questionable efficacy of coercive cybersecurity regulation is traceable, in part, to the relatively low costs of penalties for large companies. Benjamin Dean of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs analyzed the breaches at Sony Pictures, Target, and Home Depot, concluding that the breaches cost less than one percent of the companies' annual revenues. 84 This suggests that fines, court awards, and other expenses would need to be significantly higher to encourage corporate executives to invest in cybersecurity, even at the expense of other business units that might actually generate more revenues, such as marketing. Moreover, Dean notes, even if companies suffer significant expenses due to data breaches and other cybersecurity incidents, they often can be at least partially reimbursed by insurance, or they can write off those expenses. 85 This moral hazard, he reasoned, means that it "does not make economic sense for companies like Home Depot to make large investments in information security." 86 The cybersecurity vulnerabilities of individual companies - as seen in recent attacks on Equifax, Dyn, Target, and Ashley Madison - pose a significant risk to individuals and, in some cases, national interests. However, our legal system has not yet created adequate incentives for individual companies to take the necessary - and sometimes costly - steps to reduce the likelihood of cybersecurity attacks.

To create an incentive for greater cybersecurity investments, the government could raise the costs of data breaches to such a high level that even large companies would go out of business if they suffered a large data breach or other attack. The government could accomplish this punitive goal by imposing astoundingly high fines on companies that suffered from cybersecurity incidents, or by allowing plaintiffs to recover large damages in class action lawsuits. However, this strategy would be short-sighted for a few reasons. First, even companies that invest heavily in cybersecurity cannot anticipate every future vector of attack. A hyper-regulatory environment for cybersecurity likely would threaten to penalize even the companies that attempted to make adequate investments in safeguards. Second, and more practically, it is politically unlikely that Congress or state legislatures would impose fines so high that would threaten to put companies out of business.

That is not to say that cybersecurity should be a regulation-free zone. Coercion can play an important and necessary role in cybersecurity law. However, coercive measures should encourage the most effective safeguards, and these measures should be fairly imposed. Most importantly, coercive cybersecurity measures should be used in conjunction with cooperative laws.

Cooperation is particularly important for cybersecurity law, as compared to other business laws, because companies' goals often - but not always - are aligned with those of the government. It would be absurd for a rational Chief Executive Officer to be entirely indifferent to a cyberattack that cripples the company's operations for weeks. For instance, it is safe to say that both the U.S. government and Sony Pictures ultimately want to prevent another such attack. It is in the national interests and Sony's corporate interests to avoid another high-profile embarrassment at the hands of another country. In contrast, corporate and government interests are not necessarily aligned for environmental law. The federal government's goal may be to reduce pollution and negative impacts on the environment, while an automaker's goal may be to efficiently produce cars and maximize value to shareholders. Accordingly, there is far more room for cooperation with cybersecurity than with other areas. When we discuss cybersecurity law, we should consider both cooperation and coercion, and determine the appropriate blend that maximizes effective cybersecurity protections for both the public and private sector.

The coercive and cooperative cybersecurity laws must be harmonious. For instance, if the government determines that medical devices are particularly vulnerable to attacks, it could take a multipronged approach. First, the government could provide companies with the technical guidance to adopt adequate safeguards for the devices, as the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") often does by developing many cybersecurity controls. 87 Second, the government could create tax incentives for device-makers to invest in the technology and staff necessary to implement the controls. Third, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") could refuse to approve new devices that have not incorporated these controls into new products. Fourth, the FDA could impose heavy fines on companies that do not maintain these safeguards and fix vulnerabilities in existing devices. The government need not choose only one of these options. Rather, all four approaches could achieve a common goal.

In short, a well-conceived legal framework will include incentives and penalties, and ensure that those policies achieve a common goal of improving cybersecurity. A legal system that consists entirely of coercion or entirely of cooperation likely will have limited success. The challenge for policymakers is to determine how to use a combination of penalties and incentives to most effectively encourage companies to adopt safeguards.

D. When Are We Securing?

By asking "when are we securing?," we must assess whether cybersecurity laws should focus on events that already have occurred, or if they should attempt to build resilience and defenses to prevent the attacks from occurring in the future.

To the greatest extent possible, cybersecurity law should be forward-looking. Cybersecurity law should prevent cybersecurity incidents from ever occurring, and if incidents do occur, cybersecurity law should help companies and government recover as quickly as possible and prevent future harmful events.

This element of the definition sounds obvious, but many of our laws are backward-looking. They require companies and regulators to litigate the minute details of incidents that already have occurred. In some cases, such retrospection may be valuable, as it can help companies and governments avoid repeating past mistakes. However, the ultimate focus always should be on preventing additional attacks and losses from occurring in the future.

The necessity of a forward-looking component of cybersecurity law is most apparent in any discussion of cyber-resilience, an increasing focus of cybersecurity professionals. 88 In 2013, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 21, which encouraged the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, such as the electric grid. 89 The Directive defines "resilience" as "the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions," and it states that "resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents." 90 The DHS has stated that resilience measures include business continuity plans, back-up power generators, and durable building materials. 91 This growing - and entirely justified - focus on resilience requires cybersecurity law to be forward-looking and consider not only how to prevent cybersecurity incidents from occurring (either through coercion or cooperation), but also how to recover from cybersecurity incidents once they have occurred.

