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Implementation key to ensure effective deterrence through cohesion and unity

Monaghan 6/28/22

(Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Resetting NATO: The Sword and the Shield Redux “What we are looking for from NATO in this next phase is long-term planning for how it will contain Russia post Ukraine and provide resilience and reassurance to countries that cannot do that on their own. That could be permanent basing or it could be rapid readiness—being able to deploy quickly, instead of being stuck in a big base in one place. That is all up for development, which I think is incredibly important.” – Ben Wallace MP, UK Defence Secretary, May 19, 202268 NATO’s defense and deterrence reset will begin in Madrid when its leaders open the next chapter of their alliance with its eighth strategic concept. Like its predecessors, the concept will set the vision and basic principles that will guide NATO through this testing time.69 But the devil will be in the detail. As Britain’s defense secretary Ben Wallace stated recently, the finer points of NATO’s new strategy, such as whether it will rely on deterrence by reinforcement or through permanently forward-based forces, will require development by NATO’s military planners in the weeks and months after Madrid. What can they learn from the history of NATO’s strategic concepts? Plan against Russian “Maximum Intentions” The guidance that accompanied NATO’s first strategic concept advised that for defense planning purposes: “Precise Soviet intentions are not known and cannot be predicted with reliable accuracy. For military planning purposes, however, it is essential to consider maximum intentions and capabilities.”70 This is sound advice considering the inherent uncertainty in estimating adversary intentions and plans.71 It is also best practice for military planning.72 Moreover, in light of Russia’s current actions, NATO’s 1956 assessment of Soviet intentions and their implications are strikingly resonant today. Beyond the following highlights, the assessment is worth reading in full:73 Circumstances may develop, however, in which the Soviet leaders may harden their attitude and be prepared to take greater risks than theretofore. They have indulged in the use of threats, including the threat of war and even of nuclear attack, as blackmail to attain their ends. The Soviets are thus not likely to launch such [conventional] attacks, provided that the West maintains its defence commitments, such as the stationing of overseas troops in Western Europe, its firm purpose to defend itself, appropriate nuclear retaliatory strength and adequate conventional forces to ensure that local armed intervention by Soviet or satellite forces does not offer a prospect of easy success. However, the following possibilities of action . . . must be included among those requiring consideration: (a) General attacks against NATO. The USSR might launch general attacks with conventional weapons against NATO if the Soviet leaders estimated that the Alliance would be deterred from employing nuclear weapons . . . for example: - because of assumed Western reluctance to be the first to use nuclear weapons. - because [the West feared] it was more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear attack. - because of assumed Western division or demoralisation. (b) Local attacks against NATO. If the Soviets believe that NATO . . . were not able to defend itself against all types of limited aggression . . . [they] might initiate, instigate, support or condone such aggression. (c) Attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries. If . . . the Soviet leaders thought that a non-NATO country on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc would not or could not receive effective support of the Western powers, the Soviets might be tempted to use their preponderance in conventional forces either for armed intervention in the country in question or to exert pressure on it in order to influence it towards alignment with the Soviet camp.74 Revitalize the Sword and the Shield The second insight logically follows the first. The assessment of Soviet intentions set out above led to NATO adopting its strategy of the sword and the shield in its 1957 strategic concept—a combination of strategic nuclear forces to deter attack through the threat of massive retaliation, alongside the forward defense of NATO’s eastern front through the basing of significant forces as far east as possible.75 If NATO’s assessment of Russia today is anywhere close to that made by NATO’s planners of the Soviet Union then, the option of revitalizing this strategy must be on the table. Several questions for NATO defense planners flow from this insight. For example: What force posture—in terms of location, scale, and capabilities—is required to meet the basic aim of shield forces: “To make it credible to a potential aggressor that he will have to contend with an immediate and effective response by NATO?”76 What is the optimum balance between the sword and the shield, or deterrence by punishment versus denial?77 How can shield forces and NATO members in Eastern Europe best support NATO’s strategic nuclear forces? What is the utility of a revitalized “flexible response” or “graduated deterrence” doctrine for deterring a range of Russian aggression? What levels of response should this doctrine consist of?78 To what extent should out-of-area operations drive NATO defense planning?79 Modernize the Sword and the Shield The third insight builds on the second: if NATO revitalizes its sword and shield, both must meet the demands of the contemporary strategic and operational context. Further defense planning questions stem from the need to modernize NATO’s sword and shield. For example: Are NATO’s strategic nuclear forces resilient to threats from emerging technologies?80 What opportunities do emerging technologies present for enhancing the capability—and therefore deterrent effect—of shield forces?81 What is the contribution of “total defense” (through national and whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness) to the aim of deterring conventional and hybrid aggression by denial?82 How does assistance to non-NATO partner nations support deterrence?83 Final Word: Political Cohesion and Military Strength NATO is the world’s largest, most powerful, most successful, and preeminent military alliance of nations. One reason for its longevity is continuous adaptation. The main mechanism for this process has been the alliance’s most important document: its strategic concept. NATO’s new concept will guide its latest evolution as the alliance resets to deal with a situation it has never faced in its history: a full-scale land war in Europe. Yet resetting NATO’s defense and deterrence posture is not simply a military-strategic matter. It is above all a political one, requiring unity and solidarity. In facing this crucial task, the allies of NATO must recall one of the basic principles from its founding strategic concept, taken from the North Atlantic Treaty itself: “They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” Or, in the words of NATO secretary general Joseph Luns from 1976, which resonate today: “our efforts can only succeed if they are based on political cohesion and on military strength of a scale sufficient to resist military or political pressures. Then we shall be able to face with confidence the constant challenges which we must expect to be our lot over the months and years ahead.”84

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