Concept shifted AWAY from non-deterrence issues --- the alliance is focused on deterrence and defense and supporting Ukraine militarily
Gotkowska et al 7/5/22
(Justyna, graduated from University of Warsaw and RWTH Aachen University. Since 2008 she has been working at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), at the beginning as an expert in German foreign and security policy. Since 2013 she has coordinated an OSW research project on security and defence in Northern Europe, in 2020 renamed the Regional Security Programme.Jacek Tarociński“NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern flank?,” pg online @ //um-ef)
NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid summit defines Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security and does not rule out the possibility of an attack against any of the Allies. NATO intends to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, but there will be no revolutionary change in its military presence on the eastern flank. The compromise reached at the summit implies there will be limited reinforcements of the existing battlegroups and a pre-assignment of forces stationed primarily in Western Europe. Additionally, NATO will develop a new Force Model by increasing the pool of higher readiness forces fitted into defence planning and subordinated to SACEUR. This may prove to be a much more far-reaching decision for the future of the allied deterrence and defence posture but it remains to be seen how it will be implemented in practice. Nor will changes be seen in the US military presence on the eastern flank from rotational to permanent – with the minor exception of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post. Washington will, though, place a second rotational brigade in the Black Sea region. Overall, the security of the eastern flank will be strengthened in the coming years, but not to the extent expected by those NATO members bordering Russia. Redefining the threats and challenges The Madrid summit will above all be remembered for the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which defines what kind of organisation it is to become. Collective defence will remain its core mission, with three associated core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. The approach to these tasks is different than twelve years ago and linked with the need to strengthen individual and collective resilience and to enhance the technological edge which NATO has over its adversaries. The document also emphasises the importance of the transatlantic bond and NATO’s role as a forum for consultations and coordination – thus fulfilling various demands of the Allies. The strategic environment is defined very differently in the new Concept. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be ruled out. The Russian Federation is defined as the most significant direct threat to the security of NATO members, and its military build-up and military integration with Belarus are seen as a challenge to NATO security. This is a significant change from the 2010 Strategic Concept, which referred to NATO’s wish to develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The current document mentions neither the NATO-Russia Council nor the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, intended to be the basis for developing cooperation and strengthening stability in Europe in part through restrictions on the permanent stationing of substantial NATO combat forces in the new member states. There is no consensus within NATO to officially denounce the Founding Act, but there is agreement to avoid adherence to the constraints which arise from it due to the changed security situation. Some members still want to keep open the possibility of returning to the Act as a basis for future relations with Russia. Any change in NATO’s relationship with Moscow, however, will be dependent on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law. At present, the response to hostile Russian actions is to strengthen deterrence and defence as well as resilience. At the same time, NATO seeks stability and predictability and will want to maintain channels of communication to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency with Russia. Although Russia is defined as the main threat in the document, due to the 360-degree approach and indivisibility of allied security, NATO wants to take into account all threats coming from all directions. Therefore, terrorism is described as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO’s citizens and international peace. Conflicts and instability in Africa and the Middle East are also perceived as a challenge. For the first time in history, NATO’s Strategic Concept mentions China, whose ambitions and policies challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. It is worth noting that the strengthening of the strategic partnership between China and Russia and their attempts to undercut the rules-based international order is at odds with NATO’s interests. Other challenges mentioned in the document include cyber-attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies developed by adversaries, the erosion of arms control, the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and climate change. A remake of the deterrence and defence posture NATO’s three core tasks have been redefined by three factors: the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the move away from large-scale out-of-area operations sealed with the withdrawal from Afghanistan; and the rivalry with China. The priority is deterrence and defence, with the goal of denying any potential adversary opportunities for aggression. NATO is to develop forces, capabilities, plans and infrastructure to deter and defend, including for high-intensity warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. The new Strategic Concept places greater emphasis on the role of nuclear deterrence in NATO’s strategy than the 2010 document. With regard to conventional deterrence, however, there will be no revolutionary changes when it comes to the deployment of forces on NATO’s eastern flank and no shift from a forward presence to forward defence, which Poland and the Baltic states favoured and which would bring a significant increase in the allied presence. There are several reasons for this – the diagnosis of Russia’s relative military weakness and the conviction of some NATO members that Moscow is not able to take aggressive actions against NATO after the invasion of Ukraine.; the reluctance of the largest member states to engage significant forces in the region on a permanent basis, as they want to retain flexibility to operate in other theatres; and the lack of political will among some members for significant and rapid investments in a military build-up. For these reasons, a compromise was developed that consists of limited reinforcements of existing NATO battlegroups on the eastern flank and pre-assigned combat-ready forces there if necessary, (without stationing them there). In total, these combined forces will reach brigade-size units (3,000–5,000 troops) in the Baltic states and Romania. This is to be complemented by the prepositioning of ammunition and equipment, improved military mobility, investments in military infrastructure, intensified training and exercises, strengthened NATO Command and Force Structure, a faster decision-making process and a new generation of military plans. The lack of significant changes in the deployment of NATO forces will be offset by the implementation of the new NATO Force Model. This is briefly mentioned in the Madrid summit declaration, but without entering into detail.[1] According to Jens Stoltenberg, NATO will increase the size of its higher readiness forces from the current 40,000 within the NATO Response Force (NRF) to over 300,000 troops in the new Force Model.[2] These forces will be pre-assigned to specific NATO defence plans, will have specific tasks and areas of responsibility and will be subordinated to SACEUR. They will have an increased level of readiness of up to ten days (100,000 troops), around 10–30 days (200,000 troops) and up to 30–180 days (500,000 troops).[3] The plans for the new NATO Force Model are to be completed next year.[4] The first country to publicly declare units for the new Force Model was Germany. Berlin wants to assign 15,000 troops, including an armoured division with two brigades, 65 combat and transport aircraft, 20 warships and special forces units.[5] The UK has also announced the assignment of one brigade, an unspecified number of multi-role aircraft and warships, including an aircraft carrier.[6] While crisis management was an important task in the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO has far less ambition in this area now. It wants primarily to prevent conflicts and to engage less in managing them. It will continue to maintain capabilities to conduct crisis management operations, but will rather focus on supporting its partners in building their military and civilian crisis response capacity. Similarly, the 2022 Strategic Concept is much less focused on cooperative security, which was a top priority in 2010. NATO wanted then to concentrate on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, on an open-door policy and partnerships, including with Russia. Nowadays, NATO underlines the importance of enlargement policy, mainly in connection with the planned accession of Finland and Sweden. Before the Madrid summit, it was not entirely clear whether Turkey would lift its objections to them joining NATO. In the end, the three countries signed a trilateral memorandum on, among other issues, countering terrorism, which opened the way for both countries to be invited to join NATO, to sign the accession protocols and for NATO members to ratify those documents. The memorandum does not however spell out how long Turkey will take to ratify the process, and it retains the possibility to prolong or block it.[7] In 2022 the development of relations with partner countries is also important for NATO. Relations with the Western Balkan and Black Sea countries are considered as crucial – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine were explicitly mentioned. NATO will continue to support Ukraine cautiously, sticking to the consensus that sending military aid is the responsibility of member states and is coordinated outside NATO. Nonetheless members have agreed to an updated comprehensive assistance package to Ukraine that includes the supply of secure communications, fuel, medical assistance, protective equipment and portable anti-drone systems. In the long term, NATO also wants to support Ukraine in the transition from Soviet-era military equipment to modern Western weapons systems but with regard to technical support rather than arms supplies. In second place, the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Indo-Pacific region were mentioned in the Strategic Concept. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were invited to the NATO summit for the first time.