This is not to say that cybersecurity laws should not address cybersecurity incidents that already have occurred. Companies that have been particularly negligent or reckless with their cybersecurity safeguards should expect to face consequences, such as regulatory investigations, fines, and lawsuits. Large fines and judgments could set an example for other companies and motivate them to invest in stronger cybersecurity safeguards. But the ultimate goal of penalties for past cybersecurity incidents should be deterrence of future events.

E. Why Are We Securing?

To fully define the scope of cybersecurity law, we must fully articulate our ultimate goals. The government should not impose regulations or make substantial investments until there is a more thorough understanding of why it is doing so.

The Sony Pictures attack caused great harm and embarrassment to individuals by allowing egregious privacy violations. The cyberattack also damaged Sony's business interests by exposing its confidential business information and significantly reducing the value of its movies. Finally, the incident threatened U.S. national security and further strained the U.S. government's relationship with North Korea. In short, the Sony Pictures attack (and others like it) highlight three distinct types of harm that cybersecurity law should seek to provide: (1) harm to individuals; (2) harm to business interests; and (3) harm to national security.

The first reason to enact cybersecurity laws is to prevent and mitigate harm to individuals. This harm often involves privacy violations, 92 such as the disclosure of the email messages of Sony executives and the personal information of Sony employees. Such disclosures are highly embarrassing and can have dramatic effects on individuals' lives. Courts and legislators often focus on the financial harm to individuals - such as the consequences of identity theft - caused by data breaches. Indeed, in some consumer lawsuits against companies that have experienced data breaches, courts have refused to find that the plaintiffs have Article: III standing unless the plaintiffs demonstrate that they have actually suffered identity theft as a result of the breach. 93 However, cybersecurity law - both statutes and court rulings - should attempt to prevent not only identity theft and other financial harm; cybersecurity law should address all potential harm to individuals caused by cybersecurity incidents. Daniel J. Solove and Danielle Keats Citron recently articulated this wide spectrum of harms by making a compelling case for courts to recognize the intangible harms of data breaches, such as increased anxiety among consumers:

The harm from an increased risk of identity theft is akin to the risk of contracting a chronic disease. The risk of a data breach is ongoing. Data breach notification letters explicitly inform people that there is a risk of identity theft. Credit monitoring services are offered for one or two years, signaling to plaintiffs an increased risk of theft for that time period. When a person has a reasonable belief that her credit identity is in jeopardy, she is rightly afraid that her creditworthiness is out of her hands. 94

The concern about anxiety-related harms to individuals could be seen after the 2015 data breach of Ashley Madison, a site that allowed users to seek extramarital affairs. 95 Despite the lack of concrete financial harm, the public disclosure of the names of Ashley Madison customers had far-reaching effects, including job resignations and suicides. 96

The second reason to enact cybersecurity laws is to prevent economic harm to companies. On average, a data breach costs a company approximately $ 4 million, and the cost per stolen record is approximately $ 158, according to a recent report by the Ponemon Institute for IBM. 97 According to the report, a U.S. company has a 26% chance of experiencing a breach within 24 months of at least 10,000 records. 98 On aggregate, cybersecurity incidents take a significant economic toll. A recent study estimated that the aggregate cost of data breaches will exceed $ 2 trillion in 2019. 99 Cybersecurity law should attempt to reduce these negative impacts both on individual companies and the economy as a whole.

Finally, cybersecurity law must incorporate the national security interests of the United States. In the Sony incident, these concerns came to the forefront when the United States attributed the attack to North Korea and imposed sanctions, at the time an unprecedented move after a cyberattack. Similarly, Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. election, via cyberattacks, threatened to fundamentally undercut the confidence and legitimacy of the U.S. democratic system. Even if the attacks target entirely private infrastructure - such as the email system of a political party - the consequences for the public and national security can be far-reaching.

Moreover, attacks on critical infrastructure - even if it is owned and operated by the private sector - can severely harm national security. President Obama recognized this danger in Presidential Policy Directive 21, writing of the need "to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure - including assets, networks, and systems - that are vital to public confidence and the Nation's safety, prosperity, and well-being." 100 To date, the United States has not suffered a devastating cyberattack on critical infrastructure that has caused significant physical damage, but serious critical infrastructure attacks have occurred in other countries. For instance, in 2007, Estonia, a small nation that is highly dependent on the Internet, suffered a massive economic slowdown after its cyber-infrastructure was hit with massive denial-of-service attacks. 101 In 2015, Ukraine suffered a cyberattack that caused blackouts for more than 80,000 people for several hours. 102 U.S. cyber officials have reported a rapid increase in the number of attacks on critical infrastructure, such as the industrial control systems of utilities. 103 Such attacks not only threaten economic and business interests; they can cause injuries, death, and national unrest. Accordingly, national security must be among the top considerations of cybersecurity law.

F. A Proposed Definition of "Cybersecurity Law"

Factoring in all of these considerations, we can develop a broad and flexible definition that provides the general parameters and scope of cybersecurity law. By providing this definition, this Article: does not intend to suggest that cybersecurity law should be limited to a particular set of policy prerogatives. Rather, this Article: identifies areas that should be considered when we develop and refine laws that address cybersecurity:

Cybersecurity law promotes the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks, through the use of forward-looking regulations and incentives, with the goal of protecting individual rights and privacy, economic interests, and national security.

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