The new Strategic Concept breeds cohesion and refocuses on Russia and China. There is no mention of AI and biotech, and the approach to cyber and space are uncontroversial nods about “norms” not security cooperation.
William Alberque 6-30-2022. Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at the IISS. "The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control". The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/the-new-nato-strategic-concept-and-the-end-of-arms-control. DL
The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept significantly downgrades the focus on arms control as the principle tool for managing conflict and arms races in favour of risk reduction, conflict management and confidence-building measures – compared to the last Strategic Concept released back in 2010. This was to be expected in an era when the concept of negotiating with Russia on any topic remains out of bounds. The Russia and China policies expressed in the new Strategic Concept are also important and break with past policies in several key areas. The fact that the Strategic Concept mentions China at all is notable because NATO documents very rarely do so. And it uses Cold War-style language regarding Russia that is stronger than that which has been used in any of the post-Cold War strategic concepts (in 1991, 1999 or 2010).
More specifically, the new Strategic Concept describes Russia as a ‘direct threat’, which is the strongest use of language to describe Russia since 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept (the first to be issued publicly by NATO) hailed cooperation with the Soviet Union in the context of breakthroughs in arms control with the United States and Europe. However, quite presciently, it also said that potential future malign changes in Soviet forces were ‘a factor of which the Alliance has to take account’. The 2022 Strategic Concept lays out a new Russia policy, stating that ‘[t]he Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.’ Russia had been NATO’s strategic ‘partner’ in the previous Strategic Concept, and this is a clear statement that it has become a threat.
The 2022 Strategic Concept is also the first NATO strategic document to mention China. The 2019 London Summit Communiqué was the first mention of China in any NATO-agreed public statement since December 1965. The Strategic Concept states in paragraph 13 that China’s ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values’, which is consistent with language in the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué.
The Strategic Concept also discusses risk reduction and transparency as potentially useful ways to approach arms control with both Russia and China. Regarding Russia, it states that ‘NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation’ (par. 9). Therefore, NATO will ‘remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency. We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and the Russian Federation.’ Meanwhile, regarding China, it asserts that NATO will ‘remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests’.
The Strategic Concept discusses the problems facing the current instruments of the global arms-control and non-proliferation regime, but it does not offer much in the way of solutions. Paragraph 18 is very specific in describing the problems:
The erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability. The Russian Federation’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a threat to our security. Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes. Syria, North Korea and the Russian Federation, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction.
However, it is not until later in the document that the Allies describe their views about the future of arms control. The document turns first to strategic stability, falling back on the definition of arms control provided by the 1967 Harmel Report: deterrence and defence must come first and then, on that basis, arms control. It is interesting to note that this specific description of strategic stability does not specify that it applies only to Russia, and it was also not placed, as in previous documents, in the context of NATO-Russia or US-Russia arms control. Therefore, by inference, NATO’s approach to strategic stability can apply to China: ‘Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security’ (par. 32).
Then, in the same paragraph, the Strategic Concept continues by discussing the Alliance’s traditional approach to arms control (to which I am proud to have contributed when I was a staff member at NATO):
Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation strongly contribute to the Alliance’s objectives. Allies’ efforts on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation aim to reduce risk and enhance security, transparency, verification, and compliance[.]… We will make use of NATO as a platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts.
Paragraph 32 also contains new, unexpected language that engages with issues of crisis management and crisis prevention instead of arms control as a focus for practical work ahead:
We will pursue all elements of strategic risk reduction, including promoting confidence building and predictability through dialogue, increasing understanding, and establishing effective crisis management and prevention tools. These efforts will take the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies into account and complement the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.
The unexpected element here is that it signals a new concept of operations for NATO on how to pursue ‘arms control’ in an era when there are no recognisable arms-control agreements or proposals on the table. By focusing on action related to tools from the broader security toolbox, such as strategic risk reduction, dialogue, responsible behaviours and crisis management and prevention, NATO is opening the aperture quite wide on the ways to pursue the key aim of arms control – preventing unintentional conflict – while at the same time strengthening Allied deterrence and defence. The last sentence in the passage cited just above is key to understanding how little appetite NATO has for chasing grand ideas in arms control with Russia today and for the foreseeable future.
The section of the Strategic Concept discussing arms control ends by referencing the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There is no notable departure from the language used in previous strategic concepts and, importantly, there is no mention of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Nuclear Ban Treaty), which seems quite wise (given the Allies’ well-known opposition to the treaty and their persistent status as objectors):
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, and NATO remains strongly committed to its full implementation, including Article VI. NATO’s goal is to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons, consistent with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Lastly, the new Strategic Concept endorsed an approach towards arms control in outer space and cyberspace that focuses on responsible behaviour (par. 25), which is a nod to the ongoing work at the United Nations (inspired by the UK government) on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles:
We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space.
The 2022 Strategic Concept and its perspective on arms control is clearly in line with the new direction taken by NATO member countries beginning at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, held in the wake of the war launched by Russia against Ukraine in February of that year and its annexation of Crimea. Arms-control optimism is now gone; pessimism has set in; Russia is a threat; China is a challenge; and risk reduction and crisis prevention are the preferred tools, alongside deterrence and defence, for safeguarding the Alliance.