C --- Lack of INTENSE CONSULTATION
Adebahr et al ‘22
(Adebahr is a nonresident fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on foreign and security policy, in particular regarding Iran and the Persian Gulf, on European and transatlantic affairs, and on citizens’ engagement, Erik Brattberg was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations, Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe.“How the Transatlantic Relationship Has Evolved, One Year Into the Biden Administration,” pg online @ //um-ef)
As the EU develops its Strategic Compass and as NATO prepares for its summit in Madrid, intense consultation between the United States, key EU members states, and EU institutions is necessary in order to safeguard Europe’s defense architecture. More broadly, the compatibility of Turkey’s bilateral actions and its participation in NATO is at stake. While the current situation between Turkey and its partners and allies is fraught—to say nothing of Turkey’s huge domestic economic challenges and rising political uncertainty—perhaps close U.S. and European collaboration can find a path to the stronger, more stable relationship that would benefit all three. CORNELIUS ADBEHR: ON IRAN After four years of increasing transatlantic confrontation over Iran policy following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, expectations of a joint approach with the incoming Biden administration were high. The past twelve months have seen solid cooperation, if also underwhelming progress on the dossier. Initially, the concern was that European allies might not be prepared to accommodate a decisive U.S. return to the negotiating table, as announced by Biden on the campaign trail, even though they had been the ones keeping the agreement alive. This turned into frustration over the sluggish pace of the administration to make tangible offers for a reopening of the talks. The Islamic Republic has had its own role in stalling progress, from refusing to conclude the negotiations before a presidential election in June to slow-walking their resumption for five months after. Given the country’s advances in nuclear technology as well as in the stockpiling of highly enriched uranium, the urgency to restore the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime, is obvious. However, with both Iran and the United States constrained by domestic politics that do not reward compromise with an adversary, any agreement to relax U.S. sanctions in return for the reintroduction of stringent nuclear controls will have to be carefully calibrated. The continued focus on the nuclear file, though, belies a reality that is moving on. Israel has been establishing relations with Arab Gulf countries, and its new government is much less opposed to a nuclear accord than the previous one. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in turn, have begun to speak with Tehran directly about their security concerns, sensing that Washington is, slowly but surely, on its way out of the region. Meanwhile, Russia has gained an active security presence in the region via the Syrian theater while maintaining strong ties with Israel. Lastly, China remains a sought-after commercial partner that is gaining political clout as a result of America’s turn toward Asia. It is these shifting geopolitical sands that should make the focus on regional cooperation an imperative for the coming year. Ideally, such a move would follow a revival or renewal of the JCPOA, the “longer and stronger” deal that Washington aspires to. However, the chances of failure increased during 2021, so a push for some kind of security arrangement is critical, especially in case talks should falter. The alternative is another violent conflagration that benefits only a handful of cynics, and not the people in the region itself. ERIK BRATTBERG: ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY While Biden’s team has removed any doubt about U.S. commitment to NATO after Trump’s threats—and has gone out of its way to support the EU—the past year has also seen some serious transatlantic diplomatic rifts, notably over the haphazard U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August and the sudden announcement of the AUKUS security agreement in September. These two events reinforced European concerns about shifting U.S. strategic priorities to the Indo-Pacific and triggered complaints about the inadequacy of U.S. consultation with transatlantic partners. Biden administration officials have responded by stepping up diplomatic engagement with European capitals. But the recent geopolitical turbulence between Russia and Ukraine also painfully illustrates Europe’s lack of power and influence on the world stage, prompting more voices in Europe to call for investing in European sovereignty. (The Ukraine crisis is also a clear reminder that Europe remains completely dependent on Washington for its own security for the foreseeable future.)