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The nature of cyber operations undermines NATO credibility – impossible to ensure proportionality and discrimination.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

How likely is it that the requested cyber effect will be delivered? The answer to this question is not clear, in respect of either its preparation or its execution. This is not only because IT vulnerabilities are constantly discovered and patched; it is also because of the difficulty of assessing the effects and possible side-effects of an exploit when navigating and analysing complex IT infrastructures. In other words, reconnaissance is difficult in cyberspace, and so is the containment of effects. The Russian attempt to use ransomware aimed at disrupting critical Ukrainian infrastructure in 2017, for example, succeeded—but simultaneously encrypted computers globally, causing substantial economic damage to multinational businesses such as Maersk and FedEx.34 Collateral damage and unintended consequences are serious issues for NATO. The alliance takes pride in its adherence to the principles laid out in international law, such as proportionality and discrimination, as former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Jamie Shea has emphasized.35 Thus, disruptions of servers with huge negative implications for civilians, or the use of generic cyber tools that risk spreading their effects far and wide, are most likely not going to be considered for use in NATO operations. Indeed, one of the main challenges to US efforts to disrupt servers in working against ISIS was finding ways to ensure that civilians were not hit by their cyber effects.36 Another aspect of the difficulty of assessing the cyber effect relates to adversaries’ cyber defence efforts. For the more sophisticated players in cyberspace, cyber defence has developed into more than simply patching, clearing and updating systems. Cyber defence is also increasingly about following an intruder’s activity in one’s own network and creating ‘honeypots’ or ‘honeynets’; or about following data traffic back to the intruder’s network. In short, cyber defence is also about deception and active defence.37 This approach to cyber defence offers valuable insights into the intruder’s techniques and strategies; but the mere knowledge that deception is becoming a predominant defensive strategy also introduces doubts into the intruder’s assessment of possible effects. Consequently, as Russia is considered a peer competitor with considerable cyber-defensive capacities, one informant expressed scepticism about the extent to which smaller member states are confident in their ability to deliver a cyber effect when it is requested by NATO.38 This is especially the case if operational success depends on a specific effect. Even if a state has developed the appropriate exploit, it must also be able to verify that the effect is achieved and ensure that the effect is contained to minimize collateral damage. And even if a state is confident about its current ability to contain and verify an effect, it must also be confident that it can deliver, verify and contain the effect at the specific time in the future when CYOC requests it. The process of integration is further complicated by the fact that NATO must be willing to hand over to contributing states the responsibility for making battle damage assessments and collateral damage estimations. As the following subsection shows, states are generally unwilling to share classified information about exploits. Hence, the delegated NATO commander is unlikely to receive much useful information about how cyber effects are delivered before a decision about their deployment must be taken. As commanders would prefer to have control over the capabilities used, member-state cyber effects are likely choices of method only if alternative, conventional effects are unavailable.

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